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Executive Summary
Introduction
The fragmentation of the United Nations (UN) development system re-
quires aid coordination to bring about a more consistent whole. As the 
“lynchpin of coordination” at the country level, the system of Resident 
Coordinators (RCs) is a key driver of coherence for the operational activ-
ities of the UN for development.
With overall contributions totalling more than US$ 22 billion annually, 
the UN is one of the “big players” in development. Active across sectors 
and dealing with a multitude of development challenges, the UN mem-
ber states have created a complex UN development system that consists 
of 37 different funds, programmes and agencies with operational activ-
ities at the country level. All of the UN entities have countless achieve-
ments to show for their development success, yet at the same time it has 
become a commonplace that the UN development system collectively 
“punches below its weight”. Making the different components of the 
“UN puzzle” fit together is a substantial challenge for country-level aid 
coordination.
Currently, reforms are underway to make headway towards more coher-
ence. Because of a political impasse among member states in reaching 
consensus about changes at the global level, a pragmatic shift of attention 
towards the country- and operational levels can be observed, with a par-
ticular focus on the RC system. Tasked with strengthening the effective-
ness, efficiency and relevancy of the UN development system through 
coordinating assistance and activities of the UN entities in each of the 
130 partner countries, the RC normally is the UN’s highest-ranking of-
ficial on the ground. In that sense, it is not surprising that a functioning 
RC system has been deemed key for the overall functioning of the UN 
system at the country level. Moreover, in a majority of countries, the RC 
also has a leadership role, together with partner governments, in coordi-
nating all aid coming from the broader bilateral and multilateral donor 
community, giving it additional weight in the process.
Against this background, this study offers an in-depth examination and 
assessment of UN country-level aid coordination mechanisms revolving 
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around the RC system. It addresses the following question: How do the 
different entities of the UN that are operationally active in the field of 
development coordinate in order to ensure that their contribution is im-
plemented in an efficient, effective and meaningful way? The analysis 
and conclusions contained in the study are based on a thorough review 
of existing official reports, documents, literature, primary survey data 
collected by the UN Secretariat as well as more than 30 expert inter-
views.
Theoretical perspectives on aid coordination
As part of donor harmonisation, aid coordination has been highlighted in 
the discourse about aid- and development effectiveness emanating from 
the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness and subsequent fora. Albeit 
widely in use, it has remained a rather ambiguous concept, however, with 
its application varying among different actors. Partner-country owner-
ship, as also codified within the OECD-DAC principles, presents the 
main frame of reference within the UN context. On this basis, the study 
introduces the concept of a continuum of potential aid-coordination mod-
els with the choice of model hinging on a number of external and internal 
factors, such as country context, coordination capacity, group composi-
tion and organisational setup. Crucially, it is important that coordination 
does not become an end in itself but rather a means towards an improved 
engagement. Selecting an optimal level of coordination that maximises 
gains in terms of reduced overlap and inconsistencies and minimises the 
costs of coordination on the side of the UN and partner governments, 
however, faces particular measurement challenges.
The case for UN aid coordination
The second chapter explores the case for aid coordination, pointing to-
wards the historical evolution of its institutional context and the resulting 
state of affairs that is characterised by a polycentric and compartmental-
ised structure of the UN development system as major driving forces for 
the aid-coordination demand. As such, the history and evolution of the 
UN development system mirrors the global trend of entity proliferation 
and increasing fragmentation of their activities. Without an overarching 
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command structure to bring about coherence, individual UN funds, pro-
grammes and agencies are only loosely coupled together, which has re-
sulted in coordination becoming the dominant model of structuring UN 
entity relationships. By building on the system of specialised agencies 
that existed at the time of the UN’s foundation, and expanding the de-
velopment system further in an iterative fashion over time, UN member 
states have created an internal logic and structure that is not per se di-
rected towards coherence. Paradoxically, difficulties in overhauling ex-
isting structures have become a driving force for the creation of new 
ones, which result in further complexity. The longstanding response to 
the growing complexity within the UN development system has been a 
matching drive towards strengthened coordination.
The quest for systemic funding
Member-state funding practices have repeatedly been identified as a 
key factor in sustaining fragmentation of the UN development system. 
Recent years have seen a growing trend in earmarked contributions de-
signed to make the UN more pliable for bilateral interests and priorities, 
but the decentralised approach to resource mobilisation has at the same 
time stipulated substantial competition between individual UN agencies 
to the extent where incoherencies and overlap within the UN develop-
ment system can often be traced back to incoherent funding practices by 
major donors. In that sense, the need for aid coordination continues to be 
closely linked to donor funding practices.
Organisational setup of UN aid coordination
How is UN aid coordination organised? Chapter 3 presents the institu-
tional framework for UN aid coordination along the four dimensions of 
(a) governance, (b and c) global and country-level organisational setup, 
as well as (d) management. The analysis is based upon the assumption 
that the institutional setup that sets the boundaries for aid coordination 
has a significant effect on the functioning of these processes, and, ulti-
mately, its outcomes.
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Governing UN aid coordination
The governance dimension of UN aid coordination refers to the inter-
governmental realm serviced by diplomatic missions of the UN member 
states tasked with providing overall policy guidance to the UN devel-
opment system in general, and the interagency coordination machinery 
in particular. This realm is differentiated from interagency processes 
serviced by the representatives of the different agencies, funds and pro-
grammes aimed at coordinating their activities. Among the UN’s prin-
cipal organs, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) principally 
has the mandate to coordinate activities of the specialised agencies – and 
by extension also the funds and programmes that were established sub-
sequent to the UN Charter’s adoption – and relay respective recommen-
dations to the General Assembly. The fact that this mandate is, however, 
spelt out in relatively weak terms has become a fundamental challenge 
for the governance of the UN development system. Vested with a weak 
mandate, and lacking decisive action by member states, ECOSOC has 
experienced a gradual shift of its powers to the General Assembly and 
the executive boards of the specialised agencies and the funds and pro-
grammes. As a result, the system-wide intergovernmental coordination 
and oversight function is largely considered defunct, which is aggravated 
by the fact that member states often send incoherent messages to the UN 
development system through different channels.
Organisational setup for UN aid coordination at  
global level
Shifting to the implementation sphere, the Chief Executives Board for 
Coordination (CEB), and in particular the UN Development Group 
(UNDG), constitute the main instruments for interagency coordination 
and support to the RC system at the global level. UNDG is an inter-
locution mechanism between member states and the UN development 
system, whereby the former relay high-level policy guidance through the 
Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review (QCPR) process. Working 
at the level of agency headquarters, the global aid coordination machin-
ery is organised in a horizontal fashion, that is, across the boundaries of 
individual entities. Since the majority of institutions, systems and pro-
Country-level aid coordination at the UN – taking the Resident Coordinator system forward
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 5
cesses within the UN development system continue to be organised in 
a vertical manner under different executive boards, accountability lines 
are frequently at odds with a system-wide orientation, thus resulting in 
incompatibilities, ambiguities and clashes. The analysis identifies three 
broad sets of limitations to the effectiveness of UNDG in providing sup-
port to country-level aid coordination and the RC system:
 • First, the focussed purpose of the former “executive” UNDG in har-
monising and simplifying operations has been diluted through a sub-
stantial enlargement of the group;
 • Second, there are various limitations arising from UNDG’s member-
ship composition not being aligned with the CEB and UN develop-
ment system overall, which causes friction in cases where entities are 
affected by UNDG decisions, despite not having been represented;
 • Third, UNDG’s voluntary and consensus-based decision-making pro-
cesses frequently result in agreement at the level of least-common 
denominator only, thereby constraining the effectiveness of its oper-
ational guidance for country-level coordination and the RC system.
In summary, global aid-coordination structures appear complex and their 
capacity for forging compromise limited.
Organisational setup for UN aid coordination at the 
country level
It is on country-level aid coordination that expectations for substantial 
change seem to be focussed on the most. To an extent, this level’s or-
ganisational setup mirrors global structures. The functioning of the RC 
system, which member states established to be “owned by the UN devel-
opment system as a whole” and to function in a “participatory, collegial 
and accountable” way, with its management being “firmly anchored in 
the UNDP”, is strongly influenced by the relationship between RC and 
UNCT members. In particular, the latter principle is seen to be behind 
a contentious debate about the independence of the RC function, which 
essentially revolves around the question of whether RCs – in addition to 
their system-wide functions – also act as the Resident Representatives or 
the UNDP, or the other way around. Against this background, the study 
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identifies a number of challenges with the Management and Accounta-
bility System (MAS), which was introduced in 2008 to address this issue, 
and for the functioning of the RC system more broadly:
 • The relationship between RC and UNCT members is not based upon 
a binding and committal agreement, which demotes it to an informal 
association that lacks specificity and institutionalisation. In particu-
lar, the RC is not provided with any formal authority over the mem-
bers of the UNCT, nor any means to coordinate their programmes 
during the implementation phase.
 • Incentive structures and accountability lines of the UNCT mem-
bers continue to be unaligned with the RC system, implementation 
of agreed changes is lagging behind and the mutual responsibilities 
of RC and UNCT members under “collegial accountability” remain 
vague.
 • Persistent role conflicts arise from the existing arrangements, which 
only notionally separate the RC function from those of UNDP, and 
they are exacerbated by a lack of external awareness of the separation 
of roles. The linkage of the RC system to UNDP as a major source of 
support for the RC system may also have been weakened as a result 
of the firewall.
In conclusion, both global- as well as country-level aid coordination 
frameworks are complex, involving ambiguous roles and responsibilities, 
and are based on diffused accountability systems. As a result, the high 
hopes placed upon country-level aid coordination can only partially be 
met within the existing institutional and organisational setup.
UNDP management of the RC system
The principle of the RC system being “firmly anchored within the 
UNDP” has been one of much controversy in the past, because the func-
tioning of coordination crucially depends on how the coordinator’s role is 
perceived by peers. As the analysis has shown, the relationship between 
RC and UNCT members is principally based on voluntary commitment 
with very little formal authority. It has been found that, by and large, 
RCs rely on personal leadership and reputation in cultivating allegiance 
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within and outside the UNCT. Against this background, it would be seen 
as necessary for RC management to be situated in a neutral position in 
order to be – and be seen to be – devoid of any conflicting interests. 
UNDP’s ability to serve as manager of the RC system has repeatedly 
been called into question because of the existing long-running institu-
tional tensions arising from its two-tiered mandate, in both system-wide 
coordination and agency-specific operations. Responding to mounting 
criticism, a “functional firewall” was introduced in 2008 in an effort to 
isolate the two quintessential functions. With full implementation still 
wanting, conclusions on the adequacy of the firewall are still pending. 
Based on the analysis of conceptual proposals and historical practice, 
the study outlines four principal options for the positioning of the RC 
management function:
 • The “status-quo” option favours the full implementation of the func-
tional firewall and other technical measures to delineate UNDP and 
RC functions, while preserving UNDP’s operational role.
 • In line with the High-Level Panel proposal of 2006, the “system-wide 
coherence” option favours a continued anchoring of the RC manage-
ment within an operationally active UNDP, with its areas of activity 
reconfigured so as to avoid compromising the coordination role.
 • A third option would see the management of the RC system anchored 
in the UN Secretariat.
 • The independent institution option would call for the establishment of 
a new entity independent of the funds, programmes and agencies to 
manage the RC system.
Practice of country-level aid coordination through  
the RC
Chapter 4 analyses the “default model” of how the RC system functions 
on the basis of an appraisal of its historical legacy. Subsequent sections 
retrace the three dimensions of the RC system orientation: i) the internal, 
ii) the external and iii) the aid coordination with the partner country. The 
final section of the chapter reviews the current role and mandate of RCs 
at the country level.
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Evolution of the RC system
Today’s RC system is the product of a lengthy process of institutional 
evolution whose roots can be traced back to the early 1950s. Its devel-
opment was never straightforward or linear, but rather incremental and 
adaptive in response to external and internal impulses. Understanding the 
origins of the RC system offers important insights into current debates. 
Taking key events in the RC system evolution as yardsticks, five phases 
are identified:
 • 1950–1969 (“Laying the groundwork”): In 1950, a predecessor in-
stitution of the UNDP started the practice of dispatching field rep-
resentatives aimed at giving partner countries a stronger voice in aid 
allocation. ECOSOC accorded these representatives a first coordina-
tion mandate in 1960, and their authority was further boosted through 
a centralised command over systemic funding.
 • 1969–1977 (“Growing discontent with the UN development sys-
tem”): In 1969 the “Capacity Study” of the UN development system 
resulted in a strengthening of the UNDP Resident Representative as 
“leader of the team”. On the downside, the autonomy of the indi-
vidual entities equally started to grow, and UNDP’s own operational 
engagement meant its leadership role was no longer above reproach.
 • 1977–1997 (“A period of stagnation”): 1977 marks the birth of the RC 
system as a principally independent function. While this improved the 
clarity of the coordination mandate, the subsequent double-hatting of 
the RC and UNDP Resident Representative functions resulted in its 
practical limitation.
 • 1997–2006 (“A coming revival?”): The period saw a renewed inter-
est in reform of the UN development system, including of its mech-
anisms for aid coordination, benefitting from a favourable political 
climate. A 1997 reform package eventually led to the introduction of 
the “firewall” between the functions of UNDP and the RC.
 • 2006 – to date (“Delivering as One and rising expectations”): The call 
for an “empowered RC” to support the UN development system in 
“Delivering as One” (DaO) by the “High-Level Panel on system-wide 
coherence” in 2006 marks another key step in the RC system evolu-
tion, which led to the piloting of an amended DaO concept.
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Throughout the evolution of the RC function, the management issue has 
emerged as a crucial condition for an effective aid-coordination system 
at the country level. The authority of the RC vis-à-vis the members of the 
UN Country Team seems to have become more limited in its long-term 
perspective. Given that responsibilities seem to have expanded, however, 
the risk of a “capability-expectations gap” for the RC system is identi-
fied, whereby demands are frequently not matched with a corresponding 
capacity and authority.
Practice of UN aid coordination
On the basis of a convoluted mandate, RCs are fulfilling multifaceted 
roles in different contexts. Their main orientations are, first, towards part-
ner-country alignment; second, internally towards UN operational activ-
ities for development; and third, externally towards other donors. Under-
lying these three are additional duties, in particular advocacy for the UN 
system values, standards, principles and activities in a given country, and 
follow-up to global conferences and agreements.
Alignment with partner-country requirements
Aid relationships regularly contain an element of disparity between 
country demand and donor programming. The primacy of the host gov-
ernment can be seen as one of the guiding principles for all UN entities 
with operational activities for development, and it is ingrained in the op-
erational policies for the RC system. The inclusion of national authorities 
in UN planning and programming processes is frequently stressed. RCs 
have to rely on limited means in trying to ensure alignment of UNCT 
activities with partner-country requirements, in particular during project 
implementation. Since UN entities often have a stake in supporting part-
ner-country aid coordination directly, this sometimes leads to a percep-
tion of UN exemption from alignment processes, which is complicated 
by the fact that a number of UN member states do not consider the aid-ef-
fectiveness process that originated in the OECD-DAC working party on 
aid effectiveness to be of sufficient legitimacy.
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External aid coordination
In a majority of countries, RCs are co-chairing, together with host gov-
ernments, high-level aid-coordination fora for external development 
partners, which pay tribute to the special recognition and legitimacy, but 
also to the unique nature of the relationship that the UN and the RC – as 
its highest-ranking representative – traditionally enjoy in partner coun-
tries. In these situations, RCs aim for a coherent representation of the 
UN development system within the larger donor group, while ensuring 
the proper functioning of the aid-coordination forum. The guiding docu-
ments for the RC system reveal that UN internal coordination constitutes 
the clear priority, with external coordination taking place as a mere after-
thought. For RCs to fully carry out their role in external aid coordination, 
this would require an adequate level of support and capacity.
Internal aid coordination
Aid coordination internal to the UN development system is the prime 
responsibility of every RC, and the related mechanisms and processes 
are fairly more developed than those corresponding to the alignment with 
partner countries and external aid coordination. Notwithstanding signif-
icant variation in terms of the size and composition of UNCTs, the aver-
age number of UN entities active per country is around 15, which is often 
as large – or larger – than the number of external donors with a country 
presence. Covering a full project cycle, a number of instruments enable 
the RC to perform aid coordination, including the Common Country As-
sessment (CCA), the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 
and UNDAF’s results-reporting matrix are at the disposal of RCs. Evi-
dence suggests, however, that significant differences between “intended” 
and “realised” strategy are persistent, coupled with signs of duplication 
of processes resulting from the vertical organisation of the UN develop-
ment system.
Reasons why the role of the RCs in coordinating UNCT assistance is 
meeting challenges include incentive structures within individual agen-
cies that sometimes favour competition, distinction and visibility over 
cooperation; competition of agencies for turf and donor funding; and im-
balances within the composition of the UNCT. At the same time, there 
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are also obstacles on the side of partner governments, including potential 
gains to be made from playing individual UN entities off against each 
other, as well as a certain wariness towards bringing the UNCT closer 
together, as this could lead to stronger pressures through a “united front” 
of UN entities and beyond.
Shifting expectations? The evolving role and mandate 
for the RCs
RCs serve a multitude of needs and perform numerous roles only par-
tially reflected in their formal mandate. Stakeholder perspectives and the 
analysis of the existing operational guidance suggest that political dis-
agreement is strong among stakeholders about what is – and ought to 
be – the future, the role and mandate of the RC. Four major groupings of 
stakeholders can be differentiated: first, those that are directly affected by 
the RC system, in particular partner governments and involved UN en-
tities; second, those that are responsible for its functioning, in particular 
UN member states and the UNDP as manager of the system; third, those 
that collaborate with the RC system, such as humanitarian actors, and the 
UN Secretariat in peacekeeping; and finally, the RCs themselves. Long-
standing disagreements among these groupings have complicated nego-
tiations about fundamental policies for the RC system policy, and have 
contributed to their complexity and ambiguity as a necessary condition 
to accommodate competing perceptions. In several regards, there exists 
a discrepancy between the de jure mandate and the de facto role of RCs. 
Differing perceptions relate in particular to the following three areas:
 • Mandate: Traditionally, a predominantly technical approach towards 
the RC relationship with governments is foreseen, but with, for ex-
ample, human rights gaining more practical bearing, there have been 
calls to increase the normative and political role of RCs.
 • Coverage: Over time, the orientation of the RC system has moved 
“beyond development”, breaking down traditional UN silos in its 
course. Member states disagree in their assessments to what extent 
such evolution is welcome, and should be encouraged further.
 • Authority: There also exists a controversial debate about the appro-
priate relationship between the RC and UNCT members, with some 
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advocating for a transformation of the current collegial system to one 
relying on arbitration or direction.
 • Orientation: Regarding the appropriate balance between the internal 
and external aid-coordination functions of the RC mandate, there is a 
concern that the RC function is becoming too secluded and unrespon-
sive towards the broader donor grouping.
In order to move forward, it is suggested that expectations placed upon 
the RC system need to be brought in line (again) with its existing man-
date and capabilities.
Differentiation within the RC system
The UN development system has a presence in more than 130 countries 
worldwide, and it is often viewed as having one of the most heterogene-
ous country portfolios, which has necessitated a high degree of variation 
in terms of aid-coordination models applied. One of the drivers of this 
differentiation is the “new geography of global poverty”, which triggered 
a debate about the future size and composition of the UN presence. The 
claim towards UNCT inclusiveness, which faces criticism on grounds of 
high transaction costs but is often seen as the “politically correct route” 
towards aid coordination, is setting narrow limits for reform attempts. In 
contrast, a closer collaboration of those few “large-spending” entities is 
sometimes advocated as an alternative coordination model.
Different hats of the RC
Lacking an overarching strategy to guide the adaptation of the UN coun-
try-level presence and corresponding coordination mechanisms, practi-
cal differentiation within the UN development system evolves iteratively 
from the bottom-up through the RC system. Five different patterns are 
distinguishable. Apart from the “standard” or default case as well as those 
countries where there is no RC, the multifaceted system encompasses the 
“Delivering as One” coordination model, countries faced with a humani-
tarian crisis with relief efforts coordinated by a Humanitarian Coordina-
tor (HC), those in the context of a political and/or peacekeeping mission 
(“integrated mission”) under a (Deputy) Special Representative of the 
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Secretary-General (DSRSG), as well as the Joint Office model. The latter 
represents an interesting case aimed at rationalising the country presence 
of the UN development system by means of agency representation. A 
comparative analysis of the different adaptation patterns identifies coun-
try circumstances, the degree of RC authority and the partner countries’ 
approach towards UN internal aid coordination as key factors. Against 
this background, there could be ground for the argument that the UN de-
velopment system is currently lacking an RC system model to deal with 
the particular situation of middle-income countries facing globalisation 
challenges. Finally, in the case of small (island) states or middle-income 
countries with a relatively limited UNCT presence, the Joint Office mod-
el could be applied.
Conclusions
A number of broad conclusions and recommendations are presented in 
the final chapter focussing on the following four areas.
Role, mandate and functioning of the RC system
The study has shown that, as a result of the disaccord among member 
states about the role, functioning and future direction of the UN develop-
ment system, the essential elements of the RC system are in a constant 
state of flux. By assigning individual RCs with multiple functions, for 
example in humanitarian affairs or peacekeeping, the RC system is serv-
ing to integrate the traditional silos of the UN system, and in that sense 
could be seen to move UN aid coordination “beyond development”. This 
evolving conversion has not yet been formally acknowledged by member 
states however, which makes the RC system vulnerable to reproach and 
criticism. Against that background, it is recommended that member states 
forge a new consensus about the RC engagement, including in political 
and normative concerns, and address the institutional implications re-
garding the appropriate mechanism(s) to reconcile competing demands. 
The study further finds that there exists a certain mismatch between what 
the RC system is able to accomplish in terms of expectations placed upon 
it, which reflects the incongruity between the claim for horizontal coher-
ence and a vertically organised UN development system. Addressing this 
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mismatch would necessitate empowering the RC in terms of capacities 
as well as competencies, including through system-wide career paths, a 
matrix reporting arrangement for UNCT members to report to both the 
RC as well as their individual agency heads and further support to utilise 
RC leadership positions in external aid coordination.
Management of the RC system
One of the main findings coming out of the study is the pivotal role that 
the UNDP plays for the proper functioning of the RC system and UN 
country-level aid coordination more broadly. Unrivalled within the UN 
development system, the UNDP has a mandate for system-wide coordi-
nation and services, including the management of the RC system, which 
makes it the “primus inter pares” among the UN development entities. 
Exercising these function while continuing to be operationally active has 
its inherent challenges, however. In particular, perceived or actual con-
flicts of interest that arise from the current model are found to have a per-
sistently detrimental effect on the functioning of the RC system, which 
leads to the conclusion that, at some point, member states may have to 
re-examine the issue of where to anchor the management of the RC sys-
tem. Of the four principal alternatives that were identified in Chapter 3, 
the “system-wide coherence” option offers a clear, but also more politi-
cally challenging opportunity for grounding the RC system in the UNDP 
as a strong organisation that has both operational and system-wide func-
tions, albeit one that is not burdened by mandate overlap and conflicts 
with other entities of the UN development system. As a second-best but 
potentially more feasible option, member states should push for a full 
implementation of the functional firewall.
Decentralisation
The shape of the UN country presence as well as its further differentia-
tion are determined to a large extent by an agency-driven decision-mak-
ing process with little regard for the strategic orientations of the system 
as a whole. Giving RCs a stronger role in the composition of an adequate 
UN engagement at the country level would run counter to supply-driv-
en tendencies. The specific RC model to be applied in a given country 
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should furthermore be decided upon with due regard to cost-benefit con-
siderations, in accordance with the principle “as light as possible, and 
as heavy as necessary”. The Joint Office model has demonstrated ample 
potential for the rationalisation of the UN field presence and should be 
re-examined with a view towards its expansion. The study also suggests 
that the RC guidelines should allow more flexible approaches that neither 
describe universal inclusiveness requirements, nor focus on a pre-deter-
mined set of agencies only. Whereas coordination-intensive model might 
be justified in certain contexts, the requirements are much different in 
others, and it is therefore suggested that the “inclusiveness” principle 
that is underlying the RC system be reviewed and possibly replaced by 
a new “subsidiarity” norm of determining aid-coordination coverage in 
a flexible and country-based manner implemented through RC leader-
ship. Such a decentralisation of decision-making power to the RC finally 
should be accompanied by a parallel drive towards the harmonisation of 
business practices at the global level.
UN Aid coordination and division of labour
Recent years have seen a strong focus on aid coordination as a pragmatic 
and politically feasible way of maximising overall effectiveness and ef-
ficiency of the UN’s operational activities for development. Attempting 
to bring together – by means of country-level aid coordination through 
the RCs – the UN development system, which member states created in a 
complex and fragmented manner, is a challenging task, however. Theory 
suggests that marginal benefits of increased coordination bear transaction 
costs at the agency, inter-agency and system-wide levels. While it has 
been suggested elsewhere that returns on UN aid-coordination invest-
ments are still positive, that the current approach is reaching its limits is 
increasingly being acknowledged by member states. Against this back-
ground, the study suggests that structural reform at the global level aimed 
at establishing a clearer division of labour between different UN entities 
could effectively pre-empt at least part of today’s country-level coordina-
tion challenges. Given the close linkage of the fragmentation challenge 
to underlying funding practices by member states, it further concludes 
that in order to increase the likelihood of success, parallel efforts would 
have to be pursued to establish new and innovative mechanisms for fund-
ing the UN development system that potentially go “beyond aid”. The 
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reform impulses coming from the Sustainable Development Goals and 
the post-2015 debates might present suitable opportunities for member 
states to move towards a clearer division of labour.
Outlook
The future of the RC system is closely intertwined with that of the UN 
(development) system more broadly. In fact, the RC system has become a 
shadow battlefield of sorts where different stakeholder conceptions about 
the future of the UN development system are played out. Ultimately, 
however, the focus on aid coordination at the country level presents only 
part of the picture. It is only through concerted actions that encompass 
both the country-level operations and structural deficiencies at the global 
level that a true UN development “system” will be forged.
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1 Introduction 1
How do the different funds, programmes and agencies of the United Na-
tions that are working towards development collaborate so as to ensure that 
their contributions are implemented in an efficient, effective and meaningful 
way? This question is explored by focussing on the Resident Coordinators, 
who are (usually) the UN’s highest-ranking officials in 130 partner countries 
with a UN presence. Resident Coordinators are tasked with coordinating all 
assistance coming from the various funds, programmes and agencies that to-
gether form the United Nations development system.2 In addition, in a ma-
jority of countries, the RCs also have been given a leadership role, together 
with partner governments, to coordinate all aid coming from the broader 
donor community. Against the background of the ever growing complexity 
and fragmentation of today’s aid business – both within as well as outside 
the UN – there are major efforts underway to adapt and adjust the RC sys-
tem to current and emerging requirements. Increasingly, the RC has been 
recognised as “a key driver of system-wide coherence of operational activi-
ties for development” (UNSG 2012b, 25). In the words of one of the experts 
interviewed, “a functioning RC system is key for a functioning UN system.” 3
Within the UN context, the demand for aid coordination is driven by two 
factors: first, an internal drive towards improving the efficiency of the UN 
development system itself, and second, an external impulse originating from 
the aid-effectiveness discourse.
1 This study forms part of a broader research agenda at the German Development Institute / 
Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) on the perspectives for the reform of the 
United Nations development system. The research agenda is funded by the Bundesmin-
isterium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) / Federal Ministry 
for Economic Cooperation and Development of Germany. The author wishes to gratefully 
acknowledge this support. 
2 Different opinions exist about the specific composition of the “UN development sys-
tem”. For the purposes of this study, the term refers to those UN agencies, funds and 
programmes that engage in “operational activities for development”. Operational activ-
ities for development are carried out with the promotion of development as the primary 
objective and they cover both longer-term development activities as well as shorter-term 
humanitarian assistance (UNSG 2012a, 10). There are currently 37 UN entities that fit 
into this category. A complete list of them can be found in the Annex.
3 Personal interview conducted by the author, November 2012. 
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The paper deliberately places the focus on the UN’s country-level aid coor-
dination as opposed to corresponding processes at the regional or headquar-
ters level. It does so for two reasons: first, there is near universal agreement 
among development practitioners and scholars alike that taking the local 
context into account is the single most vital ingredient for development 
success. As of late, the aid/development-effectiveness paradigm reinforced 
this shift of focus from the global level, donor-driven agenda towards em-
phasising the crucial role of country ownership for development (Booth 
2011). Second, within UN circles and among member states, because of 
a political impasse, prospects for far-reaching reform proposals, which in-
clude the consolidation of agencies and mandates, are dim (but the merger 
of four entities to form UN Women in 2010 was a noteworthy exception). 
This situation has resulted in a pragmatic shift towards the country and op-
erational levels (Weinlich 2011b, 2011a). It is against this background that 
the RC system has seen a resurgence of interest in recent years, whereby it 
has become one of the primary targets for improvements and reform within 
the UN development system (UNSG 2011, 3). A reform measure that has 
been receiving particularly strong attention in current UN debates is the 
“Delivering as One” (DaO) pilot, which includes – as one of the four central 
elements – measures to strengthen the RC as the “One leader” of the UN 
development system at the country level. Against this background, the atten-
tion paid to the RC system is warranted.
Sixty years into the venture of development aid, the proliferation of donors 
and the fragmentation of aid across and within countries is a reality that 
recipient countries and donors, including the UN development system, in-
creasingly have to reckon with (Knack / Rahman 2008; OECD 2011a; WB 
2007). In that sense, the UN development system is an interesting case, 
as it is often seen as one multilateral actor with a high degree of intrinsic 
fragmentation. Indeed, the UN development system represents more of a 
loose network of individual entities that are held together by little more 
than a limited number of shared systems, a sense of commonality and a 
common basis within the UN system (Browne 2011, 111; Mueller 2010a, 
29; Weiss 2009, 72). Sustaining and increasing the efficiency, effectiveness 
and relevance of the UN’s development aid under these circumstances is an 
enormous challenge that offers many lessons that are relevant far beyond the 
UN’s boundaries. Indeed, virtually all donor organisations – bilateral, mul-
tilateral, even non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and others – as well 
as partner-country governments are struggling to adjust their aid models 
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and the aid relationship they are based on to the ever growing complexity of 
today’s aid business (Riddell 2007, 18 ff.).
While its influence and weight have diminished relative to other players in 
recent years, the UN development system still constitutes a ubiquitous com-
ponent of the multilateral aid architecture (Mueller 2010a, 2010b; Weinlich 
2011b; Riddell 2007; and others). Operational activities for development 
constitute and will continue to constitute the core of the UN’s business and, 
in terms of finances, accounts for the highest share of all UN activities. The 
majority of the US$ 15.5 billion for operational activities for development 
is being implemented in approximately 130 countries worldwide – in the 
standard case under the coordinating authority of an RC.
According to the UN Charter, the UN development system was created “to 
achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character.” The Charter, howev-
er, never contained any arrangements for an overarching authority to man-
age the differentiated institutional system of funds, programmes and other 
entities that were to evolve in the coming decades. This was a grave mishap, 
as each new agency was subsequently endowed with a separate mandate, 
governing board,4 and reporting and accountability lines. As a result, the UN 
development system has been described as a “machine” that has evolved 
into arguably “the most complex organization in the world” as early as 1969 
(UNDP 1969, iii). Accordingly, the scourges of the UN development system 
are duplication, fragmentation, competition and lack of overall guidance 
and management. It soon became evident that the lack of an authoritative 
force steering and managing the system as a whole constitutes the single 
most dominant factor determining its development to this day. Due to the 
lack of an overarching structure with the commanding authority necessary 
to bring about coherence, coercively influencing the direction of activities 
has never been a viable option. Instead, coordination has become the dom-
inant model of structuring the relationships among UN entities as well as 
externally. The RC system is conceptualised as the linchpin of this relation-
ship, charged with holding together the parts of the UN development system 
at the country level.
4 “Governing board” is the generic term used for the oversight body of the specialised 
agencies, recognising that their actual boards might carry a different label. The governing 
bodies of the funds and programmes that are under the control of the General Assembly 
and ECOSOC are normally referred to as “executive boards”. 
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The paper aims to provide an in-depth exploration of the role and function-
ing of the RC system for the benefit of the UN development system as a 
whole. By doing so, it aims to contribute to current debates within the UN 
context and among member states that aim for a repositioning and redefini-
tion of the RC system embedded in the UN development system operations 
at the country level. The UN’s field of activity ranges from least-developed 
to upper-middle-income countries; from states struggling with development 
challenges to those faced with fragility, political transition and humanitari-
an crises; and from small island state to the most populous countries in the 
world. This variety of country contexts has necessitated a high degree of 
variation within the application of the RC system, and depending on which 
criteria are applied, there are at least five diverging patterns distinguishable. 
Based on an in-depth analysis of the “standard” – or default – case of the 
RC system, as well as an assessment of its opportunities and limitations, the 
paper aims to develop some proposals on how current practices could be 
further improved.
The structure is as follows: After having introduced the topic and established 
the theoretical perspectives on aid coordination as well as the state of the lit-
erature, the case for UN aid coordination is established in Chapter 2. Chap-
ter 3 then presents both the global as well as country-level organisational 
setup for the RC system. A particular focus is put on the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), which has been given the responsibility 
of governing the RC system. An in-depth historical examination of how key 
categories of the RC system have evolved over time in response to structural 
changes within the UN development system provides the background for 
an assessment of the current “standard model” of the RC system in prac-
tice. Five variations of the model are identified in Chapter 5 and assessed 
in terms of their applicability in different country contexts, with a view on 
how to develop them further. The last chapter draws some key conclusions.
The paper draws from a variety of sources: first, a thorough desk review 
of the academic literature and the (vast) documentation from within the 
UN development system on country-level coordination has been undertak-
en. Second, through a compilation of data from the UN and other sources, 
a database was built on key characteristics of the RC system and the UN 
development system presence around the world and used for the analysis. 
Third, the study relied on primary data from three surveys of RCs, the UN 
agencies, funds and programmes as well as member states on aspects of the 
RC system that had been conducted by the UN Secretariat in the first half of 
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2012. Finally, these sources were complemented and triangulated through 
around 30 interviews and background discussions with a diverse group of 
stakeholders, including former and current Resident Coordinators, repre-
sentatives of UN member states, agencies and others (see Annex).
1.1 The state of research
Somewhat surprisingly, given its centrality, little academic literature exists 
about the RC system specifically. This is in contrast to the rather vast and 
growing stock of official reports and documents from within the UN de-
velopment system, as well as practitioners’ accounts on various aspects of 
the Resident Coordinator system that is available and has served as a prime 
source for this paper (UNDP 1969, 1996; UNSG 2011, 2012b; Longhurst 
2006; Messina 2007; Lindores 2012; and many more). More specific is the 
literature on the RC system proper, which mostly stems from UN encyclo-
paedias (e.g. Kulessa 1995; Volger 2006; Fomerand / Dijkzeul 2007). Addi-
tional literature that has been drawn upon can be broadly classified into the 
following three main branches.
First, a primary branch of literature is concerned with the properties and 
qualities of the UN as a system, as well as with its individual components. 
As the study of the RC system is closely interwoven with its host and guard-
ian, there are a limited number of monographs on UNDP (Klingebiel 1999; 
Murphy 2006; Browne 2011) as well as books with extended chapters on 
UNDP (Stokke 2009; also compare the overview in Leininger / Weinlich 
2012, 239). The literature becomes more extensive with higher levels of 
abstraction and has a clear tendency to focus on the political role of the 
United Nations, including on peacekeeping and the Security Council, at the 
expense of the UN development system. At the highest level of abstrac-
tion, there are numerous monographs providing a general overview about 
the UN system that proved useful for background information (e.g. Dicke 
/ Huefner 1987; Luck 2003; Krasno 2004; Gareis / Varwick 2005; Thakur / 
Weiss 2009; and in particular the seminar handbook by Daws / Weiss 2007). 
Perspectives to be found are numerous and UN reform features prominently 
(cf. e.g. Aufricht 1970; Huefner 1995; Center for UN Reform Education 
2008; among others). Coverage of UN reform issues with a particular focus 
on the UN development system seems to have proliferated significantly as 
a result of the most recent round of reform attempts that started with Kofi 
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Annan’s Agenda for Change in 1997 and culminated in the High-Level Pan-
el (HLP) on system-wide coherence in 2006 (e.g. Fomerand 2000; Bhatta 
2000; Gillinson 2003; Luck 2003; Fomerand 2003, 2004; Jolly et al. 2004; 
Messner et al. 2005; Fues / Klingebiel 2006; Vatterodt 2008; Freiesleben 
2008; Stokke 2009; Weiss 2010; FUNDS Project 2010; Fues 2010; Weinlich 
2011b, 2011a; Singer 2011; Browne / Weiss 2012; and others). A number of 
expressly historical accounts of the UN system also provided useful insights 
into the structure and evolution of the UN development system that shapes 
the demand for aid coordination (Yoder 1997; Jolly / Emmerij / Weiss 2009; 
Weiss 2009, etc.). Finally, where available, reports by insiders and experi-
enced senior UN personnel were used for triangulation purposes (Ryan / 
Morch 2005; Mueller 2006, 2010a). In particular, Chapter 2 on the context 
for UN aid coordination as well as Section 4.1 on the historical evolution of 
the RC system relied on these works.
A second strand of literature that this paper draws upon focusses on aid co-
ordination and related issues under the overall theme of “aid/development 
effectiveness”. While the aid/ development-effectiveness paradigm has a 
longer tradition – originating in particular from the landmark publication 
“Harmonizing Donor Practices for Effective Aid Delivery” (OECD 2003; 
cf. OECD 1988; Ross 1990; as well as Box 1 in the next section) – it has 
gained attention over the last decade in response to the conferences of Mon-
terrey (2002), Rome (2003), Paris (2005), Accra (2008) and Busan (2011), 
which placed a premium on the question of “how” aid was being delivered. 
Through this series of high-level events, donors committed to harmonise 
their operational policies, procedures, practices and institutions so as to 
minimise their impact on partner countries, as well as to deliver the aid they 
provide in a more efficient and effective manner. As is shown, in the con-
text of the UN, the aid-effectiveness debate has presented a major impulse 
for the increased focus on the RC system in recent years (compare also 
the comprehensive study by Vatterodt 2008). The negative consequences on 
recipient countries of the increasingly fragmented state of the international 
aid architecture (Riddell 2007; Reisen 2009) have generally been well doc-
umented (Torsvik 2005; Knack / Rahman 2008). Throughout the debate, 
aid coordination has been identified as one useful approach for addressing 
these negative externalities. As a result, the literature on aid coordination 
in its various facets is comprehensive (see e.g. Dante 2002; Ashoff 2004, 
2005; Bigsten 2006; Disch 2010; Obrovsky / Schlögl 2011; OECD 2011b; 
Bigsten / Tengstam 2012). At the same time, Bigsten (2006) concluded that 
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there is relatively “little systematic academic research on the implications 
of coordination, or the lack thereof, on aid effectiveness.” Drawing on the 
existing aid-effectiveness literature, this paper aims to contribute to the re-
search by offering an in-depth study of aid-coordination mechanisms within 
the UN development system, which constitutes one of the major channels of 
international development aid.
The third and final strand of literature deals with the functioning of inter-
national organisations (IOs) from a theoretical perspective. One common 
explanation analyses IOs in terms of their “agency” and how that distin-
guishes them from their “principal(s)” in their executive boards or other 
oversight bodies. While the recognition of the capacity for agency of inter-
national organisations such as the UN is a useful notion, solely focussing 
on “delegated authority”, which varies according to the extent of the con-
trol mechanisms at the disposal of the governing boards, tends to disregard 
other crucial factors (expertise, normative power, rational-legal authority, 
etc.) that bureaucracies can resort to. In particular, neo-functionalist and 
social-constructivist approaches (such as Haas 1958, 1990; Dijkzeul 1997a, 
1997b; Barnett / Finnemore 1999; Dijkzeul / Beigbeder 2002; Barnett / Fin-
nemore 2004; Bauer 2006; Weaver 2008; Venzke 2008; Biermann / Sieben-
hüner / Schreyögg 2009; Masciulli / Molchanov / Knight 2009; Reinalda 
2011; Bauer / Weinlich 2011; Ostereich 2012) deserve credit for broadening 
the picture on international bureaucracies to questions concerning the inter-
nal structure, governance and process dynamics taking place within them, 
thereby allowing for a more differential picture of how the UN develop-
ment system functions (an overview is contained in Liese / Weinlich 2006). 
For example, Walle (2005) provides a critical analysis of the bureaucratic 
nature of aid agencies, from which he draws the conclusion that donors 
should systematically follow a “lead donor” approach in their collaboration. 
On the basis of his analysis, Easterly (2002 and 2004) comes to a simi-
lar conclusion, making the case for a higher degree of decentralisation in 
the administration of aid. For the case of the UN development system, the 
latter theme is explored in this paper. The concept of “incentives” within 
international bureaucracies in an environment characterised by complexi-
ty also provides significant explanatory power for the workings of the UN 
development system (de Renzio et al. 2005; Messner / Faust 2007; Reisen 
2009). Haas’ (1990) concept of organisational learning within international 
bureaucracies provides a theoretical argument for explaining the incremen-
tal approach of reforms and evolution that is generally characteristic of the 
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UN development system. Finally, Natsios (2010) is useful in identifying 
some of the bureaucratic fallacies inherent in the objective of establishing 
control over complex aid system, as illustrated for the case of United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID).
The literature reviews have shown that there is currently a gap in UN schol-
arship relating to the RC system. In particular, the contribution of the RC 
system towards the broader functioning of the UN development system has 
not received much coverage. Given that the RC system constitutes one of 
the few system-wide instruments of the UN development “system”, this 
seems both unexpected and unwarranted. This paper attempts to contribute 
towards filling that gap.
1.2 Theoretical perspectives on aid coordination
Reducing the negative effects associated with the proliferation of donors as 
well as the increasing fragmentation of their respective activities can gen-
erally be seen as the main objective of aid coordination. Albeit widely in 
use, aid coordination remains a rather ambiguous concept that is applied 
differently by different actors (WB 2001, 3; Ashoff 2004). As part of do-
nor harmonisation efforts, the practice of aid coordination has also been 
highlighted in the discourse about aid- and development effectiveness, as 
laid out in the Paris Declaration (2005), Accra Agenda for Action (2008) 
and most recently in the Busan Outcome Document (2011). It is therefore 
necessary to discuss the concept from a theoretical perspective as well as to 
offer a definition for the context of the UN development system.
In its most general form, coordination is about giving a structure to the rela-
tionship between entities that are – by choice, chance or otherwise –linked 
together to different degrees. Different forms of the structured relationship 
are possible, with coordination generally referring to a harmonious “arrange-
ment”.5 Being part of a structured relationship by definition assumes at least 
two distinguishable entities with their own identities, processes and man-
dates, albeit these entities do not necessarily have to be on an equal level.
An example of a particular structured – and in that senses “coordinated” – 
relationship is the model of primus inter pares, which refers to a group of 
5 The latin root of the term is “ordinare”, meaning “to arrange” or “put in order”.
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equals, with one that has special authority that is based not on jurisdiction 
but mutual recognition (“first among equals”). Other models are numerous 
and range from group self-coordination to those that rely on an authoritative 
coordinating function that is external to the group. Coordination always en-
tails that, on the one hand, those participating remain distinguishable with 
their own structures and identities, but on the other hand that they have a 
principal openness to constraining and/or surrendering parts thereof for the 
sake of the common good. Aid coordination can have a formalised basis 
within an agreement of the participating entities, or it can have a more in-
formal character. Through a process of institutional assimilation, structured 
high-level aid-coordination groups that are mirrored at sector-levels have 
emerged as the most common form in which aid coordination is practiced in 
most developing countries. In the vast majority of countries, RCs are indeed 
interacting with – and functioning within the context of – an organisational 
setup based upon this aid-coordination group model (cf. Chapter 3).
Partner-country responsibility presents the main “frame of reference” for 
aid coordination (cf. Ashoff 2004, 2). This principle has been enshrined in 
the OECD Guiding Principles for Harmonizing Donor Procedures (OECD 
2003, 19; see Box 1) and has since then become one of the cornerstones of 
the aid-effectiveness paradigm in development thinking. As such, aid co-
ordination on the donor side necessarily always entails an element of “har-
monisation” of activities, policies and processes. In general, this relates to 
groups of donors that have operational activities within a country. For the 
UN development system, given its breakdown into numerous smaller enti-
ties, this results in the additional responsibility of internal aid coordination. 
It should also be noted that while donors – including from the UN develop-
ment system – make frequent reference to the necessity of country leader-
ship in aid-coordination processes, in a majority of cases, they continue to 
have a strong and influential role in aid coordination.
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Box 1: The OECD-DAC and the ground rules for aid coordination
The challenge of aid coordination is certainly not unique to the UN de-
velopment system. One stakeholder that has been very instrumental in 
the development of the concept of aid coordination is the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-op-
eration and Development (OECD). Since its establishment, the OECD-
DAC has served as the global clearinghouse for instituting standards, 
definitions and best practices. In its landmark publication on “Harmonis-
ing Donor Practices for Effective Aid Delivery” (OECD 20036), it estab-
lished nine guiding principles on the provision of aid, which can be seen 
as the nucleus of the aid-effectiveness paradigm that later culminated in 
the Paris Declaration. They are as follows:
1. Donors should support country-owned, country-led poverty reduction 
strategies [...] and base their programming on the needs and priorities 
identified in these.
2. Development assistance should be provided in ways that build, and do 
not inadvertently undermine, partner countries’ sustainable capacity 
[...]
3. Coordination of donor practices enhances the effectiveness of aid, 
particularly for aid-dependent countries. Aid coordination should, 
whenever possible, be led by partner governments.
4. Reliance on partner government systems [...] is likely to enhance 
achievement of sustainable improvements in government perfor-
mance.
5. Partner countries and donors have a shared interest in ensuring that 
public funds are used appropriately.
6. Donors should work closely with partner countries to address weak-
nesses in institutional capacity [...] that prevent reasonable assurance 
on use of cooperation resources.
7. [...] donors [...] should simplify and harmonise their own procedures 
to reduce the burden placed on partner countries.
6 Previous versions of the guiding principles were published in 1986 and 1992, already 
containing the principle of country leadership of aid coordination.
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8. No single approach is suitable for all countries [...]
9. Assistance to empower civil society and support [...] the private sector 
also can enhance improvements in partner government performance.
The emphasis on the recipient government’s prime responsibility for aid 
coordination – which in spirit is contained in all principles, but explicitly 
contained in particular in the third principle – has been highly influential 
and today has gained near universal recognition. The OECD has also 
advocated for a stronger promotion of decentralisation of staff, compe-
tencies and resources in the management of aid in favour of the local 
aid agency offices as a way of strengthening the voice and involvement 
of partner countries in the decision-making about aid allocation (OECD 
2003, 123). What has hindered the contribution of the OECD-DAC, how-
ever, is the perception of it being an institution dominated by donor rep-
resentatives and thus lacking legitimacy. As a result, the guiding princi-
ples have been criticised as being selective in focus. Knack and Rahman 
(Knack / Rahman 2008), for example, established the detrimental effects 
that hiring national staff (“poaching”) can have for nascent partner-coun-
try capacities; however, this is an area where guidelines are still wanting.
For the purpose of this paper, “aid coordination” is conceptualised as a cop-
ing strategy pursued by UN entities, donor organisations as well as part-
ner-country governments facing complex interdependencies. Accordingly, 
the definition is as follows:
Aid coordination comprises activities of two or more development part-
ners that are intended to arrange their policies, programs, procedures, and 
practices so as to maximize the effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of 
their aid resources through eliminating inconsistencies. (Adapted from 
WB 2001, 3)
From a practical perspective, aid agencies frequently distinguish between 
policy coordination – which generally takes place between headquarters, 
as the practice of coordinating the content of aid programmes – and oper-
ational coordination, which is focussed on practical aspects of project and 
programme implementation on the ground (WB 2001; Bigsten 2006). The 
RC system falls into the latter category.
Most crucially, coordination is not an end in itself but rather a means towards 
an end – in this case, that of more effective, efficient and relevant delivery 
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of aid. Through misguided incentives within the participating bureaucratic 
structures, objectives can become blurred and, as a result, coordination can 
at times become a goal in and of itself. Within the UN development sys-
tem context, the argument of the potentially unintended (by the principals) 
transformation of aid coordination has been most prominently advanced by 
Righter (Righter 1995). In a context such as that of the UN development 
system, which is characterised by fragmentation, duplication and overlap, 
coordination can therefore be seen as a necessary but insufficient condition 
for the effective delivery of aid.7 In other words, the success in aid coordi-
nation does not necessarily entail or signify good development results; vice 
versa, coordination efforts should not, per se, be regarded as positive.
The success (or failure) of aid-coordination efforts depends on factors both 
external as well as internal to the aid-coordination group. Internal factors 
are based on the characteristics of those entities or donors participating in 
the aid-coordination process, and include:
 • path dependencies and historical legacies as to how coordination is ap-
proached;
 • the composition of the group including its size and homogeneity;
 • the organisational structure, such as the specific type of leadership mod-
el and the degree of formalisation of working methods and relationships.
On the other hand, important external factors are:
 • the country context;
 • the degree of government leadership in aid-coordination processes; and
 • government capacity to perform aid coordination (cf. WB 2001, 6).
The following chapters look at these factors as key determinants of the UN’s 
country-level aid-coordination processes in greater detail.
Based on the theoretical discussion, this paper introduces an analytical mod-
el that rests upon two propositions. First, it is assumed that given the plu-
rality of country contexts, aid coordination is not a standardised approach 
with numerous varieties co-existing in parallel. These varieties could be 
further differentiated according to the residual degree of independence that 
the entities participating in the aid-coordination process retain. Second, a 
7 Bigsten / Tegstam (2012); Torsvik (2005); Knack / Rahman (2008).
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basic postulation from the literature is that with the size and complexity of 
the aid-coordination process come a requirement for protocol, formalisation 
and institutionalisation (Metcalfe 1994). Combining these two, we arrive at 
the following model (Figure 1).
The model illustrates that there are various approaches on how to structure 
relationships among aid agencies, ranging from “weaker” varieties (i.e. less 
formalised and less coercive in terms of curtailing agency independence) to 
“stronger” varieties (i.e. requiring higher levels of formalisation and entail-
ing a more “authoritative” direction of agencies). For example, having sim-
ple mechanisms for real-time or ex-post exchange of information without 
prior consultation, voluntary or authoritative reconciliation (of activities, 
mandates, allocations, programming, etc.) or external arbitration in general 
terms will tend to require fewer investments into the formalisation and in-
stitutionalisation of the relationship between entities; while at the same time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1:   A continuum of aid-coordination model
 
Source: own compilation, based on a model for inter-ministerial coordination 
 developed by Metcalfe (1994) 
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coherency and consistency payoffs will also be more limited. The different 
options can be seen to form a continuum of aid-coordination models, which 
necessarily implies that there are numerous cross- and intermediate models 
and current labels should be seen as illustrative only, acknowledging that 
these are anything but discernible. It is also important to point out that the 
model deliberately focusses on the management aspects of aid coordination, 
as they are the focus of this paper, thereby excluding other aspects from 
consideration.
The following implications can be derived from the model:
 • First, at least in principle, for each specific variety on the aid-coordina-
tion continuum applied in any given country, a myriad of other varieties 
with different mixes of coercion and formalisation are also conceivable. 
The benefit of having different aid-coordination models is the flexibili-
ty they allow for adaptation, contextualisation and customisation. With 
RCs being based in more than 130 countries worldwide, the UN pro-
vides ample possibilities for the application of a variety of aid-coordina-
tion models (cf. Chapter 5).
 • Second, the expected gains in consistency and coherency have to be seen 
in light of the investments they incur in terms of the formalisation and 
institutionalisation of aid relationships. Coordination is not a goal in it-
self, and investments in it have to add value in terms of consistency and 
coherency gains. This is in line with the argument by Ashoff (2004, 3): 
“Coordination means additional expense and can therefore be justified 
from a financial point of view only if the reduction in transaction costs 
achieved through coordination exceeds the expense of coordination.” In 
this sense, the model postulates that for different donor configurations 
and country contexts, an “optimal” level of coordination exists that, eco-
nomically speaking, maximises the gains from coordination through a 
reduction and/or elimination of overlap and inconsistencies, while at the 
same time minimising the costs of coordination on the side of participat-
ing UN agencies and the partner government.
 • Third, quantifying in particular the gains of aid coordination is virtually 
impossible in practice, as they relate mostly to factors that are either 
virtually impossible to express in monetary terms (i.e. “strengthened 
partner ownership”), or for which no counterfactual exists (i.e. “pro-
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gramming overlap avoided”).8 The methodological implication here, of 
course, is that the benefits of UN aid coordination and the RC system 
have to be explored by means of a qualitative approach.
Each of the perceivable aid-coordination models has a specific set of ad-
vantages and disadvantages. In general terms, more coercive or authorita-
tive models of structured relationships can lead to resistance by those being 
coordinated when the aid coordination is perceived as an infringement of 
their independence and autonomy. It thus follows that in situations where 
“lower” levels of aid coordination work, there is no need to move towards 
more coercive and/or institutionalised forms. On the other hand, if there are 
persistent challenges, the model would advocate that a higher and more in-
stitutionalised form of aid coordination might be in order. At the same time, 
it is a basic premise of economic theory that competition – under conditions 
of a “level playing field” and market conditions – can lead to beneficial 
outcomes (but see Messner / Faust (2007, 4) for the theoretical argument 
why these conditions often do not hold for the case of aid). Accordingly, the 
argument is that
[m]ore coordination and harmonization is not always better: there is an 
optimal level of cooperation and harmonization, which allows for better 
coherence while leaving space for a healthy level of diversity and emula-
tion. (Severino / Ray 2010, 18)
It thus follows that the choice of one model of structuring relationships 
among different entities over another depends on various factors. The – ac-
tual or perceived – ratio of investments in the institutionalisation and for-
malisation of coordination mechanisms to gains in consistency and coher-
ency (which assumingly translate into overall efficiency and effectiveness 
returns) is an obvious factor. At the same time, the value and unique con-
tribution of diversity among coordination subjects also has to be taken into 
account. There are no simple keys to the choice of aid-coordination model.
8 In an attempt to address this fundamental issue, ECOSOC in 2007 tasked the Secre-
tary-General to report annually on the “functioning of the resident coordinator system, 
including costs and benefits”. The results, which are contained in E/2008/60, E/2009/76, 
E/2010/53 and E/2011/86, corroborate that while estimations of the costs of the RC sys-
tem are possible, the benefits can only be assessed in qualitative terms, but not in mone-
tary terms. 
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2 Setting the context: the case for UN aid coordination
While this paper specifically examines the country-level mechanisms, aid 
coordination occurs within – and in fact is a response to – broader dynam-
ics of its institutional surroundings. What then is the state of affairs of the 
UN development system? Optimists often cite the fact that because overall 
financial contributions during the past 15 years – that is, the period from 
1996 to 2011 – have been growing at a faster rate than total official develop-
ment assistance (ODA), this serves as evidence that donor confidence in the 
abilities and performance of the UN entities continues to be strong (UNSG 
2012a). Others see a system “in crisis” as a result of fragmentation and the 
unhealthy competition of UN entities independently vying for projects and 
funding (Weinlich 2011a; Browne 2011; Mahn 2012a). In particular, since 
the failed attempt at a comprehensive system overhaul – articulated by the 
expert panel on system-wide coherence established by the Secretary-Gener-
al at the request of member states in 2006 – debates about the need for fun-
damental reform of the UN development system have become more vocal.
Taking these differing notions as a starting point, this chapter explores the 
case for UN aid coordination. The first section analyses the prevailing con-
ditions within the UN development system and offers a discussion of its 
main implication, which is the demand for aid coordination. The centrality 
of the funding mechanisms and practices have repeatedly been identified as 
a crucial aspect of the key challenges the UN development system is facing 
today (Weinlich 2011a; Mahn 2012a), as well as a potential remedy for their 
solution, and are therefore covered in a second section.
2.1 Fragmentation, complexity, overlap
Today’s aid architecture is characterised by what Severino and Ray have 
called “hypercollective action”, which refers to the simultaneous trends of 
proliferation in the number of development entities, as well as fragmen-
tation of their respective activities (Severino / Ray 2010; cf. OECD-DAC 
2011a, 2011b). This phenomenon is not unique to the UN development sys-
tem, but rather is something that all donor agencies are struggling with. Due 
to its historical evolution, however, the UN development system has been 
particularly struck by these challenges.
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When the UN was established in 1945, it was rather visionary that the Char-
ter already contained provisions “to achieve international co-operation in 
solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or human-
itarian character” (Art. 1). For practical and political reasons, instead of 
establishing a more unified entity, the existing specialised agencies (SAs) 
working in specific policy areas – such as the World Health Organization 
(WHO) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) – that existed at 
the time were brought into the UN development system through relationship 
agreements with ECOSOC. Faced with a situation that was the opposite of a 
“tabula rasa”, during the negotiations of the Charter, the participating states 
opted for a structure of the UN system that, in retrospect, might have been 
driven by feasibility concerns rather than strategic vision. Accordingly,
[t]he basic decision was […] that the relationship to be established be-
tween the organization and the agencies would be one of coordination and 
cooperation rather than one of centralization and direction.9
The history and evolution of the UN development system mirrors the global 
trends of entity proliferation and increasing fragmentation of their activi-
ties, which together result in complexity. Provisions for the establishment of 
new entities to address any new and upcoming challenge were built into the 
Charter. In parallel to the decolonialisation phase in the 1960s, this had the 
result that the number of specialised agencies, funds and programmes creat-
ed to address new challenges in fields such as industrialisation, population 
growth and the environment within the UN development system multiplied 
to the current 15 specialised agencies and approximately 20 programmes 
and funds. Since the 1990s, proliferation has mostly halted (but note the 
establishment of UN Women in 2010 through the merger of four smaller 
entities10); however, to an extent this also marks the onset of fragmentation 
of activities, in response to the funding practices of major contributors (see 
next chapter).
The complexity of the UN development system has been strongly influenced 
by a sectoral logic, whereby the different entities – as the “components” of 
the UN development system – each cover their specific issue areas. Aimed 
at increasingly close scientific and technical collaboration among states in 
9 Russell (1958), quoted in Fomerand / Dijkzeul (2007, 568). 
10 Historically, there is only one case of a specialised agency going out of existence, which 
was the International Refugee Organization, which existed between 1956 and 1952. It 
was eventually succeeded by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 
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the hope of eventual spill-over effects in international diplomacy, the con-
cept of “functionalism” provided the theoretical foundation for the initial 
setup. On the other hand, it has been argued that the resulting compart-
mentalisation of broad and interlinked challenges has served to “promote 
disaggregation rather than integration” (Righter 1995, 51). This “polycen-
trism” of the UN development system means in effect that there are various 
entities that are only loosely coupled together. The plethora of different 
labels given to the group of UN funds, programmes and specialised agen-
cies that are active in development – UN development system, “family” 
(e.g. Browne 2011), “machinery”, “network”, “labyrinth” (Righter 1995), 
etc. – already is a good indication that there is a certain uneasiness with the 
label UN development “system”.11 Indeed, the compartmentalized design 
of the UN development system, which came to be seen as its most funda-
mental structural challenge, is closely related to the obstacle of fragmen-
tation or the separation and the particularisation of efforts among different 
entities. Paradoxically, the difficulty in overhauling the existing structures 
has become a driving force for the creation of new ones, thereby resulting 
in further complexity. The absence of an overarching structure to manage 
the process of institutional development and adaptation to new priorities 
and fields of activity has had a particularly adverse effect. It has meant that 
the UN development system “expanded by leaps and bounds in an unco-
ordinated process of growth” (Fomerand 2003, iii). Over time, this process 
has resulted in a situation that Fomerand and Dijkzeul (2007, 561) describe 
as follows: “The UN ‘system’ is highly fragmented, rife with competition, 
and certainly not a harmonious cooperative whole in which the parts work 
towards a common purpose.”
Much has been written about the negative impact of such complexity for 
the effectiveness and efficiency of development cooperation (Easterly 2004; 
Riddell 2007; Messner / Faust 2007; Knack / Rahman 2008). In economic 
terms, the proliferation in the number of UN entities can lead to inefficien-
cies as economies of scale are not being realised (Knack / Rahman 2008). 
Fragmentation of activities, in turn, can have numerous direct and indirect 
negative effects. Direct costs include significantly higher transaction costs 
through the multiplication of staff as well as programming, monitoring and 
11 At the same time, there are plenty of examples where the label is being used and that do 
not accord to the same criteria either (e.g. the “international system”). In recognition of 
that fact, and since the label has become customary, it will be maintained in this paper.
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reporting requirements. Indirect costs arise through the duplication of efforts 
(i.e. when two or more entities are working towards similar goals without 
taking each other’s efforts into account, which thus results in inefficiencies) 
and mutual obstruction (efforts that cancel each other out) (Ashoff 2004, 2). 
Through agency competition and following donor incentives, some entities 
might also feel obligated to become active in sectors where they do have a 
comparative advantage (Knack / Rahman 2008, 12; Severino / Ray 2010, 
13). Negative externalities can be particularly severe for partner countries, 
which have to carry the burden of increasing demands on their thinly spread 
administrative capacities, including the poaching of qualified staff to work 
on donor projects. More generally, the diffusion of responsibilities for de-
velopment outcomes that are associated with numerous small-scale activi-
ties is also harmful (Knack / Rahman 2008, 2).
A recent survey of programme country governments confirmed several of 
these negative externalities. In particular, it found that almost 50 per cent 
of countries asked had strongly or somewhat agreed with the statement that 
there is a significant amount of duplication within the UN development sys-
tem (UNS 2012, 45), and a majority of respondents in low-income and low-
er-middle-income countries confirmed incidents of competition among UN 
agencies for donor funding (UNS 2012, 48). It thus comes as no surprise 
that one interviewee characterised the UN development system as being 
based on a “competitive organizational model”.12 Against this background, 
there seems to be ample justification for developing measures to cope with 
the complexity of the UN development system.
One of the potentially most far-reaching attempts at taking charge and insti-
tuting more direction within the UN development system was the creation 
of the senior-level post of Director-General for Development and Interna-
tional Economic Cooperation (DG Development) by the Secretary-General 
at the request of member states in the late 1970s (for details see Chapter 4). 
While the post existed for a number of years, it was never able to overcome 
the ingrained centrifugal forces.
The decentralised nature of the UN development system has also had im-
plications on the extent and composition of the UN field presence. In the 
1970s, member states had established that
12 Personal interviews conducted by the author, October 2012.
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[t]he creation of new field offices or the enlargement of existing ones 
should depend on the volume of programme operations in the particular 
country and should be undertaken with due regard to the need for econo-
my. (UNGA 1970)
Given the lack of an overarching mechanism such as the DG Development 
for most of the time, however, the decision to open a country office by any 
fund, programme or agency is normally determined in consultation with 
partner countries by the governing board of the fund, programme or agency 
without taking a larger systemic strategy into consideration. Internal politi-
cal economies of partner countries may have a part in this, as responsibility 
for decision-making predominantly falls to line ministries, which, as the 
direct counterparts of UN funds, programmes and agencies, may exhibit 
much less regard for overall strategic priorities and aid-effectiveness con-
siderations than ministries of finance and/or economic planning, which are 
normally charged with strategic considerations of UN engagement.
The longstanding response to the growing complexity within the UN de-
velopment system has been a matching drive towards strengthened coor-
dination. One of the reasons why aid coordination has been favoured over 
other measures is the general lack of political support for more structural 
changes, such as a reduction in the overall number of entities within the 
UN development system (Weinlich 2011b). The absence of a central steer-
ing mechanism led to a situation where numerous mid-level coordination 
centres with partial and more limited authority have emerged, which Fo-
merand and Dijkzeul (2007, 567) call the “coordination machinery”. As a 
result, instead of being centralised within the Secretariat or UNDP, coordi-
nation responsibilities within the UN development system are diffused at 
the decentralised level, but these responsibilities have frequently not been 
followed by an adequate transfer of authority and resources.
The focus on coordination is also not a new phenomenon. Robert McLaren 
(1980, 139) has referred to the second development decade of the 1970s as 
“the coordination decade”. However, a number of more recent assessments 
have come to the conclusion that in some areas – including field-level op-
erations, as evidenced by the independent evaluation of the “Delivering as 
One” pilot phase (Todd et al. 2012), and the reviews of the RC system (Lin-
dores 2012) and the UNDAF (Balogun 2012) – aid coordination as a cop-
ing strategy for complexity within the UN development system may have 
reached its limit; further strengthening of coordination activities may lead to 
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unintended outcomes, such as the proliferation of “coordinocrats”.13 While 
this may not be the majority view, one interviewee characterised aid-co-
ordination efforts as “neither ideal, nor effective” but as “all we (i.e. the 
UN) have”14 in the absence of more systemic reforms undertaken by UN 
member states.
In summary, it can be said that the different agencies, funds and programmes 
are structured according to an internal logic that is not directed towards 
coherence per se. Whereas some entities address different sectors of de-
velopment, such as health and environment, others are meant to respond to 
different client groups such as children or workers, and still others work on 
cross-sectoral subjects such as culture or industry. Making the entities of 
the “UN puzzle”, which are organised according to very different logics, 
“fit” together is a tremendous challenge for country-level aid coordination 
(ibid.).
2.2 The quest for systemic funding
Aid coordination is closely connected to the issue of current funding prac-
tices of the UN development system: if the current funding system were to 
undergo a fundamental structural transformation, the necessity for aid co-
ordination as a coping strategy for fragmentation services would be drasti-
cally reduced. Sally Fegan-Wyles, the former head of the UN Development 
Group Office (which subsequently changed its name to the Development 
Operations Coordination Office, DOCO) and a very knowledgeable re-
source on the UN development system, remarked in an interview once that 
“it will be difficult to achieve a 100 % ‘One UN’ under the current funding 
structure,” noting that 90 per cent of the current dysfunctions of the UN 
comes from the incoherent funding structure.15 Indeed, funding practices 
have been identified as one of the key drivers of UN development system 
fragmentation (Weinlich 2011b; Mahn 2012b; UNSG 2012a). In the words 
of Bruce Jenks (Jenks 2012, 24), who is a long-time UN staffer and expert 
on the state of the UN development system: “The international community 
gets the system it funds.”
13 JIU (1999, para. 14), quoted in Mueller (2010a, 33).
14 Personal interviews conducted by the author, December 2012.
15 Quoted in von Freiesleben (2008). 
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The UN development system was created in the second half of the 20th 
century as a reaction to emerging problems in member states. Overall, the 
system has a comprehensive, differentiated mandate, which often makes it 
difficult, if not impossible, to objectively determine the budget needed for 
implementation. The volume of contributions depends on a variety of fac-
tors; in addition to reports detailing needs in strategic plans presented by 
UN agencies, donors also have financial and domestic-policy restrictions. In 
the early days of the UN development system, funding was centralised. But 
it ultimately proved futile to monopolise the funding role.
Shortly following the establishment of UNDP, the specialised agencies, as 
well as UNDP itself, started to receive – and sought out in turn – addi-
tional earmarked funding from other sources outside the central funding 
mechanism. While the decentralised approach to resource mobilisation al-
lowed the UN entities to directly approach donors to get support for spe-
cific programmes, it has also generated competition between individual 
UN agencies. Mobilising resources is both an opportunity and a necessity 
for individual UN agencies, which also then have an incentive for pushing 
agency visibility and for setting themselves apart from the competition. This 
“fragmentation impulse” is at the base of many of the challenges the UN 
development system is facing today. Margret Joan Anstee, who was one of 
the authors of the so-called Capacity Study, which was the most influential 
reform proposal in the history of the UN development system, stated: “A 
main reason why the Capacity Study did not achieve its aims was that the 
power of the purse fell down and that, in the long run, was the downfall of 
UNDP.”16
For a number of years, there has been a growing trend in so-called ear-
marked or multi-bi funds, which are designed to make the UN more pliable 
for bilateral interests and priorities. While the share of core financing has 
been more or less steady for years, earmarked funding has skyrocketed. In 
2010 core financing made up only 30 per cent of the US$ 15.5 billion in total 
funding for operational activities for development (UNSG 2012a), which is 
a marked change from 15 years earlier, when the share was still 63 per cent. 
Now, nearly 90 per cent of earmarked funding is restrictively earmarked by 
individual donors for specific projects. This entails significant challenges for 
the UN development system, as costs increase whenever rules and deadlines 
(have to) differ from those set forth internally by UN agencies. Depending 
16 Margret Joan Anstee, quoted in Weiss (2009, 105).
Country-level aid coordination at the UN – taking the Resident Coordinator system forward
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 39
on their specific design, earmarked contributions therefore can significantly 
increase the amount of red tape. A report by the Secretary-General speaks of 
an “indirect” relation between earmarked funding and the mandates, guide-
lines, priorities and targets of the various governance boards at UN agencies 
“in the best case”. Earmarked funding regularly encourages UN agencies to 
expand their activities at the margins of their mandates, which undermines 
the oversight of the multilateral boards in the end (cf. Mahn 2012b).
The current funding structure can therefore be seen as a major driving force 
behind the fragmentation of the UN development system (Weinlich 2011a). 
While a solution for the challenge will have to be designed and implement-
ed at the central level, the centralisation of the resource mobilisation func-
tion at the country level through the RC as part of the “Delivering as One” 
initiative – thus mirroring the centralised funding position of UNDP in its 
early days of existence – has the potential to bring about positive change.
3 Organisational setup of UN aid coordination
How is UN aid coordination organised? As it has been shown in the previous 
section, the context for overall UN aid coordination – in terms of institutions, 
prevailing practices, and in particular, funding structures – is characterised 
by conditions that are certainly not favourable for the organisational setup 
and functioning of its mechanisms, processes and procedures. The purpose 
of this chapter is to provide an analysis of the former – the organisational 
setup for UN aid coordination – with the subsequent chapter then focussing 
on the analysis of actual practice. The analysis is based upon the assumption 
that institutions and the organisational setup have a significant effect upon 
– and influence the functioning of – processes that take place within their 
framework and the outcomes produced by them. Analysing them is crucial 
for understanding the RC system.
The chapter covers three broad dimensions of the organisational setup for 
UN aid coordination. It starts out by examining the “governance structure” 
at the highest level. For the purposes of this paper, the governance dimen-
sion refers to the intergovernmental realm serviced by diplomatic missions 
of the UN member states and tasked with providing overall policy guid-
ance – to the UN development system in general, and the inter-agency co-
ordination machinery in particular. This realm is differentiated from the in-
ter-agency sphere serviced by the representatives of the different agencies, 
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funds and programmes and aimed at coordinating their activities. UNDG, 
working at the level of agency headquarters, constitutes the main instrument 
for inter-agency coordination and support to the RC system at the global 
level, with the RC system essentially serving as the country-level equiva-
lent. The third and final section then covers the issue of the management of 
the RC system, which refers to the day-to-day administrative management 
of the RCs in areas such as personnel management, overall reporting and 
inter-agency support. The latter has been identified as a crucial element for 
the overall inner functioning of the RC system and is explored in greater 
detail in the subsequent chapter.
3.1 Governing UN aid coordination
Given the nature of the UN development system outlined in the previous 
chapter, member states would be called upon for clear direction. The main 
forum for them to do so is ECOSOC, which is one of the six main organs 
of the UN hovering at the top of the coordination machinery. ECOSOC has 
the mandate to
[c]o-ordinate the activities of the specialized agencies through consul-
tation with and recommendations to such agencies and through recom-
mendations to the General Assembly and to the members of the United 
Nations.17
This responsibility extends to the UN specialised agencies – including the 
two Bretton Woods institutions – its subsidiary functional commissions18 
plus the five regional commissions19 (UN Charter articles 60, 63 (2) and 
68). As all the UN funds and programmes were established subsequent to 
the adoption of the Charter, the document itself contains no specific pro-
17 UN Charter, Article 63(2). 
18 These are the Statistical Commission; Commission on Population and Development; 
Commission for Social Development; Commission on the Status of Women; Commission 
on Narcotic Drugs; Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice; Commission 
on Science and Technology for Development; Commission on Sustainable Development; 
and the United Nations Forum on Forests. In addition, there are a number of other tempo-
rary and standing subsidiary bodies. 
19 These are the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), Economic Commission for Eu-
rope (ECE), Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) and Economic and 
Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA).
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visions for them. However, that their activities should also be coordinat-
ed by ECOSOC is generally justified by extension of its coordinating role 
vis-à-vis the entities mentioned above, which is a rather weak basis. The 
exact nature and scope of ECOSOC’s coordination function was left for its 
membership to decide during the process (Rosenthal 2005, 14), which, for 
various historical and political reasons, member states have interpreted to be 
rather confined. Finally, there is a significant level of ambiguity contained 
in the UN Charter in terms of both ECOSOC’s role and also its relationship 
vis-à-vis the General Assembly (Rosenthal 2007, 138). Vested with such a 
weak – and, in many respects, not clearly defined – mandate, and lacking 
membership resolution, ECOSOC for decades has experienced a gradual 
shifting of its powers elsewhere,20 in particular:
 • to the General Assembly, where all (instead of just 54) members are 
represented;
 • to the specialised agencies, which early on concluded “relationship 
agreements” with ECOSOC that codified their autonomy based upon 
their establishment as international organisations endowed with legal 
personality, separate funding mechanisms (in most cases) and member-
ship, and separate governing bodies;
 • to the executive boards of the funds and programmes where major pow-
ers felt they had a stronger and more immediate influence over the direc-
tion of activities and funds than in ECOSOC.
To this day, member states, as well as stakeholders within the UN devel-
opment system more broadly, continue to struggle with the question of the 
most appropriate relationship and division of labour between ECOSOC, the 
Secretariat, UNDG, the governing boards of the funds, agencies and pro-
grammes, as well as DOCO and UNDP.21
As a result of this situation, ECOSOC today has largely been divested of its 
oversight and coordination function for the operational activities for devel-
opment (Rosenthal 2005; Messner et al. 2005; Rosenthal 2007; Weiss 2010) 
– less in theory, but even more so in practice. This leads to the conclusion 
that there is no central intergovernmental body within the United Nations 
20 For the alternative argument, namely that ECOSOC was never intended to constitute a 
strong coordination body, compare Rosenthal (2005, 10).
21 This issue was raised in a number of personal interviews conducted by the author with 
experts on the RC system (October–December 2012). 
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that is providing continuous authoritative guidance to the funds, agencies 
and programmes of the development system in terms of steering the divi-
sion of activities and mandating programme priorities and the allocation of 
funds. Rather, those decisions are taken at a decentralised level through the 
governing bodies of the individual entities. However, system-wide guidance 
by member states has frequently been hampered by incoherent messages 
sent by member states, stemming from the fact that different governing 
boards are frequently serviced and attended by representatives of differ-
ent ministries within one government that frequently do not speak with one 
voice.
Partly in an attempt to provide better – and better informed – guidance, 
member states committed themselves to conduct, in regular intervals, a sys-
tem-wide monitoring exercise of operational activities for development22 
that would complement their agency-specific oversight through the govern-
ing boards. This exercise, which was called the (triennial) “comprehensive 
policy review”23 process, has to date evolved into the main instrument for 
member states’ guidance and orientation to the UN development system, 
including, as a key element, the RC system.
One of the key functions where the question of governance plays out in 
practice is the appointment of new RCs. In line with the (original) spirit of 
the RC as an essentially operational instrument – and in light of its status as 
his/her designated representative – the right to appoint RCs is reserved by 
the Secretary-General. Selection of nominees from a roster of suitable can-
didates in turn is done through an “Inter-Agency Advisory Panel (IAAP)”, 
which is an inter-agency consensus and clearing mechanism. As the chair 
of UNDG, the UNDP Administrator recommends a candidate to the Secre-
tary-General based on the IAAP-prepared short-list. The Secretary-General 
then makes the final decision, taking into account qualifications, geograph-
ical representation and other factors. While there have been repeated at-
tempts to establish member state influence in the RC selection and appoint-
22 Cf. footnote 2. 
23 The comprehensive policy reviews have been established by member states through GA 
Res 31/197 – the same resolution that established the RC system proper. The mandate 
calls for ECOSOC to conduct “comprehensive policy reviews of operational activities 
throughout the UN system, bearing in mind the need for balance, compatibility and con-
formity with the priorities established by the GA for the system as a whole.” In 2007, it 
was decided to conduct the exercise every four years, leading to the new name Quadren-
nial Comprehensive Policy Review (QCPR). 
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ment process in the past, to date the Secretary-General has been able to 
resist such steps, which would risk politicising the function. Criticism of the 
process has also been forthcoming from the UN development system, fo-
cussing in particular on the role of the UNDP Administrator,24 which some 
perceive as having undue influence.
Member state governance processes – through ECOSOC, the governing 
boards of the funds, programmes and agencies as well as through instru-
ments such as the comprehensive policy review process – are in turn accom-
panied by inter-agency efforts at coordination within UNDG and other fora. 
It is this UN aid-coordination machinery, both at the global and country 
levels, that is addressed in the next two sections.
3.2 UN aid coordination at the global level
To address the challenges of fragmentation, incoherence and overlap, an 
elaborate institutional machinery for inter-agency aid coordination within 
the UN development system has evolved over time. Given its purpose of 
achieving more system-wide coherence, this machinery is organised in a 
horizontal fashion, that is, across the boundaries of individual entities. Fun-
damental challenges for this attempt arise from the fact that the majority 
of institutions, systems and processes are organised in a vertical manner, 
resting within the boundaries of each single entity (Mahn 2012b).
At the top of the machinery sits the highest-level and longest-standing 
board for inter-agency coordination within the UN system: the Chief Ex-
ecutives Board for Coordination. All specialised agencies, 11 funds and 
programmes, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are part of the CEB, which approves policy 
statements on behalf of the UN system as a whole. All stakeholders partic-
ipate in the decision-making process, which gives its decisions significant 
weight, but the downside is that the resulting decisions tend to be at the level 
of the least-common denominator. Its effectiveness is particularly limited by 
the fact that the Secretary-General, who heads the CEB, is vested with no 
24 In addition, it should be noted that the Secretary-General’s authority in appointing RCs 
does not extend to the authority to recall them once they have come under UNDP man-
agement. 
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authoritative power to enforce any policies or measures vis-à-vis the auton-
omous specialised agencies.
While the CEB has a mandate for UN system-wide coordination, which 
includes peacekeeping, norms, human rights and other areas, it is the UN 
Development Group – formally one of three committees25 under the CEB 
– that is the UN’s inter-agency body tasked with the mandate for aid coor-
dination of the UN’s operational activities for development (cf. Figure 2). 
UNDG has been specifically created as an interlocution mechanism within 
the UN development system for the reception of – and system-wide imple-
mentation of – high-level policy guidance received from member states, in 
particular through the comprehensive policy review process (ibid.). While 
UNDG was established as part of a larger Secretariat reform package as 
Kofi Annan took office as Secretary-General in 1997, it was only integrated 
into the CEB structure in 2008. Initially, this step led to some friction and 
overlap before an agreement on the appropriate division of labour between 
the three committees and appropriate support structures26 could be reached.
In recognition of UNDP’s role in managing the RC system on behalf of the 
entire system, the Administrator of UNDP has been granted the chairman-
ship of UNDG, reporting directly to the Secretary-General and the CEB. 
On a rotational basis, the head of agency of one of the specialised agencies 
serves as the UNDG vice chairman. A measure like this aims to give assur-
25 Besides the UNDG, the High-level Committee on Programme (HLCP) and the High-level 
Committee on Management (HLCM) report to the CEB as well. Whereas the UNDG ca-
ters for the coordination of operational activities at the country level, the HLCP promotes 
“global policy coherence, including the development of common policy tools, including 
toolkits, in addition to its work on global policy and programme issues and global public 
goods”; and the HLCM works for the “harmonization of business practices across the 
system, including general management issues, thus ensuring overall management coher-
ence from global to country level”; online: http://www.undg.org/index.cfm?P=591 (ac-
cessed 9 July 2012). 
26 The UNDG receives secretarial support from the Development Operations Coordination 
Office (DOCO). According to its self-description on the UNDG webpage, DOCO “focus-
es on supporting and strengthening the Resident Coordinator system with funding, policy 
guidance and training. DOCO advises RCs on how to make country programmes more 
efficient, effective and aligned with national priorities, and work to streamline coordina-
tion mechanisms.” The Office is also responsible for the administration of the UN Country 
Coordination Fund (UNCCF), which provides RCs with resources for coordination activ-
ities. Finally, it provides technical support to UNDG and the CEB in developing policies, 
guidelines procedures and decisions for more effective country-level operations; online: 
http://www.undg.org/index.cfm?P=15 (accessed 10 July 2012).
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ances and voice to the specialised agencies as a key stakeholder group with-
in UNDG. Table 1 contains a list of the current members of UNDG. It could 
be assumed that UNDG membership is synonymous with being part of the 
UN development system per the Secretariat’s definition; however, this is not 
the case, as some of the members of UNDG are not included in the defini-
tion of the Secretariat’s definition of the UN development system, and vice 
versa.27 Such complications are the reason for why the debate about the 
specific composition of the UN development system persists (Hill 2010, 1).
According to the UNDG Statement of Purpose approved during the course 
of its integration under the CEB, the group sees its primary objective in “co-
ordinate(ing) the approach to operational activities at the country level”28 
through work in three areas:
(i)  development of policies, guidelines and procedures to ensure the con-
tinued effectiveness of the UN system at country level;
(ii)  development of policies and procedures for the management of the RC 
system; and
(iii)  provision of guidance to the UNDP Administrator in his / her role as the 
manager of the RC system (ibid.)
UNDG works through various inter-agency working groups on specific is-
sues, including the “Resident Coordinator System Issues Working Group” 
chaired (currently) by the Deputy Director of UNAIDS as the Director of 
UNIDO’s New York office. Given a combined portfolio for operational ac-
tivities for development worth US$ 15.5 billion (2010), UNDG is the key 
element for UN aid coordination at the global level.
While UNDG had acquired a reputation for decisive action and deci-
sion-making, in particular during its early years, as of late its reputation has 
been tarnished through an imprudent approach towards its evolving pur-
pose, membership and working methods. Since 1997, UNDG has under-
27 Cf. footnote 2 as well as the list of agencies in the UN development system in the Annex. 
Whereas a number of specialised agencies as well as research and training institutions 
that have operational activities are not (yet) represented in UNDG, a number of entities 
from within the UN Secretariat, the regional economic commissions as well as some other 
entities not covered in the Secretariat’s definition of the UN development system are also 
members of UNDG. 
28 UNDG Statement of Purpose, approved by UNDG on 15 June 2008; online: http://www.
undg.org/docs/714/Lisa_Statement-of-purpose-UNDG---approved.doc.
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Table 1:   The 32 Members of the United Nations Development Group 
Funds and Programmes (9) 
United Nations 
Development 
Programme 
(UNDP) 
United Nations 
Human Settle-
ments Pro-
gramme (UN-
HABITAT) 
United Nations 
Women (UN 
WOMEN) 
United Nations 
Population 
Fund 
(UNFPA) 
World Food 
Programme 
(WFP) 
United Nations 
Children's 
Fund 
(UNICEF) 
United Nations 
Environment 
Programme 
(UNEP) 
United Nations 
Conference on 
Trade and 
Development 
(UNCTAD) 
United Nations 
High Commis-
sioner for 
Refugees 
(UNHCR) 
 
Specialised Agencies 
Food and Agri-
culture Organi-
zation of the 
United Nations 
(FAO) 
United Nations 
Educational, 
Scientific and 
Cultural 
Organization 
(UNESCO) 
International 
Fund for Agri-
cultural Devel-
opment 
(IFAD) 
United Nations 
World Tourism 
Organization 
(UNWTO) 
United Nations 
Industrial 
Development 
Organization 
(UNIDO) 
International 
Labour 
Organization 
(ILO) 
International 
Telecommuni-
cations Union 
(ITU) 
World 
Meteorological 
Organization 
(WMO) 
World Health 
Organization 
(WHO) 
 
UN Secretariat  
Office of the 
Special Advi-
sor on Africa 
(OSAA) 
United Nations 
Department of 
Public Infor-
mation (DPI) 
Special Repre-
sentative of the 
Secretary-
General for 
Children and 
Armed Con-
flict (SRSG-
CAC) 
Department of 
Economic and 
Social Affairs 
(DESA) 
Office of the 
High Repre-
sentative for 
the Least De-
veloped Coun-
tries, Land-
locked Devel-
oping Coun-
tries & Small 
Island Devel-
oping Coun-
tries 
(OHRLLS) 
United Nations 
Office on 
Drugs and 
Crime 
(UNODC) 
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continue table 1:   The 32 Members of the United Nations Development 
 Group 
Inter-agency and other 
Joint United 
Nations Pro-
gramme on 
HIV/AIDS 
(UNAIDS) 
Office of the 
High Commis-
sioner for 
Human Rights 
(OHCHR) 
Regional Com-
missions 
(ECA, ECE, 
ECLAC, 
ESCAP, 
ESCWA –
 rotating 
annually) 
United Nations 
Office for Proj-
ect Services 
(UNOPS) 
 
Observers 
World Bank Spokesman for 
the Secretary-
General 
Director, 
Office of the 
Deputy Secre-
tary-General 
Office for the 
Coordination 
of Humani-
tarian Affairs 
(OCHA) 
United Nations 
Fund for Inter-
national 
Partnerships 
(UNFIP) 
Source:   own compilation 
  
gone substantial changes. When the initial proposal of a merger of UNDP 
with UNICEF, UNFPA and WFP proved impossible, the concept of strong 
ties between the “big four” agencies with substantial operational activities 
– which together make up approximately 70 per cent of total funding for 
operational activities (cf. UNSG 2012a) – was transformed by installing the 
Executive Committee (ExCom) of UNDG. In addition to budget sizes and 
a clear focus on operations, the ExCom agencies share a number of other 
characteristics: being under the direct authority of the Secretary-General, 
having parallel executive board meetings and relatively little mandate over-
lap. This qualified them as being UNDG’s “core group” and frontrunners in 
simplifying and harmonising their approaches on the basis of a relatively 
compatible way of doing business.29
The executive approach towards global aid coordination, in concert with a 
limited but clear-cut mandate of developing coordination mechanisms, pro-
cesses and tools aimed at ensuring the complementarity of operations, were 
key factors for the relative success of UNDG, which only lasted a few years, 
29 The “harmonized approach to cash-transfers to implementing partners” or the establish-
ment of single UN Houses are only some examples of efforts by the ExCom agencies to 
streamline their operations. 
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however. In a par excellence case of “good intentions, bad outcomes“, other 
UN funds, programmes and agencies took notice and, stipulated by their 
donors, started applying for membership of UNDG, which quickly grew to 
the 32 entities and five observers (cf. Table 1) represented today.30 While this 
larger “sounding board” for aid coordination was initially welcomed, what 
proved far more damaging was the eventual creation31 of a second, more 
inclusive forum called the UNDG Advisory Group,32 which was tasked with 
preparing the grounds for major decisions, sidelining the ExCom in the pro-
cess. As a result, larger entities felt that UNDG had been “taken over” by 
the smaller entities (Lindores 2012, 9). One interviewee offered a similar 
assessment, noting that since the creation of the advisory board in 2008, 
“no important decision has been taken by UNDG since.” In a sense, UNDG 
seems to have fallen victim to its own success.
Following from the analysis, at least three limitations to the effectiveness of 
UNDG in providing support to country-level aid coordination and the RC 
system can be identified.
 • First, the clear and focussed purpose of the “executive” UNDG in har-
monising and simplifying the operational approaches of those (few) 
agencies with substantial operations has been diluted. With UNDG now 
having taken on the role of inter-agency policy-making organ within 
the UN development system – negotiating, for example, the standard 
terms of reference for RCs, but also terms for technical advice in mid-
dle-income countries – there is a clear incentive (and, from the perspec-
tive of any individual entity, furthermore a responsibility) for all funds, 
programmes and agencies of the UN development system to take part 
in the decision-making process. While the broadening of UNDG’s ob-
jectives responds to the need within the UN development system for an 
30 UNDG has never engaged in a strategic approach towards membership. Instead, member-
ship is being decided on an ad-hoc basis through an agency request (Browne 2011, 62). 
As a result, membership has grown from 25 to 32 entities during the period of 2008–2012. 
31 Compare letter by UNDP Administrator Kemal Dervis, 30 May 2008; online: http://www.
undg.org/docs/9526/UNDG_AG_compostion.pdf.
32 The members of the UNDG Advisory Group are FAO, ILO, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, 
UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIDO, UN Women, WFP and WHO (all non-rotational), as well as 
rotational members (one each from the three groups: 1) UNAIDS OHCHR, UN Women 
and UNODC; 2) DESA, UNEP, UNCTAD and UN-HABITAT; 3) five regional economic 
commissions).
Timo Mahn
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)50
all-encompassing approach, it has come at the cost of limiting effective 
functioning of (more limited) operational harmonisation.
 • Second, there are various limitations arising from UNDG’s membership 
composition. UNDG membership has experienced uncontrolled en-
largement due to the absence of clear membership criteria and a strate-
gic concept. While “most of the coordination tools were designed for a 
limited number of 3-5 agencies maximum,”33 the drive towards inclusive-
ness has been carried forward to the country level as well, and increased 
transaction costs as a result, as evidenced by the UNDAF or Common 
Country Assessment processes. On the other hand, UNDG membership 
is not aligned with the CEB and the UN development system definition, 
which causes further friction, as tensions arise in situations where UN 
entities are affected by UNDG decisions despite not having had their 
voices represented during the negotiation stage (a fact that, in particular, 
the humanitarian actors criticise, as they are closely connected to the 
UNDG policy realm).
 • Third, the voluntary and consensus-based decision-making process 
within UNDG frequently results in agreement being possible at the lev-
el of least-common denominators only. This ultimately constrains the 
effectiveness of UNDG’s operational guidance for country-level coor-
dination and the management of the RC system. Close aid coordina-
tion between the relatively congruent ExCom agencies has hinged on 
the Secretary-General’s authority, which is wanting in the case of the 
legally independent, specialised agencies and the “semi-independent” 
(UNSG 2012b, 26) funds and programmes with their separate governing 
bodies. The head of UNDG has no formal or other authority to enforce 
decisions, such as on the division of labour between member entities. 
This constraint becomes most tangible in the CEB, which ultimately and 
unanimously has to approve all UNDG policies.34 In the words of one 
interviewee, the current system is build on “nothing but good faith.35”
33 Personal interviews conducted by the author, December 2012.
34 Letter by the UNDP Administrator Kemal Dervis, dated 17 October 2007, to the heads 
of the specialised agencies FAO, ILO, UNESCO, UNIDO and WHO in response to their 
letter dated 5 October, 2007; online: http://www.undg.org/docs/8021/letter_from_KD_
in_response_to_SAs.pdf.
35 Personal interviews conducted by the author, September 2012.
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The coordination machinery carries on at the level of the individual UN 
entities as well. As independent international organisations, each of the 14 
specialised agencies has a governing board, as do most of the funds and 
programmes.36 It is these governing boards that the employees, country rep-
resentatives and agency directors are “vertically” accountable for, which is 
why instituting “system-wide”, and thus “horizontal”, processes and proce-
dures within the UN development system is so challenging.
Between the policy-focussed level of headquarters and the operational 
country level, there is also the regional level of the six “UNDG regional 
teams”.37 Chaired by UNDP regional directors, which is a position graded 
at the Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) level, the UNDG regional teams 
represent an intermediary organisational level – on the one hand they pro-
vide technical support to the RCs and the United Nations Country Teams, 
and on the other they are responsible for appraising RC and UNCT perfor-
mance. The existence of the regional level coordination structure responds 
largely to the institutional setup of the specialised agencies, which generally 
have had regional structures, whereas the funds and programmes generally 
have not. For historical reasons, definitions of regions have differed across 
entities, and the members of the regional teams are typically scattered across 
different countries.
The UNDG regional structure is therefore illustrative of the challenge with-
in the UN development system more generally: against the background of 
a long historical legacy and initially designed to suit the needs of individual 
entities, global aid-coordination mechanisms evolved within a landscape 
that is anything but a “tabula rasa”: it is characterised by special interests, 
historical structures and peculiar legacies that each have to be accommo-
dated. Moreover, and most crucially, there is no single authority to draw 
the numerous agencies, funds and programmes together, which makes par-
ticipation in coordination voluntary, and decision-making consensus-based. 
As a result, aid-coordination structures at the global level are complex and 
rather “weak”, in the sense that they preserve entity independence, instead 
36 One peculiarity is that UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and WFP conduct joint meetings of their 
boards. 
37 These are 1. eastern and southern Africa; 2. western-central Africa; 3. Arab states; 4. Asia 
and the Pacific; 5. Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States; and 6. Latin 
America and the Caribbean.
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of forging compromise. The next chapter analyses the organisational setup 
at the country level.
3.3 UN aid coordination at the country level
Given weak organisational structures at the global level, expectations and 
hopes among UN member states and stakeholders seem to be focussed on 
the country level. A statement by Gert Rosenthal, a former Under-Secre-
tary-General (USG) at the UN, and for many years the Permanent Repre-
sentative of Guatemala to the UN, may illustrate this point: “By far the most 
effective coordination that can take place between the different specialized 
agencies and programs in fact takes place at the country level” (Rosenthal 
2005, 38). All interviewees attested to this fact as well, noting, for example: 
“It is at the country-level where UN aid coordination is essential and makes 
a difference.”38 This chapter presents an overview and initial assessment of 
the structures.
To an extent, the organisational setup for UN aid coordination at the country 
level mirrors that at the global level. Along this line, the UNCT can be seen 
as UNDG’s counterpart at the country level (Vatterodt 2008, 15). As the 
inter-agency fora for aid coordination, the UNCTs are the “nuts and bolts” 
of each UN country-level presence. Each UNCT, as a group, encompasses 
all the entities of the UN system that carry out operational activities for 
development, emergency, recovery and transition in any given partner coun-
try. Representation within the UNCT meetings is generally at the level of 
the highest representatives of the agencies with a country office. The views 
of other so-called non-resident agencies are to be represented by the RC. 
UNCTs exist in more than 130 countries worldwide, covering all of the 180 
countries where there are UN programmes.39 Figure 3 below presents an 
overview of the country-level coordination framework.
As the designated representative of the Secretary-General, the RC has been 
determined to be the lead coordinator of the UNCT. The specifics of the 
relationship between the RC and the UNCT are therefore critically impor-
tant, as they determine the opportunities and limitations of the RC system. 
38 Personal interviews conducted by the author, October 2012.
39 Information retrieved from the UNDG webpage; online: http://www.undg.org/index. 
cfm?P=1257 (accessed 10 July 2012). 
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Through the Triennial / Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review (TCPR 
/ QCPR) resolutions, UN member states have been closely involved in set-
ting the parameters for the functioning of the RC system. Accordingly, the 
TCPR resolutions (UN 2008, 13) established the following three principles:
 • The RC system is to be owned by the UN development system as a 
whole.
 • Its functioning should be “participatory, collegial and accountable”.
 • With the management of the RC system to be firmly anchored in UNDP.
These principles were spelt out in further detail in two documents that are 
of fundamental importance for the functioning of the RC system. These are, 
first, the “Guidance Note” (UNDG 2009a) on RC and UNCT relations, and 
second, the “Management and Accountability System”40 (UNDG 2008b) for 
the RC system.
The Guidance Note represents a coordination agreement for the purpose of 
clarifying the working relations between the coordinator and the coordinat-
ed. According to the agreement, the Resident Coordinator should eventually 
have “an equal relationship with, and responsibility to, all UNCT mem-
ber agencies”; should be “empowered by clear recognition by each Agency 
of his / her role in strategically positioning the UN in each country”; and 
“be supported, as required, with access to agencies’ technical resources 
as agreed with the agencies Representatives balancing available resources 
with tasks to be performed.”
Given the centrality of the relationship between the RC and the UNCT for 
the functioning of aid coordination, the Guidance Note has only marginally 
contributed to resolving the conflicts and challenges that have been plaguing 
the RC system for a long time. In particular, the persistent challenges are:
 • Unbinding and noncommittal agreement: the Guidance Note is not a 
formal and authoritative agreement in the regular sense. What it con-
tains is an “overall long-term vision”, which demotes the relationship 
between the RC and the UNCT to a rather informal association that is 
lacking specificity and institutionalised form.
40 The full title is as follows: “Management and Accountability System of the UN Devel-
opment and Resident Coordinator System including the ‘functional firewall’ for the RC 
System” (UNDG 2008b). The Management and Accountability System is analysed in 
greater detail in the final section of this chapter. 
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 • Voluntary and informal relationship: the Guidance Note neither gives 
the RC any formal authority over the members of the UNCT, nor any 
means to coordinate their programmes during the implementation phase. 
It moreover remains vague about the mutual responsibilities. All UNCT 
members continue to have direct line accountability to their own organ-
isations, and only “collegial accountability” to the RC and rest of the 
UNCT for producing common results. The Guidance Note also gives as-
surances to all stakeholders that it will “not prejudice their relationship 
with their own agency” (UNDG 2009a, 4).
 • Unaligned incentive structure: the underlying incentive structure of the 
UN entities has not been aligned consistently with the new arrangements 
introduced through the MAS. The management system is overly com-
plex and accountability diffused. Fundamentally, the line accountability 
of UNCT members continues to be vertically structured (i.e. to their in-
dividual agencies) instead of being accountable for their performance to 
the RC. With the MAS, all agencies in principle agreed that they would 
recognise the RC’s role in the job description of their agency heads, but 
implementation of this proposition has been lacking (Lindores 2012).
 • Role conflicts: the complex structure of the MAS implies role-conflicts 
for the RCs, who continue to be UNDP staff. Resident Representatives 
(RRs) who serve as RCs continue to be held accountable for the results 
of UNDP as a whole in their personal performance appraisals, alongside 
being accountable to the regional UNDG team for their performance as 
RCs. The RCs themselves are funded from UNDP core contributions. As 
a result, the fundamental conflict persists of a coordination function “be-
longing to all” but being managed by one entity. Efforts are underway 
to broaden the pool of applicants for RC positions to candidates outside 
UNDP. In principle, applicants for an RC position can come from all UN 
agencies as well as from outside of the UN, but in reality the majority 
of them continue to be from UNDP. While these efforts are a practical 
measure to turn the claim that the RC system belongs to the system as a 
whole into reality, this may also lead to new dimensions of role conflicts 
as a result.
 • Lack of external awareness of separation of roles: Being the result of 
a compromise internal to the UN, there is also little to no understand-
ing among host countries or within the country donor group about the 
separation of functions between the Resident Representative function 
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of UNDP and the internal division of labour within the UNPD. Without 
recognition, however, perceptions of conflicting interests persevere. RCs 
continue to serve as the Resident Representatives of UNDP, and in that 
function continue to be called upon to deal with internal UNDP affairs 
(UNSG 2011, 16). The situation is further complicated by the fact that 
no separate diplomatic accreditation of the RC exists with the host gov-
ernment.
 • Limiting agency support from UNDP: the firewall may also have weak-
ened the RC system by limiting the linkage to UNDP, which consti-
tutes a major source of support for the RC system (UNSG 2011, 19). As 
manager of the RC system, UNDP provided US$ 92 million of its core 
budget funds as operational support to the RCs / RRs (UNSG 2008b).
In conclusion, both global as well as country-level aid-coordination frame-
works can be characterised as complex, involving ambiguous roles and 
responsibilities, and diffused accountability. At the same time, it becomes 
clear that the challenges inherent in the RC system management as well as 
within the relationship between the RC and the UNCT at the country level 
have clearly been recognised by UNDP, UNDG and member states alike. 
UNDG has made comprehensive attempts towards formalising the RC-
UNCT relationship, as well as towards ridding the governance structure of 
the RC system of its inherent conflicts of interest. However, given the high 
hopes placed upon country-level aid coordination, the existing institutional 
and organisational setup can only partially meet these expectations.
3.4 Primus inter pares? UNDP and the management of the 
RC system
[T]he procedures and processes proposed...could only be implemented if 
(among other things) the development activities of the various organiza-
tions of the United Nations system are coordinated to the maximum extent 
possible by a central body, through which the greatest amount possible 
of technical cooperation funds made available should be channeled....It 
should be accepted that UNDP provides the best foundation on which a 
coordinating organization could be based. – Jackson Report (UNDP 1969, 
II, 148 ff.)
A crucial aspect of the relationship between the coordinator and those being 
coordinated is how the coordinator’s leadership role is being perceived by 
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them. In the case of the RC and UNCT members, this is particularly relevant 
since, as it has been shown, their relationship is principally based on the 
voluntary commitment towards coordination by the heads of the UN entities 
within the UNCT. Most interviewees stressed that without formal authority, 
RCs generally have to resort to personal leadership and the reputational 
clout of the RC position in cultivating – or in the hopes of cultivating – rec-
ognition and allegiance within the UNCT and outside.41 Giving this context, 
it would be seen as necessary for the management of the aid-coordination 
function, including the RC system, to be situated in a neutral position in 
order to be – and be seen to be – devoid of any conflicting interests.
Per UN member state guidance, the Administrator of UNDP is responsible 
for the management of the RC system and the RC system “is firmly an-
chored within the UNDP” (UN 2008, 14). That each RC is therefore em-
ployed through a contract with UNDP is one of the practical implications of 
this mandate. However, in terms of overall financial contributions, UNDP 
is also the single-largest agency within the UN development system, ac-
counting for nearly one-quarter of all funding for operational activities for 
development, and one-third if humanitarian assistance is excluded (UNSG 
2012a, 16, 23). Fulfilling both its system-wide coordination function, as 
well as tending to its agency interests as part of the UN development sys-
tem, is a tightrope walk (Leininger / Weinlich 2012, 239). Against this back-
ground, as will be shown, there are thus questions about UNDP’s ability to 
adequately serve its role as the manager of the RC system, which, by anoth-
er of its fundamental principles, should be “owned by the United Nations 
development system as a whole.”42 The issue has also been picked up by the 
Joint Inspection Unit (JIU), which, as an independent oversight body of the 
UN system, observed: “The dual role of UNDP as broker in operational 
activities and coordinator / advocate of the United Nations family has the 
potential for conflict of interests” (JIU 2009, 12). The existence of these 
two conflicting roles of UNDP have long been recognised (cf. Klingebiel 
1999, 132; Browne 2011; Weinlich 2011a, 34), including by Mark Malloch 
Brown, who, as a former Administrator of UNDP, confirmed “long-running 
institutional tensions between UNDP’s role as co-ordinator of the UN sys-
tem and as development agency in its own right.”43
41 Personal interviews conducted by the author, October 2012. 
42 UNGA (2008b); Resolution 62/208.
43 Quoted in Browne (2011, back cover).
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In their essence, then, ongoing debates about the management of the RC 
system principally relate to the question of whether the RC – in addition 
to his system-wide functions – is also acting as the UNDP Resident Repre-
sentative, or the other way around. Debates about this sensitive matter tend-
ed to be characterised by fundamentally opposed perspectives on whether 
neutrality could be maintained continuously, questioning in particular the 
system-wide orientation and allegiance of RCs as UNDP employees (“RC 
system as a UNDP puppet”44). At the same time, several interviewees also 
attested to the fact that, in practice, most RCs, aware of the heightened at-
tention surrounding the matter, have generally been taking great pains – 
such as moving into office facilities separate from UNDP’s, etc. – so as to 
not compromise their status in any way. Several interviewees also suggested 
that the debate might also have a political economy aspect to it, essentially 
serving as an obstruction and an “excuse for the unwilling not to be coor-
dinated.”45
From an historical perspective, however, UNDP’s management of the RC 
system has not always been contested to this extent. During its early years, 
UNDP served the role of central funding agency and service provider for 
the UN development system (Leininger / Weinlich 2012, 233; Browne 2011, 
61; cf. also Section 4.1). Moreover, for more than two decades of its ear-
ly existence, UNDP not only funded and coordinated the UN development 
system, but also led the evaluation function of the aid programmes of its 
peers in the funds and programmes (Yoder 1997, 147). Over time, however, 
this role slowly changed and UNDP started to become “more ‘programme’ 
than ‘fund’” (Browne 2011, 27). The establishment of what later evolved 
into the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) was a crucial, but not the 
only step in this prolonged process of institutional redefinition and evolu-
tion. More and more, UNDP embodied a “primus inter pares” among the 
funds, programmes and agencies that constitute the UN development sys-
tem, with its independent role as manager of the UN development system 
becoming increasingly compromised as a result.
In 1977, in an early attempt to rectify the RC management question, at the 
request of the General Assembly,46 the Secretary-General created a new sen-
ior-level position charged with ensuring a coherent, coordinated and effi-
44 Personal interviews conducted by the author, October 2012.
45 Personal interview conducted by the author, October 2012.
46 UNGA (1977); Resolution 32/197. 
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cient management of all operational activities. Acting under the authority of 
the SG, this position of Director-General for Development and International 
Economic Cooperation (“DG Development”) was not only significant be-
cause of its ambitious mandate, but more specifically because it effectively 
constituted an attempt to switch the aid-coordination management over to 
the Secretariat and the Secretary-General (cf. Browne 2011, 33). The at-
tempt, however, ultimately proved unsuccessful and the position was again 
abandoned in 1992.47 According to Browne (Browne 2011, 61), one of the 
reasons why the mechanism failed was because it was not in line with the 
hierarchically structured UN development system. According to this inter-
pretation, what provoked the lack of authority was that the DG was estab-
lished at the level of the Under-Secretary-General only, thus placing it at the 
same level as some of the heads of agencies it was supposed to coordinate.48 
More broadly, it has to be acknowledged that the Secretariat, through var-
ious offices and subordinate entities, is a member of UNDG and, at least 
historically, has also been engaged in operational activities,49 which raises 
questions about its suitability as well.
The latest attempt to bring more clarity to the aid-coordination function 
within the UN development system and the governance of the RC system 
occurred in 2006, when the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Sys-
tem-wide Coherence recommended that UNDP withdraw from all opera-
tional activities in order to focus on strengthening coherence and fulfilling 
its coordination role (UN 2006, 24). However, this proposal faced strong 
resistance, in particular from UNDP itself, but a number of developing 
countries also rejected any efforts to consolidate and rationalise the UN 
47 One of the more lasting impacts that the DG for Development had on the UN develop-
ment system were the “comprehensive policy review” (now QCPR) resolutions estab-
lished by the office that have since become the main instrument for policy guidance for 
the UN development system. 
48 According to the unofficial hierarchical rules, the UNDP Administrator is the UN sys-
tem’s third-highest-ranking official. Formally at the rank of an Under-Secretary-General, 
seniority of the Administrator among the group of his peer USGs (approx. 50) is estab-
lished by the fact that the Associate Administrator (i.e. the USG’s deputy) is also at the 
rank of USG, and there are several more Assistant-Secretary-General (ASG) positions 
within the organisation (cf. Browne 2011, 61). USGs have diplomatic rank equivalent to 
a national cabinet minister. 
49 Compare Sahlmann (1987, 95), who reports that in the 1980s, the UN Secretariat was 
being used as an implementer for programmes and activities designed and financed by 
some of the specialised agencies. 
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development system, which they saw as attempts to reinforce the role of 
the Bretton Woods institutions by confining the role of the UN development 
system to “niche issues”. Accordingly, UNDP has been able to retain its 
two-tiered mandate in operations as well as coordination.
Mindful of the mounting criticism questioning the independence of UNDP 
in the management of the RC system and following a lengthy negotiation 
process, UNDP responded by introducing in 2008 a “functional firewall” 
that aimed to separate the agency-specific operational activities from the 
system-wide coordination function. The firewall itself was part of a more 
comprehensive reform of the management of the RC system, which also 
outlined the respective accountability lines of all the stakeholders and other 
organisational matters. The main elements of the so-called Management and 
Accountability Framework are:
 • designation of a UNDP country director or deputy RR to represent the 
agency interest within the UNCT alongside the other heads of agen-
cies;50
 • functional separation of tasks between the RC and the UNDP country 
director or deputy RR that removes the RC from operational responsibil-
ities within UNDP to avoid conflicts of interest;
 • re-alignment of accountability lines for the separated functions, and 
specification of accountability for the elements of the global and coun-
try-level aid-coordination machinery consisting of the RC, the UNDP 
country director, the UNCT, regional UNDG teams, UNDG, DOCO, etc.
The introduction of the “functional firewall” as an incremental and con-
sensus-oriented measure was instrumental in momentarily thwarting more 
radical proposals, including a transfer of the management function to the 
Secretariat. Upon the resolution to appoint UNDP country directors, the 
former Administrator Mark Malloch Brown expressed his hope that “[t]his 
will allow the RCs to focus on their UN coordination functions and relieve 
the perception that the RC cannot both serve UNDP and the broader sys-
50 By January 2011, UNDP had appointed country-director positions in 51 countries (UNSG 
2011, 16). In the remaining countries, the RC would have to delegate his UNDP-specific 
responsibilities to a Deputy Resident Representative. However, in a number of particular-
ly smaller countries, neither position exists (Lindores 2012, 43). 
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tem.”51 To an extent, the measures of the MAS indeed seemed to have de-
flected some of the criticism levelled against UNDP. To a large extent, what 
remains, however, is the full implementation of the MAS by other members 
of the UNCT (UNSG 2012b), including through mutual (i.e. UNCT to RC 
and vice versa) accountability.52 However, even with a country director ap-
pointed, the firewall between the RR and the RC functions drawn up, and 
responsibility for the day-to-day management of UNDP programmes dele-
gated to the country director, the fact remains that the RC as the UNDP RR 
continues to have full fiduciary responsibility for the management of UNDP 
programmes, and accreditation with the government rests with the RR – as 
the RC is a function, but not a legal entity. As a consequence, the firewall ul-
timately has to remain a limited delineation. Perceptions of inherent conflict 
of interests could only be dispelled through applied practice, instead of con-
ceptual clarity. As one interviewee remarked: “[Y]ou cannot be complete-
ly purist about MAS, there will always be minor challenges.”(ibid.) Given 
that the MAS has only very recently been established, several interviewees 
stressed the fact that implementation takes time, and that any conclusions on 
the functioning of the MAS at the current point in time would be premature.
Tensions over the management of the field coordination function within the 
UN system are not new and can be seen as part of a longstanding debate 
about where to anchor the management of the RC system. Historically, dis-
cussions have tended to oscillate between UNDP on the one hand, and the 
UN Secretary-General and, by extension, the UN Secretariat on the other. 
Based on the analysis of conceptual proposals and historical practice, four 
principal options can be distinguished.
1. Option one resembles the “status quo”, characterised by preserving the 
two-tiered mandate of UNDP, combined with the “functional firewall” 
and a full implementation of the MAS.
2. A second option, which could be labelled the “system-wide coherence” 
option, builds on the first option, but modifies it in line with the sug-
gestions by the High-Level Panel of experts of 2006. Following this 
model, UNDP would continue to be grounded in operations that, how-
ever, would be concentrated in those areas where there is a “void to be 
51 Mark Malloch Brown, UNDP Administrator to the UNDP Executive Board, 25 Janu-
ary 2005, New York; online: http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2005/january/mmb- 
undp-executive-board.en?categoryID=593045&lang=en (accessed 17 Dec. 2012). 
52 Personal interviews conducted by the author, October–December 2012.
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filled”53 in the UN development system – in particular, but not limited 
to, the areas of governance, crisis-prevention and poverty-eradication – 
so as to avoid any compromise of its coordination mandate.
3. A third option would see the management of the RC system be anchored 
again – as was the case during the early years after the establishment of 
the RC system – directly under the authority of the Secretary-General. 
Depending on the specific vision for the RC mandate, the Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), the Department for Political 
Affairs (DPA) or the Office of the Deputy Secretary-General could be 
possible hosts.
4. Finally, a fourth option that has been raised in the past envisions the 
establishment of a completely independent – of the agencies, funds and 
programmes, but also the Secretariat – new entity within the UN system 
to which the function of managing the RC system would be transferred. 
A transformation of UNDP – by reinforcing its system-wide coordina-
tion mandate, divesting it of all operations and embedding it within a 
new governance framework – would be a variant of this option.
4 Country-level aid coordination through the Resident 
Coordinator
Having covered the organisational setup and the global and country-level 
aid-coordination framework as the important determinants for the function-
ing of the RC system, this chapter focusses on the characteristics of the RC 
system in past and present practice. The first section – based on the assump-
tion that historical legacies and path dependencies over time are crucial fac-
tors in understanding current functioning – focusses on the evolution of the 
RC system. Indeed many of the current characteristics of the RC system 
can only be understood in their historical contexts. The perspective is then 
broadened beyond the immediate realm of the RC system by focussing on 
three defining dimensions of the RC system-orientation in the next chapter, 
which are a) the internal dimension, b) the external dimension and c) aid 
coordination with the partner country. First and foremost is the internal di-
mension of UN aid coordination. Against this background, the final section 
in this chapter reviews the current role and mandate of the RC at the country 
53 Personal interview conducted by the author, December 2012.
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level, which has significantly evolved over time. Together, the analysis of 
the “standard model” of the RC functioning in current practice forms the 
basis for an assessment of the major divergences of that model that can be 
identified in Chapter 5.
4.1 Evolution of the Resident Coordinator system
The RC system, as it is today, is the product of an evolutionary process of 
institutional development whose initial roots can be traced back more than 
five decades to the early 1950s. The development of the RC system was 
never straightforward, planned or linear, but rather incremental, adaptive to 
context and circumstances, and constantly in flux as a result of continuous 
impulses from within and outside the UN development system. It has seen 
numerous iterations, about-faces, progress and setbacks. Understanding the 
origins and evolution of the RC system offers important insights for current 
debates about its future role and functioning.
The chapter focusses particularly on six dimensions of the RC system that 
are deemed crucial for its understanding. These are: a) the governance 
mechanism, b) the management function, c) the organisational setup at the 
country level (i.e. the relationship between the RC and the UNCT), d) the 
mandate, e) its capacity and resource endowment and f) the instruments at 
the disposal of the RC. In a somewhat simplifying approach – and based 
upon a demarcation of key steps and events that were deemed crucial in the 
evolution of the RC system – five different stages of development in the 
evolution of the RC system are distinguished.
4.1.1 The origins of UN country-level aid coordination 
(1950–1969)
The evolution of the UN country-level representation is closely related to 
a more fundamental challenge in the field of development, namely what 
constitutes an appropriate procedure for the allocation of aid (Stokke 2009, 
55 ff.; Browne 2011, 12 ff.). When the UN development system first start-
ed the provision of technical assistance (TA), it was through a central-lev-
el funding mechanism fed by voluntary contributions from member states 
called the Extended Programme for Technical Assistance (EPTA). As early 
as 1950, EPTA – which later evolved into UNDP – first started the practice 
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of dispatching representatives to programme countries, thereby pioneering 
the concept of field representation, which at the time was quite novel. The 
primary intention was to ensure that partner-country views about the tech-
nical assistance that the UN development system delivered would become 
more important in the allocation of aid. However, contrary to this idea, the 
initial setup in EPTA guaranteed set shares of the available central funds to 
the (then) nine specialised agencies plus the UN Secretariat for the imple-
mentation of TA programmes (Browne 2011, 10), thereby rather empha-
sising the supply side of the equation through programming at the level 
of headquarters. This operational model was not without its drawbacks; 
indeed, the coordination challenges for partner countries associated with 
TA originating from various sources within the UN development system 
eventually gained recognition by ECOSOC54 and provided an impetus for 
a strengthened country-level allocation mechanism relying on the Resident 
Representatives as key intermediaries. As a result, in 1958 there were al-
ready 45 Resident Representatives in partner countries working towards 
“country-driven programming”,55 which some saw as a “UN diplomatic 
service” in the making (Stokke 2009, 67). In recognition of the initiative, 
ECOSOC adopted a resolution in 196056 that requested the Secretary-Gen-
eral and invited the specialised agencies:
to continue to make full use of the Resident Representatives and to accord 
them adequate authority, in co-operation with the Governments to which 
they are accredited, in coordinating the development and execution of pro-
grammes of assistance, whether financed from voluntary funds or from the 
regular budget of their organizations […].
This resolution constitutes the original mandate for country-level aid coor-
dination assigned to the EPTA Resident Representatives (who were later to 
become the UNDP representatives) covering the funds and programmes, and 
the specialised agencies upon their consent; the later a feature that persists 
to this day. The establishment of UNDP57 through a merger of the EPTA and 
54 ECOSOC (1961), Resolution 856 XXXII.
55 To ensure that programmes were truly reflective of the demands of partner governments, 
they were expected to contribute to any new programme, including financially. The idea 
of “free” TA, which has repeatedly been identified as a major source of distortions and 
wrong incentives on all sides of the aid relation (cf. e.g. Messner / Faust 2007), only 
evolved later in the 1960s and 1970s (Browne 2011, 3).
56 ECOSOC (1960), Resolution 795(XXX).
57 ECOSOC (1965), Resolution 2029 (XX).
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the Special Fund, which had been established in 1959, marked another step 
in the evolution of the UN country-level presence. While the management 
of the field representatives remained with the newly established UNDP, it 
was never uncontested, as evidenced in an ECOSOC resolution as early as 
1967, which raised the need “for further clarification of the central role and 
responsibility of the Resident Representatives in co-ordinating the technical 
co-operation programmes of the United Nations system organizations at the 
field level.”58
The early phase in the evolution of the UN country-level coordination sys-
tem was therefore characterised by a limited formal mandate for the EPTA 
and later UNDP Resident Representatives in aid coordination, which was, 
however, to a large extent balanced by the fact that the agencies’ authority 
– and by extension, that of its representatives – was boosted through the cen-
tralised command over systemic funding. While many of the programming 
and other instruments at the hand of the country representatives were to be 
developed only later, the principal norms for UN development cooperation 
(such as the principle of demand-driven TA), on the other hand, were devel-
oped during this period (cf. Stokke 2009, 43–82).
4.1.2 Growing discontent with the UN development system 
(1969–1977)
At the end of the 1960s, which also coincided with the end of the first UN 
development decade, calls for a more fundamental reflection on the struc-
ture and workings of the operational activities for development became 
widespread, including country-level aid coordination as a crucial element. 
UNDP and Paul Hoffmann – its Administrator at the time – have to be giv-
en credit for commissioning the “Study of the Capacity of the UN Devel-
opment System”59 in response. Its reform proposals were fundamental and 
far-reaching, envisioning a UN engagement that was much more driven by 
partner-country preferences served through integrated country programmes 
under the management of empowered UNDP Resident Representatives. 
Reception of the Capacity Study was mixed, however, with resistance in 
58 ECOSOC (1967), Resolution 1262 (XLIII), quoted in Stokke (2009, 189).
59 More informally known as the “Capacity Study” or the “Jackson Report” after its princi-
pal author, Robert Jackson. 
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particular emanating from the specialised agencies, which stood to lose 
their set funding allocations (Murphy 2006, 140 ff.). Member states were 
equally divided, but they eventually agreed to implement parts of the pro-
posed reforms through the so-called Consensus Resolution.60 While it fell 
short of expectations and restructuring efforts required for a fundamentally 
revamped engagement, it did strengthen country ownership of UN activities 
through 3–5 year “Country Programmes” corresponding to medium-term 
indicative funding envelopes for each country. Some of the most far-reach-
ing implications of the resolution concerned the Resident Representatives,61 
which were significantly strengthened by giving them the mandate to:
 • coordinate all UN organisations at country level as the “leader of the 
team”,62 including through reporting requirements for all implementing 
agencies to the Resident Representative;
 • appraise all projects under country programming;
 • have delegated authority through the UNDP Administrator for the ap-
proval of project.
Despite these notable reorganisations and reforms, the longer-term impact 
of the Consensus Resolution in terms of strengthening country-level aid 
coordination ultimately remained limited (Stokke 2009, 247; Murphy 2006, 
14 ff.). In hindsight, one of the central reasons for this was that the set of 
measures effectively decentralised the aid-allocation process from New York 
to the field level. While in principle this had the positive effect of strength-
ening the voice of partner countries as well as the role of the Resident Rep-
resentatives in linking them with the engagement of the UN development 
system, as a consequence of the changes, the previous dependency of the 
specialised agencies on UNDP funding allocations was loosened. Increas-
ingly determined to push their bilateral agendas and exhibit more concerns 
for agency efficiency at the expense of effectiveness considerations, donors 
started to task the different entities of the UN development system – includ-
ing UNDP itself – with the implementation of their projects directly in the 
following years; a trend that UNDP reinforced through the establishment of 
UNOPS and other measures. The fact that the oversight over UNDP’s own 
60 UNGA (1970), Resolution 2688 (XXV). 
61 As a clear sign of the changed function of the RR, the name was changed to “Resident 
Directors”, which however was not maintained and subsequently reversed again.
62 UNGA (1970), Resolution 2688 (XXV), para. 63. 
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operational activities was added to the mandate of the Resident Represent-
atives63 further undermined its neutral role as UN development system co-
ordinator. While this new practice facilitated resource mobilisation, it also 
stipulated agency competition.
Against this background, it has been argued that the Consensus Resolution 
has “paradoxically contributed to the erosion of the central funding and 
co-ordinating role of UNDP” (Nordic UN Project 1991, 163). In hindsight, 
the Consensus Resolution, therefore, fell short of its aspirations, as it was 
not able to resolve the contradiction between the centrifugal and the centrip-
etal forces at the heart of the UN development system. It took eight years 
for a substantial momentum for reform to build up again, during which the 
autonomy of the executing agencies, funds and programmes – at the ex-
pense of systemic coherence – continued to grow. Additionally, the scope 
of activities of the World Bank expanded significantly during this period, 
which put further external pressure on the UN development system. Finally, 
the funding crisis of 1975 demonstrated the incongruity between multi-year 
programming and a voluntary funding mechanism, which also had a damag-
ing effect on country programming as one of the central instruments at the 
hand of the Resident Representatives.
In retrospect, the high hopes associated with the ambitious reform propos-
als of the Jackson Report did not materialise. The role and responsibilities 
of the Resident Representatives in principle were strengthened; however, 
this went hand in hand with their actual weakening through the growing 
autonomy of the executing agencies, funds and programmes. The aid-co-
ordination mandate continued to rest with UNDP, but given its own opera-
tional engagement, this leadership role was no longer above reproach. The 
country-programming instrument was promising, but ultimately it proved 
ineffective to overcome the diverging agencies guarding their relationships 
with individual ministries in the field.
4.1.3 A period of stagnation (1977–1997)
Resolution 32/19764 of the General Assembly was widely noted as the or-
igin of the proposal to establish a Director-General for Development and 
63 Ibid., para. 56. 
64 UNGA (1977); Resolution 32/197.
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International Economic Co-operation (DG DIEC), which, in the spirit of 
the “new international economic order”, aimed at bringing about a more 
coherent UN development system at the global level. The resolution was the 
rather limited outcome of a process that started four years earlier when the 
General Assembly set up an ad-hoc committee of experts on the restructur-
ing of ECOSOC. However, it also included an extended chapter on the oper-
ational activities for development. It is these propositions – initially strongly 
resisted by some of the specialised agencies – that are responsible for the 
creation of the RC system as it exists today, namely, as a principally separate 
and independent function from that of the UNDP Resident Representatives. 
The key paragraph reads:
On behalf of the United Nations system, over-all responsibility for, and 
co-ordination of, operational activities for development carried out at 
the country-level should be entrusted to a single official to be designat-
ed taking into account the sectors of particular interest to the country of 
assignment, in consultation with and with the consent of the Government 
concerned, who should exercise team leadership and be responsible for 
evolving, at the country-level, a multi-disciplinary dimension in sectoral 
development assistance programmes.65
The resolution thus departed from previous policy in a number of ways: the 
first and most obvious change was that the coordination function was, for 
the first time, established as a position in its own right (“single official to be 
designated”). With this measure, the General Assembly reconciled the coor-
dination function and requirement with the new realities and roles of UNDP 
and the other agencies. It was subsequently given the title of “Resident Co-
ordinator of the United Nations system’s operational activities for develop-
ment”.66 The principle that designation of the RCs should take place “taking 
into account the sectors of particular interest to the country of assignment” 
for the first time also opened up the possibility of entrusting the RC function 
to UN entities other than UNDP. The UNDP Governing Council initially 
opposed this measure.67 While this offered an opportunity to diversify and to 
increase system-wide ownership as well as to establish the independence of 
the coordination function, following lengthy negotiations behind the scene 
65 Ibid., Annex, para. 34. 
66 This was done by decision of the Administrative Committee for Co-ordination, which is 
the predecessor of the current Chief Executive Board of all the heads of agencies, funds 
and programmes under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General. 
67 ECOSOC (1988), UNDP Governing Council Decision 88/56, para. 1.
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the General Assembly two years later specified that “[t]he UNDP Resident 
Representative was normally to be designated RC”.68 A report by the Sec-
retary-General in 1981 showed this to be almost fully achieved, with RC 
positions in most countries having been given to the Resident Representa-
tives of UNDP (Browne 2011, 33). Arguably, considerations of continuity 
and practicality played a key role in the decision in favour of the established 
UNDP candidates. However, what seemed practical at the time had a last-
ing impact in the sense that various role-conflicts resulted from this double 
designation that continue to plague the RC system to this day, even after 
the “functional firewall” was established in the mid-2000s. Another change 
of policy, if only nuanced, was that resolution 32/197 altered the wording 
established in the Consensus Resolution that designated the coordinator as 
the “leader of the team” to one “exercising team leadership”, which to an 
extent weakens the relationship with the UNCT. Finally, in recognition of 
the increasingly autonomous activities of the UN entities, the country-pro-
gramming instrument was recognised as a “frame of reference” for core 
resources only, thereby excluding the growing share of earmarked funding.
Against this background, resolution 32/197 ultimately did not effectuate 
the fundamental change that it had hoped to achieve. The authority of the 
RC never gained full recognition from the other UN entities guarding their 
independence and autonomy, which becomes evident from ECOSOC res-
olutions as early as 1981.69 Fragmentation of the UN development system 
was further magnified when the regional economic commissions started to 
become operationally active that same year, which broadened coordination 
requirements and added to the overall complexity of – as well as overlap 
within – the UN development system (cf. Browne 2011, 33). The following 
period was characterised largely by the absence of further momentum to 
reform the RC system, in consequence also to a lengthier period of de-
cline of UNDP (Murphy 2006, 232) and the development practice (“the 
lost decade”) more generally. A mandate and working arrangement for the 
country-level relationship between the RC and the other agencies, including 
UNDP, took time to evolve and overall fell short of the comprehensive man-
date – albeit under very different circumstances – that had previously been 
available to the RR of UNDP. The centrifugal forces at work within the UN 
development system seemed to have prevailed during the 1980s and 1990s. 
68 UNGA (1979); Resolution 34/213, para. 3.
69 ECOSOC (1981); Resolution 1981/59, para. 5.
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One of the contributing factors was that UNDP was increasingly unable to 
fulfil its central funding role and channelled increasingly less funding to the 
entities of the UN development system (Browne 2011, 44), which resulted 
in further competition to offset shortfalls. On the other hand, UNDP became 
increasingly more active in operations itself, which produced mounting crit-
icism of its role in aid coordination.
In conclusion, in terms of progress towards a more effective RC system, 
lasting contributions were not made during the 1980s and 1990s. The sep-
aration of the coordination function improved the clarity of the mandate, 
but in practice potential benefits were counteracted by “double-hatting” 
the functions of the Resident Coordinator and Resident Representative of 
UNDP. To the extent that double-hatting was seen to compromise the neu-
trality of the RC, it put a strain on the relationship between the RC and the 
UNCT. In terms of coordination instruments, no momentous developments 
were registered during this period. What became clear, however, was that 
the country-level and UN internal processes seemed much more innovative 
and ground-breaking than intergovernmental negotiations, to an extent. The 
evolution of the double-hatting of the RC with the Humanitarian Coordina-
tor – later confirmed as standard practice by the General Assembly70 – or the 
Unified UN offices in the Commonwealth of Independent States in the early 
1990s are cases in point in this respect.
4.1.4 A coming revival? (1997–2006)
Against the backdrop of the end of the cold war, the beginning of the 1990s 
heralded much change in the international arena, including within the UN 
development system. Since the first half of the 1990s, there had been re-
form measures taken to strengthen the RC system both at the structural and 
policy levels (Klingebiel 1999, VI), which acknowledged what had been 
described in an influential report by the Joint Inspection Unit: “The RC 
system is considered to be the substantiation and managerial centerpiece 
of the UN system presence and operations at the country level” (JIU 1997, 
11). The period saw a renewed interest in reform, including of aid-coordina-
tion mechanisms, which also benefited from a favourable political climate. 
Immediately upon taking office, SG Kofi Annan launched a comprehensive 
70 UNGA (1993), Resolution A/48/209, para. 4. 
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reform initiative entitled “Renewing the United Nations – A programme for 
reform”71 (1997), which won the General Assembly’s endorsements (ibid.) 
Apart from central-level reforms aimed at strengthening the coherence of 
the UN development system, achievements included the transformation of 
the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) into the Chief Ex-
ecutives Board for Coordination, the consolidation of several entities into 
UNODC, as well as joint executive committee meetings of UNDP, UNFPA 
and UNICEF. Under the label of “acting as one at the country level”, the 
report also introduced a number of important changes to the RC system. 
Specifically the following measures:
 • Strengthening the role of the RC as the “leader of the UNCT” through a 
direct accreditation with the partner government;72
 • Establishing UN Houses to bring together in one location different agen-
cy country-offices;73
 • Strengthening the management of the RC system through the establish-
ment of UNDG to “provide a forum for concerted directives to Resident 
Coordinators” (cf. Section 3.1);
 • Adoption of a Common Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 
to “integrate all UN programmes”.
If the reform package concerned operational and managerial aspects, the 
Millennium Declaration of 2000 conveyed a sense of common purpose and 
policy direction to the UN development system. The positive reform mo-
mentum was sustained in 2002 with a second comprehensive reform pack-
age entitled “Strengthening the United Nations – An Agenda for Further 
Change”,74 which, unlike the 1997 package, however, also contained more 
substantial recommendations and therefore required the approval of the 
71 UNGA (1997), Resolution A/52/12, para. 153.
72 The report states that: “funds and programmes and United Nations Information Centres 
will be part of a single United Nations office under the Resident Coordinator as the 
designated representative of the Secretary-General and Leader of the United Nations 
Country Team who would be accredited to the head of government.” It has to be pointed 
out, however, that legal caveats against the direct accreditation are persistent to this day.
73 After a rapid increase in the early years, their numbers have remained steady more recent-
ly. Today, 59 UN Houses exist worldwide (source: UNDG webpage; online: http://www.
undg.org/index.cfm?P=9, accessed 15 Dec. 2012).
74 UNGA (2002); Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly, 57/387.
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General Assembly, which only materialized in part.75 In terms of the RC 
system, one of the positive outcomes was that the RCs in larger and medi-
um-sized countries were given their own staff, which endowed them with a 
more independent capacity, whereas previously, they had relied on the staff 
support from UNDP or other agencies.
More fundamentally, in a reversal of previous practice, the “personal un-
ion” between the RC and the UNDP Resident Representative that existed 
in most cases, the 2004 TCPR resolution76 requested the Secretary-General 
to a) develop a new management and accountability framework for the gov-
ernance of the RC system, which was the foundation that eventually led to 
the establishment of the “functional firewall” in 2008, and b) called for the 
appointment of UNDP country directors to concentrate on the running of 
UNDP’s day-to-day business. Finally, the resolution established new guid-
ing principles for the RC system (cf. Section 3.3).
The first period in office of SG Annan thus saw a number of managerial 
and pragmatic changes within the RC system, including some with poten-
tially far-reaching implication, such as the introduction of the functional 
firewall. The RC’s capacity, autonomous of its host agency, was significantly 
revamped overall, including through the UNDAF instrument and the in-
troduction of a CCA process in 1999. The management of the RC system 
continued to rest with UNDP during the period, albeit potentially less firmly 
than previously, as a result of the growing tendency for delinking / demar-
cation.
4.1.5 Delivering as One and rising expectations  
(2006 to date)
Similar to the Jackson Report of 1969, the “Delivering as One” report pro-
duced by the High-Level Panel on System-wide Coherence (SWC) that was 
appointed by Secretary-General Annan in 2006 has fundamentally influ-
enced discussions on UN reforms. Like its famous predecessor the “Jack-
son Report”, it also illustrates the difficulties of reaching intergovernmental 
consensus on implementation. Partly owing to bad timing during the change 
of office between Secretaries-General Annan and Ban Ki-moon, the Gen-
75 UNGA (2003); Resolution A/RES/57/300.
76 UNGA (2005); Resolution A/RES/59/250. 
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eral Assembly adopted resolutions in 200877 and 201078 that respond to the 
report and implement some proposals. According to one assessment, two to 
three of the 10 major High-Level Panel recommendations have been taken 
up for implementation (Browne 2011, 134), while others continue to be 
disregarded.
In taking a very comprehensive approach towards addressing all major di-
mensions of country-level operations – calling for the UN to “deliver as 
one” through one programme, budget, leader and office – the panel envi-
sioned the RC as the key building block to deliver on all dimensions. Ac-
cordingly, an “empowered RC” was to be given the mandate to negotiate 
One Country Programmes with partner governments on behalf of the entire 
UN system; be vested with the corresponding authority to allocate resources 
from pooled and central funding mechanisms as necessary; as well as be 
given the power to hold UNCT members accountable to agreed outcomes 
and compliance with the programme.79
Given the potentially ground-breaking nature of the proposals, the inter-
governmental negotiations on the SWC report only resulted in the roll-out 
of a diluted DaO approach on a pilot basis in eight countries in 2006 (see 
Chapter 5). The pilot initiative included only a “partially empowered RC”, 
as his / her authority in making allocation decisions related to newly estab-
lished – and relatively small – pooled funds that were set up in support of the 
pilot initiative. Crucially, they continued to lack any sway over agency-spe-
cific funds, which would have been regarded a key element in enforcing a 
more coordinated provision of aid by the HLP. In a move to strengthen ac-
countability of the RC, a performance appraisal system for the RC through 
the UNCT members was introduced in 2007,80 and the TCPR resolution 
of 2007 introduced a number of other measures, such as the requirement 
for the UNDAF to be counter-signed by partner government, which (if not 
legally, at least symbolically) “binds” the participating agencies, funds and 
programmes to it. Overall, addressing these incremental measures has come 
at the expense of not dealing with the more fundamental structural and in-
77 UNGA (2008a); Resolution A/RES/62/277. 
78 UNGA (2010); Resolution A/RES/64/289. 
79 Ibid., para. 17. 
80 The appraisal system is called “One80 Performance Appraisal Tool”. Detailed informa-
tion can be found on the UNDG webpage, online: http://www.undg.org/index.cfm?P=136 
(accessed 6 July 2012). 
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stitutional challenges of the RC system. Aside from the eight pilot countries 
that have tested the DaO approach since 2007, the only substantial change 
that took place during the period was the introduction of a one-sided and 
non-reciprocal appraisal process of the RC through the UNCT, which modi-
fied the relationship between the RC and the UNCT, as well as a broadening 
of the use of the UNDAF. There were no fundamental changes concerning 
the RC mandate, governance structure or capacity.
4.1.6 Interim conclusions
Based on the assumption that historical legacies and path dependencies over 
time are crucial factors in understanding the role and functioning of the 
RC system as it exists today, this chapter traced its evolution from the early 
origins in the 1950s to today. Focussing on the key dimensions of the gov-
ernance and management of the RC system, the organisational setup at the 
country level, its mandate, capacity as well as instruments at the disposal 
of the RC, five main phases of evolution were identified. The findings are 
summarised in Table 2 below.
In conclusion, the management dimension of the RC system has emerged 
as a crucial condition for an effective aid-coordination system at the coun-
try level. In historical perspective, the system has tended to become more 
complex, in large part as a response to the increasing criticism directed to-
wards the prominent role played by UNDP as the one entity tasked with 
the management function. In terms of the relationship between the RC and 
the agencies present at the country level, a long-term development towards 
a distinct role for the RC that differentiates him / her from the rest of the 
agencies can be identified. A second long-term and parallel trend, however, 
seems to be the tendency for the authority of the RC, vis-à-vis the members 
of the UN Country Team, to have contracted and become more limited in 
historical perspective. The historical analysis also provides ample evidence 
that the centrifugal forces at work within the UN development system are 
quite strong. As has been pointed out before, the funding mechanism plays 
a crucial role in this respect. While the Resident Representative of UNDP 
in 1969 was clearly directing and steering the activities of the UN develop-
ment system at the country level, an ordinary RC in 2012 can only hope for 
voluntary participation by the agencies, funds and programmes in coordina-
tion efforts initiated by him / her. At the same time, requests for additional 
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functions and responsibilities given to RCs – including some seemingly be-
yond the narrow confines of “development” – seem to have expanded over 
time, and the instruments at the disposal of the RCs have also become more 
sophisticated (but also more complex). To an extent, therefore, there seems 
to be a lurking risk of a (to use an almost proverbial phrase by Christopher 
Hill) “capability-expectations gap” for the RC system, whereby demands 
are frequently not matched with corresponding capacity (staffing, resourc-
es) and authority.
The themes and issues identified in this chapter are explored further in the 
next two sections, which focus on the current and “standard” practice of the 
RC system. Together, they serve as a basis for an assessment of the evolving 
patterns of differentiation of the RC model that are continuously gaining in 
importance.
4.2 Practice of country-level aid coordination through the 
Resident Coordinator
Virtually the entire development literature agrees that successful aid pro-
grams must be designed around local conditions, circumstances, culture, 
and leadership […]. This requires a highly decentralized approach to de-
velopment in which authority to make policy decisions is made in the coun-
try, not in aid agency headquarters. Andrew Natsios, former Administrator 
of USAID (Natsios 2010, 29)
There are various exception that are discussed in Chapter 5, but the “stand-
ard model” of UN aid coordination at the country level, which can be seen 
as the “template” or “default position” (Lindores 2012, 15) for all countries, 
consists of the Resident Coordinator supported by an office and the UN 
Country Team consisting of all the UN entities with operational activities in 
a given country. This chapter assesses the practice of aid coordination under 
this model, which currently exists in around 60 countries.81 This provides 
the basis for the analysis of the evolving patterns of adaptation within the 
RC system.
What are the role and mandate of the RC in the standard case? The answer 
to the straightforward question is surprisingly convoluted and multifaceted. 
From a formal viewpoint, three main documents spell out the RC’s respon-
81 Compare data in Chapter 5.
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sibilities: the standard terms of reference (UNDG 2008c), the generic job 
description (UNDG 2009b), as well as the ACC Guidelines on the Function-
ing of the RC System (ACC 1999).82
The fact that it took a number of years to develop, negotiate and adopt these 
fundamental policies for the RC functioning within UNDG already hints at 
the fact that these documents – as intensely negotiated documents tend to be 
– are complex, heavy on “agreed language”, and neither easy to understand, 
nor very clear.
Broadly, the three dimensions of aid coordination that provide fundamental 
orientation for the RC’s responsibilities are:
 • alignment with partner-country demands and requirements (“country 
alignment”);
 • aid coordination of UN operational activities for development (“internal 
aid coordination”);
 • aid coordination with other donors (“external aid coordination”).
The following section explores the three dimensions of the RC mandate in 
aid coordination in greater detail. Underlying them – and mainstreamed in 
their discharge – are additional duties and responsibilities for the RC that 
come with (in the standard case) being the Secretary-General’s highest-rank-
ing representative. Most prominent among them is the advocacy role for the 
UN system values, standards, principles and activities in a given country; 
others are the follow-up to global conferences and agreements (such as the 
Millennium Development Goals, MDGs), representation of non-resident 
entities, and responsibilities in ensuring common administrative and other 
services for the UNCT. Under certain circumstances, RCs are also asked to 
assume the following responsibilities:
 • Designated Official for Safety and Security
 • Leader of the Disaster Management Team
82 The Terms of Reference, which were approved by UNDG on 10 Nov. 2008, specify that 
the document “expand(s) both the previous RC Job Description (annexed to the ACC 
Guidelines of 1999) and the RC job description finalized by the UNDG in late 2008” 
(see ref. UNDG 2009b). This means that formally, there exist two documents outlining 
the tasks RCs are supposed to perform that both have continued validity, which both 
illustrates and further adds to the complexity and confusion surrounding the RC role and 
mandate.
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 • Director of UN Information Centre, if applicable and existent in country
 • Leader of the Humanitarian Country Team, applicable at time of human-
itarian crisis when no HC has been designated83
While it could be assumed that these seemingly unrelated tasks are seen 
as an additional burden to RCs already overburdened with coordination 
tasks, interviewees stressed that these responsibilities in fact constituted a 
valuable addition for the coordination tasks of RCs.84 In particular, a joint 
programmatic and security leadership role was seen as beneficial, as it al-
lowed for a more comprehensive perspective balancing security concerns 
with considerations of programme delivery. Along the same lines, the RC 
and director of UN information centre functions were seen as complemen-
tary and mutually reinforcing, in that programmatic work was facilitated 
when the public was well informed about the overall UN engagement in 
their countries, and communication work benefited from the direct link 
to the RC. Additional resources and capacity that generally accompanied 
these responsibilities ensured that taking them on did not overburden 
the RCs.
4.2.1 Alignment with partner-country demands and 
 requirements
A conflict of interest that is fundamental for the aid relationship is the in-
terplay between what a country demands, and what a donor perceives to be 
beneficial. In an ideal situation, these two overlap to a significant extent, or 
are in fact identical. In reality, there is almost always a disparity between the 
two. Given that country ownership has been demonstrated as a key input for 
83 The responsibilities for safety and security as well as disaster management and prepared-
ness are included in the generic ToRs, which means that these functions in the standard 
case are to be performed by all RCs. The direction of a UN Information Center is sub-
ject to agreement between the RC and the Department of Public Information within the 
Secretariat. As a general rule, the RCs take on this function if and where an Information 
Center exists. Finally, in the case of an emerging humanitarian crisis situation, RCs also 
generally assume humanitarian responsibilities until an HC is designated. 
84 Personal interviews by the author, October–December 2012.
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aid-programme success under the aid-effectiveness paradigm, a high premi-
um has been put on the former.85
The standard terms of reference of the RC include provisions for a leader-
ship role of the partner country in determining which UN agencies should 
be mobilised in support of its national strategy: “RC acts […] in support of 
national priorities and capacity building […] for which the national gov-
ernments should determine the resident and non-resident UN organization 
to best respond to specific needs and priorities of the individual country” 
(UNDG 2008c, 2). In reality, however, there are signs that the UN pro-
gramme continues to respond to the institutional structure of the UN de-
velopment system (UNGA 2012, 15), and that alignment has not yet been 
fully realised.
A number of the UN member states do not consider the aid-effectiveness 
process, which originated in the OECD-DAC working party on aid effec-
tiveness, to have sufficient legitimacy (Weinlich 2011b). As a result, the UN 
development system’s relation towards the Paris Declaration and aid-effec-
tiveness process has therefore never been without its challenges. At the same 
time, by signing the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action and the 
Busan Outcome Document, which have codified the principle of alignment 
of donor activities and programmes with partner-country demands and re-
quirements as well as the other aid/development-effectiveness principles, 
the members of UNDG have felt compelled to commit to their adherence.
The primacy of the host government can be seen as one of the guiding 
principles for all UN entities with operational activities for development, 
and is ingrained in the operational policies for the RC system. At the same 
time, the latest round of Paris Declaration monitoring suggested that only 
about 34 per cent of ODA originating from the UN development system for 
the public sector is reported on partner countries’ budgets (OECD 2011c). 
There are various aspects to this assessment, including the very nature of 
the UN development system focussing on capacity-building, norms and 
85 As indicated in the literature on aid effectiveness by the OECD and other sources, the 
purpose of aid coordination is to support a country’s own developmental efforts. However, 
as has been pointed out by David Booth (2011, 10) and others, there are also situations 
of partner governments not being development-orientated, which may warrant a more 
interventionist approach. 
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technical assistance, which are per se difficult to report on budget.86 More 
recent qualitative evidence suggests that there continues to be a degree of 
mismatch between activities originating within the UN development system 
and what partner countries see as their most important development needs 
and priorities (see Figure 4).
In order to ensure the alignment of UNCT activities with the partner-coun-
try demands and requirements, RCs rely on rather limited means. While the 
RC mandate contains provisions that ensure their prominent role during the 
programme design phase, including the authority to lead the team in strate-
gic development of the UNDAF and to take “the final decision on strategic 
focus and allocation of resources against that focus, if consensus cannot be 
reached within the UNCT” (UNDG 2009b), the RC has no authority to en-
sure that agency programmes and activities reflect UNDAF priorities during 
86 Compare the extended study by Vatterodt (2008) on the UN’s implementation of the Paris 
Declaration. 
Figure 4:   Alignment of UNDS activities with partner countries by 
 economic classification 
“The activities of the UN and your country’s development needs and 
priorities are …” 
Source: UNS (2012) 
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the implementation phase. In addition, regarding the issue of the composi-
tion of the UN development system conforming to the needs and priorities 
of a partner country from the outset, RC again have no formal authority, and 
in practice are rarely consulted, on issues of opening / maintaining individ-
ual agency representations at the country level.
The Paris Declaration and aid-effectiveness principles can be seen to take a 
rather comprehensive view of partner-country alignment, which, to an ex-
tent, contrasts with the UN development system’s understanding of align-
ment. While the former includes, for example, the use of national systems 
for procurement, reporting, public financial management, auditing and oth-
er purposes, based on their unique role and mandate, UN entities emphasise 
a much more limited form of alignment – stressing in particular the inclu-
sion and participation of national authorities in UN internal planning and 
programming processes – at the expense of the “broader” dimensions (UN 
2008, 12; UNDG 2008a; Vatterodt 2008, 21 ff.).87
Such claims for exemptions from alignment processes can partially be seen 
as a consequence of UN entities being perceived as neutral and independ-
ent actors, often having a strong stake in supporting partner-country efforts 
in aid coordination directly. As part of their mandate, RCs are tasked with 
ensuring effective support by the UNCT for government aid-coordination 
processes through capacity-building within aid-coordination units at central 
planning ministries and other measures (UNDG 2008c, 4 ff.; 2009b, 2 ff.). 
In a majority of countries, RCs are also co-chairing, together with part-
ner governments, high-level aid-coordination fora that exist in most partner 
countries (see next section for details). Based on its mandate for capaci-
ty-building in the area of aid effectiveness, it is UNDP that is the most active 
among the UNCT members in this area. Against this background, at least 
to an extent, UN development system entities perceive their proximity to 
partner-country institutions as making obsolete the necessity for alignment 
processes.
87 Under the Paris Declaration process, “alignment” relates to the donor-government re-
lationship, meaning that donors base their support on partner countries’ strategies, in-
stitutions and procedures. “Harmonisation”, on the other hand, generally relates to an 
arrangement between donors bringing in line their procedures for planning, funding, 
disbursement, monitoring, evaluating and reporting with each other. The RC operation-
al guidelines and policies generally refer to the objective of “harmonising” (instead of 
“aligning”) UN support with partner countries. 
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While the literature (e.g. Booth 2011) has argued that alignment hinges on 
the precondition of a developmental orientation of partner countries, the 
RC and UN entities, based on the fundamental principle of sovereign in-
dependence of UN member states, have in the past exhibited a tendency to 
come down on the side of partner countries. In that sense, a certain diver-
gence within the RC mandate can be identified between, on the one hand, 
the closeness of the relationship between the RC and partner countries, and, 
on the other hand, the obligation to “advocate fundamental UN values” and, 
in particular, a responsibility for “promoting international human rights 
standards and principles and advocating for human rights as a common UN 
value in dialogue and interactions with national actors” (UNDG 2008c). 
While proximity can be advantageous in this respect, as it may allow RCs to 
make their voices heard more clearly, what has to be avoided is a situation 
where closeness compromises the advocacy function.88
4.2.2 External aid coordination at country level
There are several reasons why partner-country governments have tended to 
approach external aid coordination from a partnership perspective rather 
than asserting a strong leadership role. These include weak capacities in aid 
administration, donor dependency, as well as a tacit acceptance on the side 
of partner countries that aid agencies are also faced with pressures to justify 
their actions vis-à-vis their principals. As a result, external aid-coordination 
groups are frequently being configured in a way that ensures donor involve-
ment, including on the basis of co-chairing, or even chairing, arrangements.
The RC plays a prominent role in this regard. Aid coordination fora con-
stitute the principal mechanism for coordinating the different bilateral and 
multilateral donor agencies engaged at the country level. With significant 
variation across countries, there exists a surprisingly homogenous “core” 
model in the majority of developing countries, which consists of an over-
arching aid-coordination forum, where questions relating to the direction 
and implementation of aid programmes are discussed. This forum generally 
meets on an annual, biennial or quarterly basis, with high-level participation 
from both the side of government (often ministers or permanent secretaries) 
and donors (heads of cooperation, heads of agencies, etc.). These high-level 
88 This may hold true in particular for those countries where there is self-financing (i.e. part-
ner countries providing earmarked support for UNDP activities within their territories).
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fora often exist alongside a number of sectoral and other technical working 
groups with more frequent exchanges. In a majority of countries, the RC 
has been given a leadership position within these partner-country govern-
ment aid-coordination fora, which cover all major donors present in a given 
country, with RCs acting as co-chair, co-convener or even chair of the group 
(see Table 3).
That the RC is frequently given such a prominent role in external aid coor-
dination (i.e. in addition to the UN internal function) is tribute to the special 
recognition and legitimacy, but also the unique nature of the relationship 
that the UN and the RC – as its highest-level representative – traditionally 
enjoy in partner countries.
The “special status” accorded to (in the standard case) the RC in many re-
spects is a consequence of the perception of the UN’s neutral role, which, 
based on the organisation’s universal membership and its strong regard for 
the sovereignty of its member states (Stokke 2009, 484), makes it a “pre-
ferred partner of developing countries” (Weinlich 2011b, 18). This credibil-
ity and legitimacy bestowed upon the RC puts him / her in a unique position 
to perform the external aid-coordination function. In those countries with a 
UN leadership role in donor aid coordination, the RC thus serves a dual pur-
pose: on the one hand, he / she aims to ensure a coherent representation of 
the UN development system within the larger donor grouping, while on the 
Table 3:   Leadership role for UN in external aid coordination 
UN has leading role in 
aid effectiveness and 
coordination 
No such role 
Africa 31 9 
Arab States 6 8 
Asia and the Pacific 11 10 
Europe and the CIS 13 5 
Latin America & Caribbean 9 13 
TOTAL 70 (56%) 55 (44%) 
Source:   UNDG / UN DOCO (2012) 
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other hand, the aim is to ensure the proper functioning of the broader aid-co-
ordination forum, including its alignment with the government’s policy.
The fact that due to its origins in the OECD-DAC working party on aid 
effectiveness, which is often perceived as an instrument of club governance 
by Western donors, the legitimacy of the aid-effectiveness process and prin-
ciples has never been fully recognised by a number of UN member states 
(Weinlich 2011b), which has often played in favour of a stronger UN role 
in external aid coordination at the country level. For the RC – and the UN 
development system more broadly – the external coordination role has the 
potential for leveraging external funds and activities, but in particular for 
influencing policy debates within the larger donor aid-coordination fora, in 
line with UN norms, values and activities. Evidence suggests, however, that 
this prominent and more (externally) visible role and function of the RC 
often times is not fully put to use and acknowledged within the UN develop-
ment system. As can be seen from the various guiding documents of the RC 
system, UN internal coordination constitutes the clear priority of the RC, 
with external coordination becoming an afterthought. Within the standard 
terms of reference for the RC, only 3 of 93 paragraphs specifically refer to 
the role in external aid coordination, and only in general terms. Accordingly, 
the RC:
Promotes and supports effective dialogue and interaction between the 
UNCT and non-resident agencies and Government and other stake-hold-
ers on national priorities, policy-making and aid coordination mechanism. 
(UNDG 2008c, 5)
For RCs to fully carry out external aid coordination, this would require an 
adequate level of support and capacity for the function. The perception of a 
close link between the external and internal coordination functions further 
complicates the matter, as some external stakeholders argue that the UN 
development system has to “first put its own house in order”,89 before di-
recting their attention to the external dimension.
4.2.3 Internal aid coordination at country level
Partner governments as well as other donor agencies have frequently regard-
ed the question of coordination among the different UN entities as an “inter-
89 Personal interview by the author, October 2012.
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nal UN family affair” (Kulessa 1995, 1076). At the same time, government 
participation in UN internal aid coordination has become more pronounced 
more recently, in particular in those countries that follow the “Delivering 
as One” pilot initiative with the support of – and at the request of – part-
ner governments. But even in those 30+ countries, this has generally not 
translated into governments challenging the role of the RC as the principal 
coordinator of the different UN entities. In fact, only a very limited number 
of countries, which tended to have high levels of public-sector capacity and 
average incomes, have opted to coordinate the activities of the UN develop-
ment system themselves and have therefore asked the UN not to appoint an 
RC in their country (Lindores 2012, 14).
This state of affairs is reflected within the RC mandate. Accordingly, the 
RC policy guidance makes abundantly clear that the coordination of the 
UN funds, programmes and agencies with a country presence – and which 
together form the UNCT (“internal aid coordination”) – is the prime respon-
sibility of the RC. The general and specific duties of the RC in this regard 
encompass:
 • ensuring a strategic and focussed programme that draws on UN develop-
ment system mandates and expertise and that is in line with the national 
plans and priorities;
 • facilitating resource mobilisation for the UNCT as a whole; and
 • reporting UNCT results to government.
Other duties related to the internal aid-coordination function include:
 • participation in mutual and reciprocal performance appraisals;
 • implementation of the guidance note on working relations between the 
RC and UNCT (UNDG 2008c, 2009b; ACC 1999).
The fact that the mechanisms and processes for UN internal aid coordi-
nation are fairly more developed and operationalised than corresponding 
tools for the alignment with partner countries and external aid-coordination 
dimensions is also related to the fact that the average number of UN entities 
active per country is often times as large – or larger – than the number of 
other external donors with a country presence. Table 5 below provides an 
overview of the state of fragmentation of country-level operations within 
the UN development system. The average of approx. 15 UN entities – in-
cluding five specialised agencies – per country is indicative of the RC’s 
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aid-coordination burden. It has to be noted that there is significant variation 
in terms of the size and composition of UNCTs, with the number of agen-
cies generally decreasing with higher income levels.
In order to perform internal aid coordination, the RC has several instruments 
and processes at hand that principally cover a full project or programme cy-
cle consisting of the key phases of analysis, programming, implementation, 
and monitoring and reporting (Klingebiel 1999; Murphy 2006; Jolly / Em-
merij / Weiss 2009; Stokke 2009; Browne 2011; Mueller 2010a):
 • Analysis: A shared understanding of a country’s situation, needs and re-
quirements constitutes a sound basis for aid coordination. This crucially 
includes an assessment of the UNCT comparative advantage vis-à-vis 
the needs of the country and what other donors are providing. As part of 
the aid-coordination process, the UNCT, under the leadership of the RC, 
conducts an analysis of the specific development challenges in a country 
at the beginning of a coordinated programme. Normally, the tool for this 
assessment is the Common Country Assessment. The detailed UNDAF 
guidelines also offer the option of replacing the CCA partially or in full 
Table 4:   Size of UN Country Teams by world regions 
Region Regional 
fraction 
of world 
total 
Average  
size of 
UNCT per 
country 
Average 
specialised 
agencies 
Average  
funds and 
pro-
grammes 
Average 
size 
other UN 
entities 
Asia & 
Pacific 
21.5 % 18.2 6.0 7.2 5.0
Arab States 13.2 % 15.6 5.3 6.2 4.2
Africa 32.4 % 15.3 5.9 6.6 2.8
Europe & 
CIS 
14.7 % 12.5 4.4 5.5 2.6
Latin 
America & 
Caribbean 
18.2 % 14.8 5.3 5.8 3.7
World 100 % 15.3 5.5 6.3 3.5
Source:   own compilation based on data from UNDG / UN DOCO (2012) 
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with suitable analytical work conducted by other donors under the con-
dition that the government is in the lead and the UNCT is participating 
in the process. The CCA is also increasingly used in the transition phase 
between a humanitarian mission and regular development engagement 
as an analytical “bridge”.
 • Programming: While the CCA constitutes an agreed point of reference 
and departure, the UN development assistance framework serves as the 
consolidated UN business plan that is negotiated and agreed upon with 
the partner government. The UNDAF constitutes the common strategic 
planning (and subsequent results-reporting) tool for the UN develop-
ment system. It generally runs for a period of three to six years and 
efforts are undertaken to synchronize it with national planning cycles. 
The detailed guidelines for the preparation of the UNDAF90 have un-
dergone significant evolution since publication of the first guidance in 
1999, with current guidelines (2010) requiring the UNCT to identify 
three to five priorities among the challenges identified in the CCA. The 
RC normally leads the consensual process of drawing-up the UNDAF, is 
responsible for ensuring the engagement of specialised and non-resident 
agencies, and – in the rare instances where the UN entities are unable to 
reach a compromise – acts as final arbitrator. As the UNDAF normally 
also defines a funding gap, the RC also leads fundraising efforts. The 
final UNDAF is sent to the UNDG Chair as well as the partner-country 
government for approval.
 • Programme implementation: With the UNDAF adopted at the level of 
the UNCT, responsibility for implementation of individual activities, 
projects and programmes underneath the framework remains with the 
individual UN funds, programmes and agencies on the basis of separate 
and entity-specific country programme documents. This requires that 
UNDAF contributions are normally clearly delineated by UN entities. 
The role of the RC during this phase remains limited to formal oversight.
 • Monitoring and reporting: An agreed UNDAF includes a detailed matrix 
for results-reporting. The UNDAF guidelines foresee an annual review 
of the UNDAF to take stock and reflect changes, as well as preparation 
of a more comprehensive UNDAF progress report, which is to take place 
90 Programming Reference Guide, UNDG webpage; online: http://www.undg.org/index.
cfm?P=4 (accessed 15 Dec. 2012). 
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at least once during the UNDAF cycle and to be submitted by the RC to 
the partner government.
In performing UN internal aid coordination on the basis of these instruments, 
RCs are faced with a number of challenges in practice, relating in particu-
lar to the programming and implementation phases. The UNDAF process 
has strengthened collaboration among UN entities, including through the 
encouragement of joint programmes between two or more UN entities. At 
the same time, the instrument constitutes an “intra-UN initiative”, which 
does relatively little to promote cooperation with other donors (Vatterodt 
2008, 35). Against this background, there has been a long-standing debate 
about the operationalisation of the UNDAF and whether it should evolve 
into a singular planning tool for all UN entities. As a matter of fact, the in-
sufficient binding power of the UNDAF has been acknowledged by UNDG 
itself, which states in one of its guiding documents that “the  UNDAF alone 
cannot ensure coherent and comprehensive operationalization”, suggesting 
that only a single operational document that would replace entity-specif-
ic programming and other operational documents would “reduce […] the 
risk that UN system agencies’ programmes become fragmented.”91 Address-
ing this limitation, the Secretary-General recently proposed to replace all 
entity-specific country-programming documents at the country level with 
“One Programmes” that would bring together, at the level of each country, 
the strategy and operations with the budgets, all in one document (UNSG 
2012b, 32). Such measures have the potential to strengthen the integration 
of the UN development system at the country level, but given that the UN-
DAF process has already been heavily criticised for its length and inflexibil-
ity, there are questions about the cost-benefit implications of such a model. 
More specifically, the UNDAF has been criticised as a strategic framework 
that does not specify concrete steps in terms of programme implementa-
tion and the operations of individual UN entities, thus falling short of the 
intended reduction in inefficiencies and overlap. As is the case now, upon 
preparation of the UNDAF, entities generally prepare their individual agen-
cy country programmes in alignment with the priorities identified in the 
UNDAF. Such duplication of work, however, seems unavoidable, given the 
vertical structure of the UN development system.
91 UNDAF Action Plan Guidance, UNDG webpage, online: http://www.undg.org/index. 
cfm?P=4 (accessed 17 Dec. 2012). 
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In addition to these challenges surrounding the central UN internal aid-co-
ordination tool at the hands of RCs, there is a broader challenge resulting 
from an ambiguous mandate regarding the implementation of the UNDAF. 
Whereas the RC guidelines outline that RCs “facilitate and oversee […] the 
design and implementation of the UNDAF” (UNDG 2008c, 6), in practice 
the general understanding is that the RC’s role in UNDAF implementation 
remains rather limited following its adoption – in line with the RC terms of 
reference, which state that “UNCT member agencies maintain their author-
ity over their mandates, resources […] and implementation choices […]” 
(UNDG 2008c, 3).92
The matter is further complicated by the funding trends within the UN devel-
opment system (cf. Chapter 2), which renders the medium-term orientation 
of the UNDAF at odds with the short-term availability of funding within 
individual UN entities. As a result, there often exist significant differences 
between “intended” and “realised” strategy in practice (UNSG 2012b, 31). 
Whereas the fact that the RC is called upon to lead fundraising efforts for 
the UNDAF funding gap for the UNCT as a whole can be seen, in principle, 
as a positive measure to increase coherency, it has also aggravated criticism 
regarding independence and the link to UNDP.
Monitoring and reporting processes continue to emphasise vertical lines of 
accountability (i.e. within individual UN entities), as evidenced by the fact 
that submission of the UNDAF report to the partner government lacks an 
equivalent within the UN development system. Individual UN funds, pro-
grammes and agencies continue to remain accountable for performance of 
“their” projects and programmes, and report to their HQs and executive 
boards through individual progress reports accordingly. Together, these are 
clear signs of duplication resulting from the vertical organisation of the 
92 In order to address challenges arising from disagreements among the UNCT during the 
implementation phase, UNDG promotes the adoption of “codes of conduct” to be nego-
tiated among the UNCT members and the RC. For cases of severe conflicts, a “dispute 
resolution mechanism” was created in 2009 – compare “Dispute Resolution Mechanism”, 
adopted by UNDG on 29 January, 2009, available on the UNDG webpage; online: http://
www.undg.org/index.cfm?P=133 (accessed 17 Dec. 2012). The mechanism aims at re-
solving “disputes associated with UNCT common processes such as common services, 
common programming, joint programmes, and related funding”. The mechanism foresees 
a country-level process aimed at reaching an amicable resolution between the disputing 
parties, which would normally (i.e. when he / she would not be one of the concerned 
parties) be led by the RC.
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UN development system. In a move to counter the diffused accountability 
among the UNCT and the RC, the mechanism was broadened to include an 
additional reporting requirement to the partner-country government as well. 
The UNCT has at its disposal an instrument to assess the RC (One80 tool), 
which, however, is not matched with a corresponding instrument for the RC 
to hold UNCT members accountable for UNDAF results achieved.
A crucial aspect of all three dimensions of aid coordination – but in particu-
lar of the UN internal role as the main focus of the work of RCs – concerns 
the RC’s capacity and capability to perform the required tasks. The main 
sources of funding for the RC system,93 which are administered by DOCO, 
come in the form of direct support, which UNDP – as manager of the system 
– provides from its core resources, and which generally covers the salaries 
of RCs and their immediate staff, as well as office maintenance and a small 
budget (Support for Resident Coordinators fund) for coordination expenses. 
Other funds, programmes and agencies often contribute to the direct func-
tioning of the RC system as well by means of seconding specialised staff or 
in-kind contributions, and donors also provide additional forms of support 
– mostly to be used for additional specialised personnel in RC offices – in 
the form of earmarked contributions through the UN country coordination 
fund (UNCCF). At the request of UN member states,94 efforts are currently 
underway to put the financing of the RC system on a more equitable basis 
through the introduction of a cost-sharing arrangement among participating 
UN entities, which UNDG members have, in principle, already agreed to 
(UNSG 2012b). This will be an important contribution to ensure that RCs 
have the necessary resources to fulfil their role effectively.
Political economy analysis offers some insights into the reasons why the 
role of the RCs in coordinating UNCT assistance has met with significant 
challenges. A number of reasons that can be found within the UN develop-
ment system include:
93 Through the TCPR (2007) resolution, member states have requested the Secretary-Gen-
eral to report on an annual basis on the “functioning of the RC system, including costs 
and benefits”. The reports, five of which have been published by 2012, provide detailed 
information and figures, including on how the RC system is being funded (cf. UNSG 
2008b, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012a).
94 Through the ECOSOC resolution E/2011/7; online: http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/
docs/2011/res%202011.7.pdf (accessed 15 Dec. 2012).
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 • incentive system within individual agencies that sometimes favour com-
petition and distinct action over cooperation, as this could be seen to 
enhance visibility;
 • competition of agencies for turf and donor funding;
 • imbalances within the composition of the UNCT (e.g. one dominant 
agency), which can cause fear of a “takeover” among the other agencies.
At the same time, a number of factors were also identified that point towards 
obstacles to be encountered on the side of partner governments, including:
 • Governments may wish to preserve their freedom in playing individual 
UN entities off against each other, including for the purpose of improv-
ing the terms of their engagement;
 • Governments are wary of any approach that brings the UNCT closer 
together, based on a concern that it could lead to stronger demands and 
pressure to reform by a “united front” that is “ganging up” against their 
interests (cf. WB 1998, 21).
The theoretical model suggested that – depending on different country con-
texts – the choice of most-effective and efficient coordination model de-
pended upon the outcome of a thorough cost-benefit analysis of the level 
of maximum internal and external programme consistency, justifiable in 
terms of formalisation and institutionalisation costs. At the request of mem-
ber states, the Secretariat has been covering the matter in regular intervals 
through the “Functioning of the Resident Coordinator System, including 
costs and benefits” reporting series (UNSG 2008b, 2009, 2010, 2011) and 
has commissioned two comprehensive studies.95 All sources contain strong 
reservations concerning the possibility of establishing the costs and benefits 
of the RC system in monetary terms, pointing in particular to the inherent 
difficulties of quantifying harmonisation gains, which accrue in particular 
on the partner government side in terms of reduced transaction costs and 
reduced strain on administrative capacities (Ronald 2011, 28; UNSG 2011, 
22). At the same time, the Secretariat argues that given the reductions in du-
plication and the synergies that have been realised, “the costs of coordinat-
ing the UN development system remain small compared to the total value of 
country programmable resources” and that it is “reasonable to assume that 
benefits of coordination exceed the costs” (UNSG 2012b). Against all odds, 
95 Results of only one of the two studies are publicly available (Ronald 2011). 
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the UN development system therefore seems to have been able to establish 
mechanisms, processes and procedures that, given what had been identified 
as a very challenging context, are forging a minimum level of coherence.
4.3 Shifting expectations? The evolving role and mandate 
for RCs
RCs serve a multitude of needs and perform numerous roles, which, togeth-
er, are only partially reflected in their mandate. This is because the func-
tioning of RCs within the broader country-level framework covering both 
internal and external aid coordination – as well as processes of alignment 
with the government’s plans and priorities, as described above – has signifi-
cantly evolved over time. Drawing on stakeholder perspectives as well as an 
analysis of the existing body of regulations and operational guidance, this 
section provides an overview and assessment of the evolution of the RC role 
and mandate.
What should be the role and mandate of an RC at the country level? Al-
though it is seemingly straightforward, this question elicits a surprisingly 
broad range of responses from stakeholders and experts in the RC system. 
The main reason for this cacophony of perceptions about the future role of 
the RC relates to the fact that there is currently significant political disagree-
ment and a broad variety of competing perceptions among all concerned 
stakeholders about what is – and ought to be in the future – the role and 
mandate of the RC, which is at least partly in line with the saying “where 
you sit is where you stand”. Entities with an immediate interest or stake in 
the RC system include:
 • First, those that benefit from, and are affected by, its performance, that 
is, primarily partner governments and UN entities involved in operation-
al activities for development;
 • Second, those that are responsible for its functioning, in particular UN 
member states providing policy advice through ECOSOC and other 
fora; UNDP managing the RC system on behalf of the UN development 
system; and DOCO as UNDG’s support structure;
 • Third, depending on the country contexts, those that collaborate with 
the RC system and rely on it, at least in some areas of their work, such 
as humanitarian actors (in the case of RC / HC double-hatting), several 
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departments of the UN Secretariat96 in integrated peacekeeping, peace-
building or political missions, the Peacebuilding Commission, the Secu-
rity Council, etc.;
 • Finally, those individuals that perform its mandate, that is, the Resident 
Coordinators themselves.
Longstanding disagreements about the RC role have also made negotiations 
about the RC policy and operational guidelines more difficult, and have 
contributed to their complexity and ambiguity. It was felt that this was nec-
essary to accommodate competing perceptions of key stakeholders (com-
pare previous sections), but also because provisions – as the outcome of 
long negotiations and language (compromise) – have remained rather static 
on the basis of the incentive for all stakeholders not to reopen proceedings. 
An interrelated point is that the RC operational guidelines have been found 
to be little understood and known by partner governments, members of the 
UNCT and RCs themselves.97 All of these factors have contributed to a dis-
crepancy between the de jure mandate and the de facto role played by RCs 
in practice, which is becoming increasingly apparent.
Differences in opinion about the future RC role and mandate tend to relate 
to a limited number of aspects, with competing claims and sensitivities os-
cillating across a spectrum of opinions. The continua presented in Figure 5 
can be seen as the major areas of disagreement.
 • Mandate: Pertaining to the interaction with the partner government, per-
ceptions of how the RC mandate should evolve are manifold, in par-
ticular when it comes to sensitive political matters, such as addressing 
internal affairs of partner countries, but also advocacy for UN norms and 
values. At the core of the debate lies the question of whether – and to 
what extent – the RC, as the “embodiment” of the UN, ought to pursue 
an agenda that could potentially be independent of a partner country. The 
traditional conception foresees a predominantly technical – as opposed 
to normative or political – approach towards the RC relationship with 
partner governments, wherein the RC interprets the partner country’s de-
velopment challenges in order to design an appropriate UN engagement. 
96 In particular the Department for Political Affairs (DPA), Department for Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO) and Public Information (DPI). 
97 This has been confirmed through personal interviews by the author, October–December 
2012.
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Some stakeholders, however, see the need for a more insistent RC role, 
in particular in addressing human rights challenges, if circumstances de-
mand and allow for it. The latter implies that an RC office commands the 
necessary capabilities for systematic human rights monitoring. Others 
categorically caution against such an evolution, which they perceive to 
be incongruent with the fundamental principle of the sovereignty of all 
UN member states.98 While its inclusion was initially disputed, the RC 
job description today includes some “carefully worded” references, in 
 
98 The matter is further complicated in situations where the RC function is integrated into 
a political or peacekeeping UN mission mandated by the UN Security Council, but also 
in partner countries that fully – (or to a large extent) “self-fund” a UN presence in their 
country. In this regard, one interviewee (personal interview by the author, October 2012) 
stated: “A situation where the normative UN mandate is ‘on demand’ only needs to be 
avoided.”
Orientation
internal - external
Coverage
dev. - systemwide
Authority
informal - formal
Alignment with partner country
RC
Mandate
normative - technical
Figure 5: Differing perceptions of the RC role and mandate 
 
Source: own compilation 
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particular to human rights advocacy as part of the RC mandate; human 
rights concerns have also been included in the RC induction training.99 
While difficult to separate conceptually, there seems to be much less 
of a consensus, however, regarding a more “political” engagement of 
RCs. Such an engagement is taking place in practice, for example, at 
the margins of a transition from a humanitarian or post-conflict mis-
sion to a development-focussed mission. Closer involvement of the RC 
in political affairs, which in UN circles is often and somewhat vaguely 
referred to under the label of “UN ambassador”, has seen strong op-
position by a majority of UN member states, as it implies fundamen-
tal changes in the relationship of states to the RC, and the UN more 
broadly. Compounding the matter is the perception that such chang-
es would imply a closer link between the RC system and the Secre-
tariat, and in particular the Department of Political Affairs, which is 
generally associated with Security Council interventions. In theory, 
it would also require an expansion of the RC representation to make 
it universal in all countries. Taking into account the increasing inter-
linkages between development issues and the prevalent institutional 
and political framework at the country level, there are indications that 
steps towards a broadening of the normative and political roles of the 
RC are taking place in practice, albeit short of recourse to mandate re-
definition, given the cumbersome formal processes within UNDG.100
 • Coverage: The growing diversity of, and differentiation among, devel-
oping-country conditions has also had a more direct impact on the UN 
internal aid-coordination system, which has stipulated that the RC sys-
tem, over time, moved “beyond development” (ibid.). The orientation of 
the RC system traditionally was set to the confines of the UN develop-
ment system. More recently, however, the links with other areas of UN 
work – humanitarian missions, advising and assisting political transi-
tions, engaging on human rights, in addition to building capacity for 
development – are becoming more pronounced, resulting in traditional 
silos being broken down. This becomes evident, for example, from the 
composition of the UNCT as the main frame of reference for the work of 
the RC, which encompasses all entities of the UN system that carry out 
99 Personal interview by the author, September 2012.
100 Ibid. Several interviewees alluded to these changes, with some referring to an “evolution 
by stealth”.
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“operational activities for development, emergency, recovery and transi-
tion” – a description that goes well beyond the immediate development 
focus. Member states disagree in their assessments concerning to what 
extent such an evolution of the RC as the “development coordinator” 
towards a “UN coordinator” is welcome, and whether – or not – it should 
be encouraged to progress further.
 • Authority: Regarding the UN internal aid-coordination dimension, 
among stakeholders there is an intense ongoing debate about the type of 
relationship between the RC and UNCT that maximises the efficiency, 
effectiveness and relevance of the UN’s contribution to the development 
of its partner countries (cf. definition of aid coordination in section 1.2). 
At the heart of this debate is the question of whether the current colle-
gial and collaborative system, with an RC whose authority as “primus 
inter pares” relies exclusively on the voluntary cooperation of UNCT 
members, ought to be changed to a system whereby the RC would be en-
dowed with formal authority to manage and direct the activities and pro-
grammes of UN entities at the country level (“RC as arbitrator or man-
ager”). As it stands today, the RC mainly functions as an intermediary 
between different groups, relying to a great extent on personal capacity 
and charisma to perform his / her duties. This role is reflected in the la-
bels other than “coordinator” that at are frequently chosen among stake-
holders in referring to the RC, labels which include “conveyor”, “com-
municator”, “team leader”, “service point”, “enabling mechanism” and 
“custodian for cross-cutting issues”. At the same time, instances of RCs 
acting as arbitrators are rare and only possible within strict confines.101 
The option at the other side of the spectrum is frequently referred to as 
an “empowered RC”102 model, which has gathered substantial support 
from within the UN membership, as well as some strong resistance.
 • Orientation: A final area of debate concerns the particular balance be-
tween the internal and external aid-coordination functions of the RC 
mandate. As UN internal aid coordination has become the “core busi-
101 According to one interviewee, in case of arising conflicts, UNCT members are “happy 
that there is a higher authority to take up difficult issues” (personal interview by the 
author, September 2012). 
102 The term itself originates from the report of the High-Level Panel on System-Wide 
Coherence (2006), which states that “To manage the One United Nations country pro-
gramme there needs to be one leader – an empowered resident coordinator” (A/61/583, 
p. 11). 
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ness” of the RC, there have been concerns that UNCT meetings are too 
often structured around UN internal organisational matters, and that the 
RC function is becoming too secluded and unresponsive towards devel-
opments within broader donor groupings at the country level as a result.
Against this background, the immediate conclusion is that the debates out-
lined above need to be pursued further to eventually forge a new consensus 
among UN member states and other stakeholders regarding – in particular, 
but not exclusively – the focus of the RC mandate, the extent of its coverage, 
the degree of its authority and the point of reference for its orientation. The 
broader aim would be to bring expectations placed upon the RC system and 
evolving demands in line (again) with the existing mandate and capabilities 
of the function. In practice, this would require changes to a number of insti-
tutions and processes surrounding the RC system, including selection and 
appointment, training, operational and policy guidelines; capacity- and sup-
port-provided structures; as well as career-path development. Established 
practice would see such efforts implemented through an inter-agency pro-
cess with UNDG at its core. Finally, a review of the guiding principles for 
the RC system outlined in the TCPR 2007 resolution – that is, that the RC 
system should be owned by the UN development system as a whole, that its 
functioning should be participatory, collegial and accountable, and that its 
management is firmly anchored in UNDP (cf. Section 3.3) – should form 
part of the intergovernmental debates about the future evolution of the RC 
system.
5 Differentiation within the Resident Coordinator 
 system
The question that requires thorough examination is when is leverage max-
imized by the system working as a system, when by individual agencies 
acting individually and when do specific configurations need to be tai-
lored to the specific issue at hand. It is improbable that there is a one-
size-fits-all prescription for maximizing leverage – Secretary-General  
(UNSG 2012b, 15)
The RC system does not function the same way in every country and “the 
exact modalities of representation and coordination through the resident co-
ordinators vary from country to country” (Fomerand / Dijkzeul 2007, 572). 
The previous chapter assessed what could be called the “standard option”, 
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or default case, of the RC system. However, this is not the only option that 
exists. The UN development system today has a presence in a diverse range 
of more than 130 countries worldwide, including China, the Marshall Is-
lands, Somalia, Haiti and Chile, each of which faces particular development 
challenges. Among the big providers of development cooperation, the UN is 
often viewed as the one actor with the most heterogeneous partner-country 
portfolio, and the one with the most extensive exposure to diverse country 
situations. The diverse range of the UN partner countries has come to shape 
the configuration and functioning of the UN development and RC systems.
Given the functionally decentralised character of the UN development sys-
tem – and against the background of the historical evidence – the chances 
for the formation of an overarching strategy to guide the adaptation of the 
UN country-level presence and coordination-mechanisms presence remain 
rather low. Voluntary inter-agency coordination on the basis of member state 
policy guidance, which the UN development system has been relying on 
throughout its existence, will in all likelihood continue to be central to UN 
country-level aid coordination. It is therefore a central premise of this paper 
that practical adaptation within the UN development system would have to 
evolve in an iterative fashion from the bottom-up through the RC system.
Against the background of a rapidly changing geographic localisation of 
poor people, expectations are that the diverse range of UN partner coun-
tries is set to increase further in the future. In recent years, the number of 
low-income countries has been in retreat, and the world has registered a 
corresponding rise in the number of middle-income countries. This has re-
sulted in what Kanbur / Sumner (2011) have called “the new geography 
of global poverty”. Most recently, the Secretary-General – in his report of 
progress in implementing the TCPR 2007 and in previous resolutions con-
taining policy guidance for the operational activities for development within 
the UN development system (UNSG 2012b) – has identified a number of 
additional global trends that, in his view, the UN development system needs 
to respond to. These include the emergence of new global centres of growth, 
the intensification of global challenge such as climate change, a changing 
relationship between states and markets as well as the emergence of new 
development actors (cf. also Jenks 2012). The debate about the implications 
of these new trends for the UN development system country presence, in-
cluding the RC system, has recently started, but so far it has not resulted in 
any conclusive plan. To be sure, the UN development system is by no means 
the only development player that is struggling with how to respond to the 
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emerging development trends and realign its missions, policies and country 
presence to the new realities. Similar debates are taking place within the 
World Bank, the European Union (EU) and other institutions.
This chapter examines the differentiation of the RC system. The first section 
explores some of the underlying factors suggested to be behind the differen-
tiated application of the RC system in practice, which are then substantiated 
through a stock-taking of the different “hats” of RCs. On that basis, six 
“models” of how the RC is being applied in current practice are identified. 
The final section suggests some potential avenues for further adaptation of 
the RC system in the future.
5.1 Criteria for differentiation
There are multiple criteria that have an impact on a differentiated engage-
ment with partner countries, and they can be found both on the side of part-
ner governments as well as within the characteristics and functioning of 
the engaging donor institution. On the former, arguably the most common-
ly held principle is country income group. Presenting the frame of refer-
ence is the World Bank classification, which is based on certain monetary 
thresholds of per capita income expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP) 
and ranges from low-income countries (LICs) to middle-income countries 
(MICs) – which is further divided into upper-middle and lower-middle 
groups (U-MIC and L-MIC) – and finally to high-income countries (HICs). 
The government’s approach towards its role and engagement in day-to-day 
aid coordination is another criterion.
Similarly, characteristics on the side of the engaging donor are equally im-
portant in determining how aid agencies structure their relationships with 
partner countries. Overall volume, composition (technical, financial coop-
eration) or sectoral focus or specific modalities (budget support, loans, tri-
angular cooperation, etc.) are all possible criteria. With regards to the RC 
system, the degree of authority in internal and external aid coordination is 
seen as being among the important factors. Arguably, one of the strongest 
conditioning effects, however, relates to the size and composition of the 
UNCT. That the UN development system aims to respond to partner-coun-
try needs and priorities is a fundamental and venerable objective of the UN 
development system, which has long been recognised by the UN member 
states as well as within the system. Accordingly, member states in the Gen-
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eral Assembly103 have stated that “the country-level presence of the United 
Nations system should be tailored to meet the specific development needs 
of recipient countries, as required by their country programmes.” Similarly, 
the Chair of UNDG, Helen Clark, at a conference of the DaO countries in 
Tirana in 2012 remarked that the group aimed “to ensure that the develop-
ment system offers appropriate configurations and responses in the diverse 
range of countries we serve.”104 Both of these requirements have fundamen-
tal and far-reaching implications for all of the UN entities: While an ade-
quate response relates in particular to the services offered and the skill sets 
and capacities available within the UN development system at the request of 
a partner country, the configuration boils down to the more practical issue 
of which UN entity should be engaged or not in which country, and wheth-
er that engagement requires a presence (i.e. a representation office) on the 
ground, or whether the status of non-resident agency suffices.
Indeed, the composition and size of the UN presence at the country level – 
that is, who is a member or not of the UNCT – is a sensitive matter whose 
influence on the RC functioning is as obvious as it is important. Because 
of its decentralised character of decision-making, and given the strong em-
phasis on the individual responsibility of the individual entities, the UN 
development system is not endued with a strategy to guide expansion and 
contraction of its combined country-level presence. Rather, differentiation 
of the UN presence to date has taken place in an arbitrary and ad-hoc fash-
ion, with individual UN funds, agencies and programmes following a varie-
ty of criteria with individual logics that determine under what circumstances 
a country office is established. Among others, these include country income 
group, programme volume thresholds and level of need. This fact has been 
confirmed by the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU 1997, 9), which noted that “The 
context for country-level representation is extremely complex and conforms 
to no apparent blueprint of coordination among the UN entities.”
In a wayward attempt to substitute and compensate for the deficiencies re-
sulting from the lack of a strategic approach towards UN field-level com-
position, the claim towards participation and inclusiveness has emerged as 
103 UNGA (2005); Resolution A/RES/59/250, para. 62. 
104 Helen Clark, UNDG Chair on the occasion of the opening of the DaO conference in 
Tirana, 27 June 2012; online: http://www.undg.org/docs/12556/Helen%20Clark%20
Speech%20-%20Delivering%20as%20One%20Tirana%20Conference%20June%20
2012.pdf.
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a principle cornerstone of the functioning of the UN development system. 
Indeed, documented references to the claim that participation in aid-coordi-
nation processes takes places on the basis of all-encompassing participation 
of all the entities of the UN system that carry out operational activities for 
development, emergency, recovery and transition within a partner country 
are so numerous that they justify the notion of a principle of inclusive-
ness being in place. Crucially, this principle entails that all members of the 
UNCT participate in aid-coordination processes in an equal fashion and 
on the basis of principally equal rights and obligations as members of the 
UNCT. Concerns about the usefulness of the inclusiveness principle have 
been voiced repeatedly, including from a majority of the interviewees,105 re-
lating in particular to the resulting increase in transaction costs. While often 
not fully justified through equivalent gains in coherency, additional costs 
incurred through adherence to the inclusiveness principle have to be borne, 
as it was regarded as the “politically correct route” towards aid coordina-
tion. At the same time, it has been argued that while additional coordination 
costs through the inclusiveness principle may be incurred on the side of the 
UNCT through entities, benefits may be accrued outside the UNCT (i.e. 
with partner governments). More recently, a coordination model alternative 
to an inclusive approach has been proposed that focusses instead on closer 
coordination processes and procedures for a smaller group of UN entities 
whose combined operations account for a vast majority of all UNCT fund-
ing available within particular countries. This “critical mass”106 approach 
advocates closer collaboration of those few UN “large-spending” entities, 
in particular in the area of harmonising business practices, but also on the 
UNDAF as poverty-alleviation frameworks.
Finally, adaptation can also be analysed in terms of functional criteria that 
are connected to the specific tasks performed by a country representation. 
Since these are of particular importance in the case of the RC system, they 
are the focus of the next section.
105 One interviewee, for example, stated that “[t]he push towards universality is a struggle” 
(source: personal interview by the author, October 2012).
106 Compare the study by Lindores (2012), which has been prepared in preparation of the 
QCPR process on behalf of the UN Secretariat. 
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5.2 The different “hats” of the Resident Coordinator
In response to the specific demands and requirements placed before and 
upon it in different countries, a multifaceted RC system has evolved over 
time. In this regard, the historical example of assigning the RC function 
to the Resident Representative of UNDP through “double-hatting” can be 
seen to have set a precedent within the UN development system. It has sub-
sequently been replicated on a number of occasions, to the extent that it is 
possible to speak of a trend of assigning additional functions and respon-
sibilities to the RCs. Consequently, this has led to a situation that one in-
terviewee described with the statement: “half of the time, an RC is two to 
three things at the same time.”107 The status of an RC as (generally) the most 
senior official of the UN at the country level seems to have been particularly 
appealing grounds for the General Assembly – but also for the Secretariat 
and UNDG – to put the capacity of the RC to use for other purposes, includ-
ing some that clearly cross the boundary into areas outside the original area 
of focus, that is, “development”.
107 Personal interview by the author, September 2012.
  
Table 5:   Adaptation patterns of the RC system 
Label Defining 
RC hat 
Number of 
Countries 
1. None – 4 
2. Standard RC 58 
3. Enhanced RC DaO pilot 8 
DaO self-starter 25 
4. Humanitarian 
    Mission 
HC 43 
5. Integrated Mission DSRSG etc. 15 
6. Joint Office Joint Office 
Representative 
1 
Note:  Due to overlap of functions, categories are not mutually exclusive. 
Source:   Based on UNDG / UN DOCO (2012) 
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On the basis of additional functions assigned to the RC function, there are 
at least six patterns of adaptation that can be distinguished. Apart from the 
“standard” or default case, which has been described and analysed above, as 
well as the case of partner governments having opted to coordinate UNCT 
activities themselves and where there has been no RC assigned as a result, 
four other adaptation patterns can be distinguished. The first relates to the 
group of countries following the “Delivering as One” model, which was es-
tablished to pilot a different and much more closely integrated model of aid 
coordination. The combining of the RC function with the Humanitarian Co-
ordinator hat in humanitarian contexts, and the assignment of the (Deputy) 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General function in the context of a 
political and/or peacekeeping mission (“integrated mission”) entail signifi-
cant modifications of the standard aid-coordination practices, which justify 
their inclusion in this list.
The final model constitutes the Joint Office model, which was started in 
2006 in Cape Verde in an attempt to cut transaction costs by means of direct 
agency representation. Table 5 provides an overview of the six adaptation 
patterns (cf. also Lindores 2012), including a snapshot – as changes fre-
quently occur – of the number of country cases where the different mod-
els are currently being applied. As has been pointed out before, double- or 
triple-hatting is a common practice, in particular for the HC and DSRSG 
functions, but applies to the other models as well, which means that there 
is significant overlap between the different models.108 In addition, a signifi-
cant degree of intra-group variation also exists, which complicates analysis 
further; for example, the DaO model has been built around the principle of 
“no one size fits all”, and as a result none of the models look and function 
alike. This reality has also been recognised by the Secretary-General in one 
of his latest reports:
The Resident Coordinator system has generally been adapted to the practi-
cal considerations that arise in each programme country. Certain broader 
groupings have emerged, such as the “delivering-as-one” model and crisis 
and transition countries. Even within those groupings, however, the ap-
plication of the key guidelines of the Resident Coordinator system can be 
quite different. (UNSG 2012b, 28)
The following subsections explore the models in greater detail.
108 For example, following the establishment of the Joint Office in Cape Verde, the country 
also joined the group of countries piloting the “Delivering as One” model. 
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5.2.1 No Resident Coordinator
In many respects, the model of no RC constitutes an atypical case that has 
only been applied in a very limited number of countries. The two principal 
rationales for the model are either a UN presence that is too small to jus-
tify dispatching an RC (i.e. the size of the UNCT falls below the delivery 
threshold for an RC presence), or the partner government has made a re-
quest to that effect. The case applies in particular at times of transition and 
phasing-out of a UN engagement. As such, there are no specific provisions 
for the functioning of aid coordination and the workings of the UNCT under 
these circumstances. In principle the case of a government objecting to the 
appointment of an RC entails the government taking full ownership and re-
sponsibility for UN internal aid coordination, which, however, is generally 
aided by the fact that the UNCT presence tends to be rather small within 
the group of concerned countries. The model thus lends itself to country 
situations wherein a government’s capacity to coordinate the UN (and oth-
er donors’) engagement is developed and robust, and the intermediary RC 
function is no longer required. Poland is an example of a country where 
the government opted for not having any more RCs after the departure of 
the last officeholder in 2006. Because Poland is a high-income country and 
member of the EU (since 2004) and the OECD (since 2006) and since 1998 
a provider of development assistance, only six UN entities that are acting in 
an advisory role to the government remained after the departure of the RC, 
and it is likely that the country-level presence will be phased out completely 
in the not too distant future.
5.2.2 Enhanced Resident Coordinator / Delivering as One
The DaO is a comprehensive reform initiative based on the four elements 
“one programme”, “one budget”, “one office” and “one leader”. Stemming 
in part from earlier proposals for more effective collaboration among the 
ExCom agencies, the drive to ensure inclusiveness (see Section 5.1) eventu-
ally put at odds that objective though a significant enlargement of the group 
size. Currently, around 20 per cent of all UNCTs are implementing DaO 
or have indicated a willingness to do so in the near future (UNDG 2010, 
foreword). Given that “no one size fits all” had been established as one of 
the fundamental principles of the DaO initiative, there is a significant de-
gree of intra-group variation within the eight original pilot countries, but in 
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particular among the 25+ so-called self-starter countries, which joined the 
bandwagon at a later stage. In order to account for the principle, the opera-
tional guidance documents for the RCs and UNCTs within DaO countries 
that were developed as a general rule had to provide rather broad guidance. 
This left operational details to be decided through inter-agency negotiations 
at the country level and tended to result in consensus at the level of the 
least-ambitious entity. A particular challenge with the DaO for the UN en-
tities was that some of the new measures were introduced without much 
regard for existing procedures,109 which meant additional work for RCs and 
UNCTs before processes were eventually harmonised.
Albeit much broader in focus on the basis of the original four principles, the 
establishment of an “enhanced RC” acting as the one leader was envisioned 
as a key component from the start. It has been pointed out that many of the 
DaO components had been around for some years and, to an extent, the DaO 
concept only consolidated and “rebranded” them in a more comprehensive 
package (Mueller 2010b, 39). This also holds true somewhat for the “one 
leader”. However, a few elements distinguish the enhanced RC from the 
standard case:
 • Funding: Formal authority for allocation decisions over funds from the 
pooled and unearmarked country-level “One funds”;
 • Programming: Final decision-making authority over priorities of the 
“one programme” in consultation with UNCT members in case of dis-
agreement;
 • Dialogue: Enhanced relations with partner-country government through 
participation in the “Joint DaO Steering Committees”, which have been 
established in all pilot countries;
 • Visibility: Greater prominence and visibility of the enhanced RC, in-
cluding through centralised country-level fundraising mandate. In most 
DaO pilot countries, the UNCTs have voluntarily committed themselves 
to a “code of conduct” or signed a “memorandum of understanding” that 
gives the RC a more central position.
109 This relates in particular to the “one programme”, which duplicated the earlier UNDAF 
process (Mueller 2010b, 40). Reporting requirements also duplicated existing procedures 
(Todd et al. 2012). 
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It is likely that the potential benefits of the DaO model are not distributed 
evenly and that the use of the model is therefore more appealing to certain 
countries than to others. Initial reactions to the High-Level Panel’s propos-
al are particularly informative in this respect. Accordingly, whereas some 
of the larger developing countries – whose capacities to manage aid are 
rather strong – feared any new conditionalities and limitations arising from 
a more “united front” (more decentralised countries saw little benefit for 
themselves as well), it was smaller, more aid-dependent countries that saw 
the DaO model as an opportunity to reduce their transaction costs and re-
ceive a single entry point in dealing with the fragmented UN development 
system (Mueller 2010b, 38; Weinlich 2011a). In addition, there might have 
also been a certain expectation that they stood to benefit from increased 
donor contributions in support of the new initiative through participation in 
the DaO model110 (Mueller 2010b, 40). The majority of the pilot countries 
such as Rwanda, Tanzania, Vietnam and Mozambique indeed fall into the 
described category (but not the exception, Pakistan).111
In addition, it also has to be kept in mind that participation in the DaO 
model was self-selected, which means that application of the DaO model 
has benefitted from strong government commitment to UN internal reform. 
This fact has also been attested to by the head of UNDG, Helen Clark, who 
stated: “What makes the process around Delivering as One unique is that 
change is being driven from the country level up – fostering national own-
ership. Indeed, the process wouldn’t get off the ground if host countries did 
not want it.”112
110 Mueller (2010b, 40) points out that a key function of the multi-year “One budgetary 
frameworks” was to identify a funding gap for the overall engagement of the UN devel-
opment system – unlike the UNDAF. In that sense, being used as a resource mobilisation 
tool was one objective closely tied to the introduction of the one budgets. The HLP had 
initially proposed a single budget (instead of a budget framework) based on the mandato-
ry pooling of agency resources, however, this proofed politically not feasible
111 Severino / Ray (2010, 19 ff.) have advanced a similar argument along these lines, namely, 
that the Paris Declaration and aid-effectiveness principles (in a broad sense, the DaO can 
be subsumed under this category) have only very limited applicability for a larger group 
of developing countries. 
112 Helen Clark, UNDG Chair, remarks at the Wilton Park conference on the future of the 
UN development system, 18 November 2010; online: http://content.undp.org/go/news-
room/2010/november/helen-clark-wilton-park-conference-on-future-of-the-un-develop-
ment-system.en.
Timo Mahn
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)108
An independent evaluation of the DaO in 2012 found that the overall goals 
of the initiative are partially being achieved, albeit at the cost of higher trans-
action costs for the participating UN development system entities (Todd et 
al. 2012). One finding that bears particular relevance for the RC system has 
been that the introduction of the “One funds” in particular – which were 
in addition to agency resources (instead of pooling their funds, as was the 
original intent) – constituted a financial incentive that encouraged the par-
ticipation of non-resident agencies, thus enlarging the size of the UNCTs 
(Todd et al. 2012, 10). This is at odds with the original concept of the model, 
which was intended to reduce complexity and fragmentation of activities at 
the country level (UN 2006, para. 16).
5.2.3 Humanitarian Coordinator
The double-hatting of the RC and the HC functions is a common practice 
that aims at forging coherence and coordination of two principally sepa-
rate fields,113 each with its own structures, processes and procedures. Since 
the humanitarian field underwent a drastic transformation in 2005, there 
are now many similarities to the development mechanisms. Humanitarian 
Country Teams (HCTs) are equivalent to the UNCT, but also include non-
UN actors; and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is equivalent 
to UNDG (which also includes non-UN actors). The HC has a direct report-
ing responsibility to the head of the IASC, who is called the Emergency 
Relief Coordinator (ERC). However, one major difference is that not all the 
members of the HCTs are equivalent, as there are cluster leads responsible 
for coordination in different humanitarian sectors. Finally, there are specific 
policies and guidelines that apply to the HC and the HCTs, which are dis-
tinct from the RC system guidelines. Since the focus of this paper is on the 
RC system, these are not discussed and analysed here in greater detail.
Principally, even when a double-hatting between the RC and the HC has 
been established, this does not mean that the humanitarian coordination ma-
chinery is replaced with that of the RC system, the UNCT, etc. Instead, the 
two mechanisms continue to coexist and function in parallel, but are linked 
at the top level through the single UN official. Current practice has it that 
113 But note that WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF and OCHA, as the largest agencies active in hu-
manitarian assistance, are already all represented in UNDG. The only other major human-
itarian actor within the UN development system that is not represented is UNRWA. 
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most HCs are also RCs to the extent that being an RC has become a de facto 
prerequisite for the HC post (Messina 2007).
Implications for the RC of being the appointed HC are not always straight-
forward – declaring a state of emergency in countries in the midst of a hu-
manitarian crisis brings with it management and decision-making authori-
ty, which transcends what is commonly practiced or allowed in a standard 
development setting. Accordingly, it has been suggested that the leadership 
roles of Resident Coordinators and the teamwork within the United Nations 
Country Team are stronger in situations of transition from relief to devel-
opment. As stated in the synthesis of the RC annual reports for 1999, there 
exists: “a clear advantage to Resident Coordinators holding three positions 
– RC, RR and HC – as the added authority is needed to carryout activities in 
difficult situations” (UNDG 1999, 3). A factor may be that more resources 
are available in such situations, including for coordination (UNSG 2011). On 
the other hand, the HC function entails a significant workload that can lead to 
prioritisation of the humanitarian tasks at the expense of the RC function, but 
in principle this could also go the other way around, in particular when the 
candidate has a stronger background with development, as is frequently the 
case. While this does not have a formal basis, there are also indications that 
the RC stands to gain in authority and peer recognition as a sort of side-effect 
resulting from his formal HC mandate and responsibilities, which include:
 • Accountability: the HC has a direct reporting line to the Emergency Re-
lief Coordinator within the UN Secretariat;
 • Broader mandate: the HC coordinates all humanitarian actors which in-
cludes non-UN entities;
 • Funding: HCs have additional authority in many countries as they man-
age the allocation of funds from substantial pooled funding mechanisms;
 • Capacity: HCs have access to support capacities from OCHA field of-
fices and there is some evidence that RCs also benefit from coordination 
support through the humanitarian window (Lindores 2012, 53).
The benefits and risks of double-hatting have been the subject of much de-
bate, in particular within humanitarian circles. It is often opposed by NGOs, 
which see it as damaging to the humanitarian principles, in particular neu-
trality. Given that an HC is only appointed in a country where a state of 
humanitarian emergency has been declared, it follows that this model has 
only limited applicability.
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5.2.4 Integrated mission
Integrated missions are established in all conflict and post-conflict situations 
where there is either a multidimensional peacekeeping or political mission 
in place. The main purpose of integration is to maximise the individual and 
collective impact of the UN’s response by concentrating on those activities 
that are required to consolidate peace.114 Within the context of an integrated 
mission, multi-hatting, that is, the combining of the DSRSG with the HC 
and RC functions, is the norm. From a practical perspective, this means that 
the RC has a “principal reporting line” to the SRSG, and two “secondary 
reporting lines” to the ERC as HC and to the chair of UNDG as RC. Accord-
ingly, coordination in these contexts is multidimensional, it is much closer 
than in other contexts and it concerns development not as the only objec-
tive. These are the fundamental parameters for the RC system within the 
context of an integrated mission. The complex setup can invariably result 
in multiple conflicts of interest. Specific guidelines and policies have been 
developed to deal with any such potential challenges.115
Among integrated missions, the appointment of an Executive Representa-
tive of the Secretary-General (ERSG) constitutes a special case that signals 
an even higher level of integration among the different UN agenda in the 
development, peacebuilding and humanitarian fields based on a very com-
prehensive mandate and streamlined operational documents.116
As in the context of humanitarian missions, political and peacekeeping 
missions are certainly taking place in a context of weak state capacity, and 
sometimes also weak legitimacy, which results in a much more forceful 
and instrumental role of external actors such as the UN. As the Deputy of 
the SRSG, the RC or HC stands to benefit from the additional clout. The 
DSRSG position is normally also graded at the rank of Assistant Secre-
tary-General, which is generally higher than the common grading for a 
standard RC position, thus adding weight to the position. In particular, in 
the contexts of integrated missions, the RC in the past has taken the lead in 
114 UNSG (2008a); Decision 2008/24.
115 Note of Guidance on Relations between Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resi-
dent Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators of 17 January 2006. 
116 Historically, there are only two examples of this case, which are the integrated peace-
building missions in Burundi (BINUB, 2007–2011) and Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL, 2008–
2010). 
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developing a development assistance framework that covers not just the UN 
but also includes the broader donor community, including the World Bank – 
this does not happen in the standard case. Integrated mission countries also 
take a higher share of overall UN development system funding, which adds 
to the additional authority of the RC. In a more formal sense, the RC system 
functioning differs from other contexts with regard to the following aspects:
 • Inferiority: the RC is not the highest-ranking UN official at the country 
level and has to act under the overall authority of the SRSG, who heads 
the peacekeeping or political mission;
 • Integration: all operational activities need to be reflected in an “inte-
grated strategic framework” that relies on shared analysis as well as pro-
gramming and planning. As a result, autonomous decision-making on 
programming is much constrained.
Applicability of this RC system model is limited to fragile countries with an 
integrated mission concept.
5.2.5 Joint office
The Joint Office model originates in the TCPR 2004 resolution and, as such, 
was established at the request of UN member states.117 Its main objective is 
the rationalisation of country presence (i.e. agency field offices), which it 
aims to achieve on the basis of a single representation mechanism for sever-
al UN entities. In that sense, the Joint Office model is distinct from the “one 
office” under the DaO initiative (but it has probably been an inspiration for 
it), as the latter only aims to realise cost-savings through common services 
and premises of those agencies that are active in the DaO pilot countries, 
but keeps the representation structures intact. The original aim to move to-
wards a fully integrated UN office proved difficult to achieve, as it was not 
possible to broaden the application beyond the four participating agencies, 
nor to overcome the vertical orientation of those agencies – in particular, the 
lacking interoperability of the management system. There are three basic 
principles for the model:118
117 General Assembly resolution A/RES/59/250 of 17 December 2004. 
118 UNDG webpage; online: http://www.undg.org/index.cfm?P=1132 (accessed 15 June 
2012).
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 • one common programme
 • one leader who is empowered and accountable
 • one team working towards greater efficiency and effectiveness of pro-
gramme and operations with shared support services to the extent pos-
sible
Within these boundaries, different approaches towards the Joint Office mod-
el are possible and encouraged. While it was envisioned to be initially pilot-
ed in two countries (Cape Verde and Guyana) and eventually rolled out to at 
least 10, there currently exists just one Joint Office worldwide, which is in 
Cape Verde. It is led by one representative who is working on behalf of – and 
representing – the three participating agencies, which are UNDP, UNFPA 
and UNICEF (WFP used to be part of the group as well, but it withdrew 
later on for unknown reasons). The representative is also functioning as the 
RC in Cape Verde. In UNCT meetings with the other UN agencies present 
in Cape Verde, he / she is representing the three participating agencies.
The Joint Office model has encountered a number of challenges: first, it 
proved too difficult to develop a single and commonly owned system for 
business operations and processes to link to the agency systems. Eventually, 
the UNDP system was adopted for the Joint Office, which led, however, to 
continuous challenges and frustrations in the other agencies. This may also 
have been the reason why the plan to issue operational guidelines for the 
model was never realised.
A variation of the Joint Model, called the “Joint Presence”, has been applied 
in the Pacific Islands region, where the same three agencies are current-
ly collaborating on the basis of joint representation offices in some of the 
smaller island states.119 As the goal is the decentralisation of operations and 
the eventual opening of full offices (upon which the representation offices 
would assumingly be abandoned), the Joint Presence constitutes a special 
case.
In general terms, the Joint Office model has the following features that dis-
tinguish it from the standard RC system model:
119 More information can be found on the UN Pacific webpage; online: http://www.pacific.
one.un.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=104&Itemid=155 (accessed 
15 June 2012).
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 • Representation: through the personal union of the director of the Joint 
Office with the RC function, the RC has added weight in UNCT discus-
sions. In a way, the model resembles a “stronger” form of structuring the 
relationship among the UNCTs, much as the director of the Joint Office 
represents the other agencies.
 • Common programming: the agencies participating in the Joint Office 
prepare a common programme that is then integrated into the one pro-
gramme or UNDAF that is prepared within the UNCT.
The goal of the Joint Office model is to balance the costs of field offic-
es with those of programme budgets, for example by improving the ratio 
of programme to support costs. Given this focus on rationalising the UN 
development system country presence, the Joint Office model offers itself 
to application in particular in countries with a small UN development sys-
tem presence, countries which tend to be either small countries or small is-
land states.120 Since neither operational guidelines nor common operational 
procedures or systems were developed, there are significant intra-agency 
challenges with this model. If these could be overcome, however, the Joint 
Office approach seems to be a beneficial and worthwhile adaptation pattern 
of the standard RC system that could be applied in other countries with a 
small UN development system presence.
5.3 Evolving patterns of UN aid coordination
The RC system is a very complex, multidimensional and multilayered sys-
tem that sets high hurdles for a strategic approach towards adaptation. The 
analysis above suggests that there are numerous factors that differentiate 
existing adaptation patterns of the RC system, which can be summarised 
as follows:
a) degree of authority of RC system internally as well as externally;
b)  country circumstances such as the size of the group of stakeholders, the 
country context and country income groups; and
c)  the programme country government’s approach towards UN internal aid 
coordination.
120 UNDP (2005), Executive Committee report to ECOSOC, E/2005/CRP.1, p. 3. 
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Table 8 provides an overview of the six models along these lines. There are 
a few conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis.
First, the size and composition of the UN presence on the ground (i.e. the 
UNCT) is a key determinant for adapting the RC system. Aid-coordina-
tion processes necessarily become more complex and transaction costs 
grow with increased participation. The analysis confirmed the existence of a 
trade-off between group size and effective aid coordination. To some extent, 
this can be counterbalanced by more authority (rank) and resources (staff, 
funding). The integrated mission as well as Humanitarian Coordinator mod-
els show that aid coordination can still function reasonably well in more 
complex compositions and with larger groups; however, this also requires 
a significantly strengthened authority of the RC, as well as strengthened 
capacities in the form of staff and funding.
Secondly, the evidence suggests that adaptation of the RC system to date 
has not taken place following the one predominant criterion in discussions 
about adaptation within, for example, the EU and the World Bank, namely 
country income group. Instead, the evolving pattern of adaptation within the 
RC system seems to follow a logic that is much closer to the profile of the 
UN development system more generally, which stands for a comprehensive 
and broad definition of development that goes beyond simpler measures of 
growth and per capita income. Such a pattern seems to be consistent with 
how development cooperation is being perceived within the UN develop-
ment system. The MDGs, the concept of human development or more re-
cent attempts to promote the concept of multidimensional poverty constitute 
a counterpoint to the more traditional criteria of income and growth that are 
advocated by the World Bank.
Thirdly, the analysis found that there is significant variation among the dif-
ferent models as to whether they are based on specific operational guidance 
or not. The enhanced RC (DaO) model seems to be a case in point. For other 
models, such as the HC and the DSRSG hats, distinct operational guidelines 
have been adopted that have resulted in significant institutional strength-
ening of the RC. The guidelines and policies for the standard RC system 
model thus seem to be sufficiently flexible to allow substantial variation of 
their application. The coordination needs of different countries vary greatly, 
which requires a certain flexibility of the RC system.
Finally, the analysis also brings out a more fundamental question, namely 
that of the boundaries of aid coordination. The UN development system as 
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a whole has a very broad mandate that, in addition to development-related 
operations, includes political missions, humanitarian assistance, peacekeep-
ing, the advance of human rights among other activities. This broadness 
presents various opportunities for synergies and integrated action, but also 
challenges. The DSRSG and HC models to an extent are already crossing 
the boundaries of the UN development system. Against this background, 
there have been repeated discussions that the RC system – as the one ele-
ment that is common in the majority of fields – should eventually be trans-
formed into a “UN Ambassador” or “UN System Representative” position 
or given a similar label along those lines.
5.4 Future differentiation of UN aid coordination
In the longer term, I believe the United Nations should look at alternative 
models for its country-level activities. While we need to preserve the dis-
tinctive contribution of each United Nations agency, we should nonetheless 
explore different forms of United Nations presence at the national level. 
Secretary-General in an Agenda for Further Change (UNGA 2002, 21)
The institutional setup of the RC system in different countries is a direct 
function of the broader question of where the UN development system 
should – or would want to – focus its engagements more generally. It has 
been established that the standard RC system model offers extensive flex-
ibility for customisation and adaptation, and there is no reason why this 
should not continue to be the case in the future. The analysis also showed 
that the different RC system models are being applied in a broad variety of 
country contexts. Against this background, there are grounds for a defensive 
argument that further adaptation of the RC system might not be required. 
At the same time, the argument holds that when the context for develop-
ment cooperation is undergoing fundamental change, the UN development 
system should adapt – or else will eventually be forced to adapt – its coun-
try-level business model; therefore, a more positive approach would be to 
engage in the process in a more strategic and proactive way. The author 
subscribes to the latter view.
According to Jenks (2012, 21), the UN development system is currently 
engaged in four types of countries:
d) fragile states
e) low-income countries still heavily dependent on external support
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f) middle-income countries with transition challenges
g) middle-income countries engaging with the challenges of globalisation
Based on the existing RC system models, two more common types can be 
added, which are:
h) small countries and small island states
i) countries facing humanitarian crises
Comparing the existing RC system models with this – admittedly simplify-
ing – list, the following arguments can be made:
 • First, in the context of fragile states where a political or peacekeeping 
mission is established, or for countries facing humanitarian crises, the 
integrated mission and Humanitarian Coordinator models would auto-
matically apply.
 • Second, given its primary objectives which are the reduction of frag-
mentation, the enhanced RC (DaO) model seems to be an appropriate 
fit, particularly for low-income countries that are still heavily dependent 
on external support.
 • Third, for the majority of middle-income countries, the standard RC sys-
tem model applies. The UN development system experience with mid-
dle-income countries is broad; of the 132 countries where UNCTs are 
present, two-thirds fall into that category (UNDG 2010, 3).
 • Fourth, there could be grounds for the argument that the UN develop-
ment system is currently lacking an RC system model to deal with the 
particular situations of middle-income countries facing the challenges 
of globalisation.
 • Fifth, in the case of small countries and small island states or middle-in-
come countries with a relatively limited UNCT presence, the Joint Of-
fice model could be applied. Given that the model is currently only be-
ing applied in a very limited number of countries, this would signify a 
substantial expansion of the model. For that, an agreement on specific 
operational guidelines would be required.
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6 Conclusions: Taking the Resident Coordinator  
system forward
Individual UN agencies, funds and programmes have countless achieve-
ments to show for their development impact and success. At the same time, 
it is equally true that the UN development system collectively “punches 
below its weight”. The fragmented nature of what sometimes has also been 
referred to as the UN development “non-system” – driven by strong centrif-
ugal forces and an impeding funding system that propels complexity and 
overlap among the UN entities – is seen to be at the roots of this status 
quo.121 In order to make headway towards a more coherent UN engagement 
at the country level, and against the background of the broader aid-effec-
tiveness debates, member states and UN agencies, funds and programmes 
have resolved to strengthen and improve aid-coordination mechanisms, in 
particular at the country level. This is the background for ongoing reforms 
of the RC system.
As the “lynchpin of field coordination”, the RC system has been of funda-
mental importance for the functioning of the UN development system at the 
country level since its inception in the late 1970s. This study concludes that 
under certain conditions, which are outlined below, it may as well play a 
critical role in the future positioning of the UN development system.
The study at hand aimed to provide a comprehensive analysis of the role 
and functioning of the RC system as the main mechanism for country-level 
aid coordination within the UN development system. Based on the analysis 
of the larger context, organisational setup, historical development, current 
practice and evolving adaptation patterns of the RC system, a number of 
broad conclusions and recommendations have been derived. They are pre-
sented in this chapter, which focusses on four crucial areas, the first three 
of which roughly correspond to the main chapters of this study, with the 
final section drawing some overarching conclusions: 1) role, mandate and 
functioning of the RC system; 2) the management of the RC system; 3) de-
centralisation of the UN development system; and 4) issues surrounding the 
question of its proper division of labour.
121 Compare outcomes of an international expert workshop on the UN development system 
organised by the Future of the UN Development System project in May 2012, summa-
rised in Mahn (2012b). 
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6.1 Role, mandate and functioning of the RC system
The role, mandate and functioning of the RC system have undergone signif-
icant changes and evolutions over time. A system whose essential elements 
are in flux is very much characteristic of the situation today. Stakeholder 
perceptions about the future form and design of the RC system are diverse 
– and to an extent conflicting – thereby reflecting competing national and 
organisational interests. To an extent, coordination is only partly a technical 
question. In fact, many debates only mask deep-running conflicts of com-
peting interests and disaccord among member states about the role, func-
tioning and future direction of the UN development system.
As the analysis has shown, this disaccord has affected operational and pol-
icy guidelines provided for the RC system, which, in aiming to square the 
circle, have evolved in an additive fashion and are today characterised by 
ambivalence and ambiguity. The study identified four areas of particular 
discord, which relate to the mandate, coverage, authority and orientation of 
the RC role.
Discord around the mandate of the RC boils down to the question of wheth-
er or not RCs should be furnished with an agenda for normative advocacy, 
including on human rights, combined with a discrete mandate to engage on 
political issues that transcend the immediate demands of the UNCT mem-
bers and partner governments. It is consensual that the UN development 
system and the RC do not need to pursue a follow-up to the norms and 
standards set by UN global conferences “on demand” only. The practice of 
double- or triple-hatting the RC function with leadership roles, in particular 
for political or peacekeeping missions, has already blurred the boundaries 
between the different silos of the UN’s engagement. UN internal intricacies 
of separate functions for the same person are lost on donor partners and 
governments. To an extent, these shifts have not yet been fully and formally 
acknowledgment by member states, which makes the RC system vulnerable 
to reproach and criticism. It is therefore recommended that member states 
forge a new consensus about the extent and magnitude of RCs engagement 
in political and normative concerns, including institutional implications 
regarding the appropriate mechanism(s) to reconcile competing demands 
placed upon the RC system.
As far as coverage is concerned, the RC system serves as a key instrument 
of integration within the UN development system, playing a crucial “bridg-
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ing” function between the multiple areas of work of the United Nations that 
extend beyond the traditional realms of “operational activities for develop-
ment”. On the basis of multiple hats, the RC system is already serving to 
integrate more closely two to three of the traditional “silos” within the UN, 
namely development, humanitarianism and, albeit to a lesser degree, peace-
keeping, with further collaboration on normative and political issues under 
discussion. In that sense, the RC system could be seen to move UN aid 
coordination “beyond development”. This evolution is generally perceived 
positively, as it allows for a much more comprehensive engagement of the 
UN at the country level that fully takes advantage of the UN system’s com-
parative strength, which is the unique linkage between operational and nor-
mative activities. It is recommended that member states should encourage 
further system-wide integration by focussing in particular on strengthening 
the functional aspects of the RC system – coordination and representation 
– which are independent of the particular sector of engagement. Depending 
on whatever mandate configuration will eventually be assigned to the RCs, 
a secondary implication of this is the urgent and crucial need for proper in-
terfacing with agencies responsible for, and interacting with, the RC system, 
with a view towards its transformation into a representative and adequate 
interface for all stakeholders beyond the immediate realms of “develop-
ment”. In the recent past, one of the consequences of the RC system moving 
“beyond development” has been a growing discrepancy between those that 
are affected by decisions, and those that are represented during the deci-
sion-making process, which urgently needs to be addressed.
In terms of authority, the vertical setup of the UN development system has 
been found to be responsible for the continuous mismatch between what 
the RC system is able to accomplish for system-wide coherence, and the 
expectations placed upon it. Addressing this mismatch would necessitate 
empowering the RC, both in terms of capacities as well as competencies. 
In addition to boosting funding and support, capacity would particularly 
benefit from the RC system becoming a magnet for the “best and brightest” 
candidates coming from both within as well as from outside the UN system. 
Based on a system-wide – instead of an agency – career path, the RC posi-
tion needs to be regarded as one of the top-notch opportunities within the 
UN system. Strengthening the competencies of the RC would form part of 
what is necessary to make the position more attractive. The introduction of 
a matrix reporting arrangement for UNCT members to report to both the 
RC as well as their individual agency heads would be another positive step 
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towards putting the relationship between the RC and the UNCT members 
on stronger footing.
Finally, concerning the appropriate balance between internal and external 
orientation, the analysis suggested that the inward focus on UN aid coor-
dination constitutes the clear priority of the RC function, with the coor-
dination of and with bi- and multilateral donor agencies taking place as a 
mere afterthought. This contrasts with the prominent role it is being granted 
by partner countries. As the external aid-coordination role has a strong po-
tential to leverage activities and debates in line with UNCT priorities – as 
well as to serve as a necessary interface for the UN development system to 
engage with broader debates – it is recommended that the RC capacity to 
administer and utilise leadership positions in external aid coordination is 
reinforced.
As a bottom line, the functioning of the RC system would be significantly 
advanced if member states were to forge a new consensus about the core and 
mandatory functions of the RC, while retaining a broad degree of flexibility 
for adapting its role to different country contexts.
6.2 Management of the RC system
One of the main findings coming out of the study is the pivotal role that 
UNDP plays for the proper functioning of the RC system, and UN coun-
try-level aid coordination more broadly. Unrivalled within the UN devel-
opment system, UNDP prides itself on its large country presence as well as 
its mandate for system-wide coordination and service provision functions, 
making it the “primus inter pares” among all the UN development enti-
ties. The management of the RC system has been an attribute of UNDP for 
such a long period that – to many within and outside the organisation – it 
has become an essential element of its identity. Indeed, having served as 
the de facto central funding authority within the UN development system, 
UNDP during its early years was well positioned and qualified to manage 
the aid-coordination function. However, as a result of the structural changes 
in the UN funding system that have donors focussing ever more narrow-
ly on the earmarking of contributions for specific purposes, the conditions 
and context of UNDP’s management role are remarkably different today. 
Exercising a dual function of being operationally active, while at the same 
time providing coordination and other system-wide services, has its inher-
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ent challenges for the UNDP management of the RC system. In particular, 
perceived or actual conflicts of interest that arise from the current model 
have a persistently detrimental effect on the functioning of the RC system. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, there are four principal options conceivable to 
address this challenge, which are:
 • The “status-quo” option: this option favours the full implementation of 
established technical measures such as the functional firewall and the 
MAS to more clearly delineate UNDP and RC roles, while preserving 
the two-tiered mandate of UNDP.
 • The “system-wide coherence” option: in line with earlier reform propos-
als, this option favours a continued anchoring of the RC management 
within an operationally active UNDP, which, however, would have to 
reconfigure its areas of activity so as to avoid compromising its coordi-
nation role.
 • The Secretariat option: this option would see the management of the RC 
system being anchored within the UN Secretariat.
 • The independent institution option: a final option would call for the 
establishment of a new entity independent of the funds, programmes, 
agencies to manage the RC system.
Each of these options has its inherent challenges, opportunities and associ-
ated feasibility. As the historical analysis in Chapter 4 has shown, the RC 
system has seen several attempts at implementing elements of the latter two 
options on a number of occasions within the history of the UN development 
system, albeit with little success. Accordingly, after 40 years of evolution 
of the UN development system, the assessment by Joan Anstee and Robert 
Jackson in the famous Capacity Study of 1969, that “it should be accepted 
that UNDP provides the best foundation on which a coordinating organiza-
tion could be based” may well continue to hold. At the same time, if doubts 
about UNDP’s independence in the management of the RC system continue 
to be cast, member states may be forced to re-examine its future position-
ing at some point. In order to address persistent conflicts or perceptions of 
conflicts of interests in the RC management, the “system-wide coherence” 
option offers a clear, but also more politically challenging opportunity for 
grounding the RC system in UNDP as a strong organisation that has both 
operational and system-wide functions without being burdened by mandate 
overlap and conflicts with other entities within the UN development system. 
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As a second-best option that at the same time has a higher political feasibil-
ity, member states should push with renewed vigour for a full implementa-
tion of the MAS and the firewall in pursuit of a functional separation of the 
two mandates of UNDP.
6.3 Decentralisation of UN aid coordination
Differentiation of the UN development system engagement in partner coun-
tries generally does not follow a globally coordinated strategy. There is 
equally no consensus among UN member states and within the UN develop-
ment system about the future shape and composition of the UN country-lev-
el presence in its entirety. The presence of UN entities in individual partner 
countries, as well as the particular composition of the UNCT, continues to 
result from the joint decision-making processes of individual UN funds, 
agencies and programmes together with partner governments, on the basis 
of a variety of individually established criteria.
Adaptation of the RC system has to be seen in direct response to this pro-
cess, as the RC system has, in practice, been applied differently in different 
country and UNCT contexts. As suggested by the debates about the new 
geography of poverty, country situations are becoming ever more differ-
entiated, and it is reasonable to assume that the pressure on the RC system 
to adapt even further is bound to increase as well. In the past, adaptation 
processes of the RC system have evolved in a rather erratic fashion, which 
exposed opportunities that could potentially be exploited in the future. In 
order to do so, this study makes some broad recommendations for member 
states to review and develop further in the form of specific policy guidance 
to the UN development system.
First, it was found that in order to enhance UNCT alignment towards 
evolving partner-country needs and requirements, the agency-driven deci-
sion-making process needed to be counterbalanced to an extent by bringing 
a more strategic orientation to the UN development system. Accordingly, it 
is suggested that RCs be given a role in the decision-making process regard-
ing the particular composition and size of the UNCT, taking into account 
and conveying the development needs of the partner country, and advis-
ing the partner government accordingly. Decentralising the ruling over the 
UNCT country presence would run counter to supply-driven tendencies of 
the UN’s engagement.
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Second, the particular shape of the RC model to be applied in a given coun-
try context should be decided upon with due regard to cost-benefit consid-
erations and the benefits of flexibility, following the logic of an aid-coor-
dination model that is “as light as possible, and as heavy as necessary”. 
The Joint Office model has shown particular potential for more widespread 
application, in particular in small countries and small island states, but also 
middle-income countries with a relatively small-scale UN presence and en-
gagement. Based on a thorough assessment of its benefits and also remain-
ing challenges, member states should give the model some serious consid-
eration.
Third, such an approach would necessitate a reconsideration of conflicting 
guidelines for the RC system, which relates in particular to the inclusiveness 
principle by which member states established that the functioning of the RC 
system be fully participatory. Notwithstanding the valuable contribution of 
all UN entities, including those with non-resident status, marginal benefits 
of widespread participation requirements have to be balanced with added 
coordination costs and capacity strains being put on the RC system. There 
exists a practical trade-off between advances in coordination, and enhanced 
participation beyond a certain UNCT size. Against this background, there 
seems to be a need for more flexible approaches that neither describe uni-
versal inclusiveness requirements nor focus only on a pre-determined set of 
agencies. Whereas a coordination-intensive model might continue to be jus-
tified in a country context where the volume of UN engagement is substan-
tial in overall comparison – these tend to be low-income and fragile states 
– a country with a relatively smaller presence would require lighter struc-
tures only, and there may be instances where it makes sense that assistance 
is delivered outside of the common programming frameworks. In particular, 
the “inclusiveness” principle that is underlying the RC system should be 
reviewed with the purpose of replacing it with a new “subsidiarity” norm of 
determining coverage for the purpose of aid-coordination processes – such 
as, for example, the joint programming through the UNDAF – in a flexible 
and country-level-based manner implemented through RC leadership.
Finally, the decentralisation of decision-making power to the RC should 
be accompanied by a parallel drive towards the harmonisation of business 
practices at the global level. In particular, common systems for the manage-
ment of human and financial resources are seen as an indispensable foun-
dation for the outlined decentralisation of UN aid-coordination processes.
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6.4 UN aid coordination and the division of labour
The primary objective of UN country-level aid coordination and the RC 
system is to bring coherency and consistency to the UN development sys-
tem. In recent years, there has been a strong focus on this approach as be-
ing a pragmatic and politically feasible way of maximising overall effec-
tiveness and efficiency. As postulated, coordination gains have to outweigh 
their costs. Although it has been suggested elsewhere that the returns on UN 
aid-coordination investments are still positive, member states are increas-
ingly realising that the current approach is reaching its limits. This is in 
line with opinions of interviewees from within the UN development system 
who stressed that “aid coordination is all we [meaning the UN agencies, 
funds and programmes] have”, but that member states should not “overdo 
coordination”.122
First, it is one of the conclusions of this study that it is a very challenging 
task to attempt to bring together – by means of country-level aid coordina-
tion through the RCs – the UN development system, which the UN mem-
ber states over the course of nearly 70 years have designed in a complex 
and fragmented manner. From a theoretical perspective, a course of action 
that aims to tackle the incoherency challenge by predominantly relying on 
aid-coordination mechanisms may therefore only represent a “second-best” 
option. As it stands, the nature of the UN development system, which mem-
ber states have created and which RCs are tasked to coordinate at the coun-
try level, is characterised by such complexity and diverse circumstances that 
the marginal benefit of increases in coordination comes at the cost of in-
creases in transaction costs at the agency, inter-agency and system-wide lev-
els. It thus follows that structural reforms at the global level of UN agencies, 
funds and programmes aimed at establishing a clearer division of labour and 
less mandate overlap could effectively pre-empt country-level coordination 
challenges, and would therefore have to be given priority. In fact, a number 
of the challenges that the RC system is supposed to mitigate within the UN 
development system would be much less pronounced if some of its attrib-
utes were directly addressed by member states. The consolidation of four 
entities working on gender- and women’s advancement to form UN Women 
in 2010 set a commendable precedent, which could be pursued further in 
other sectors as well. Previous studies at DIE have discussed and analysed 
122 Personal interviews by the author, October–December 2012.
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the main reform options that have been developed in the past (Weinlich 
2011b).
Given the incentives for a steady expansion of entity mandates resulting 
from prevailing funding mechanisms, it is further concluded that implemen-
tation of any such reforms would necessitate member states to establish new 
and innovative mechanisms for funding the UN development system that 
would potentially go “beyond aid” by tapping into other sources of fund-
ing available. To be sure, such fundamental reforms do not seem likely, as 
there has not been much political interest among member states in recent 
years. A more realistic perspective is that there will be a continuous process 
of “muddling through”. At the same time, a suitable opportunity for UN 
member states to address some of the more delicate intricacies of the UN 
development system and to establish a global division of labour might arise 
in the aftermath of the two reform processes aimed at establishing future 
development targets, that is, the Sustainable Development Goals and the 
post-2015 framework, which – it has been agreed – are supposed to replace 
the Millennium Development Goals. Both processes, if agreed by member 
states, will likely establish new objectives and a sense of purpose for the UN 
development system from which impulses to align its form and function – 
including the RC system and UN country-level aid-coordination setup – are 
expected as well.
6.5 Outlook
The future of the RC system is closely intertwined with that of the UN (de-
velopment) system more broadly. The fundamental question that member 
states have been struggling to come to terms with since the UN’s establish-
ment is the question of commonality and distinction of the individual UN 
entities, which, together, form the UN development system. According to 
the Secretary-General:
The question that requires thorough examination is when is leverage max-
imized by the system working as a system, when by individual agencies 
acting individually and when do specific configurations need to be tailored 
to the specific issue at hand. It is improbable that there is a one-size-fits-all 
prescription for maximizing leverage. (UNSG 2012b, 15)
Given the political impasse for more comprehensive reforms, reform efforts 
in recent years have been particularly focussed on operational matters at the 
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country level. The existing “expectations-capabilities gap” of the RC system 
can to a large degree be attributed to the fact that the RC system has become 
a shadow battlefield of sorts where different stakeholder conceptions about 
the future of the UN development system – in response to the fundamental 
question posed above – are played out. It is only slowly that member states 
are coming to terms with the fact that an approach predominantly focussed 
on the country level is incomplete. Whereas a functioning RC system at the 
country level has been deemed key for a functioning UN system, taking the 
RC system forward will require member states to take bold and all-encom-
passing steps towards stronger coherence among UN funds, programmes 
and agencies at the global level as well. It is only through concerted actions 
encompassing both the country-level operations and structural deficiencies 
existent at the global level that a true development “system” that unites the 
individual funds, programmes and agencies of the United Nations will be 
forged.
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Annex 1: The composition of the UN development system
Specialised agencies (14) 
Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO)
International Civil 
Aviation Organization 
(ICAO)
International Fund 
for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD)
International Labour 
Organization (ILO)
International Maritime 
Organization (IMO)
International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA)
International 
Telecommunications 
Union (ITU)
United Nations 
Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO)
United Nations 
Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO)
Universal Postal Union 
(UPU)
World Health 
Organization (WHO)
World Intellectual 
Property Organization 
(WIPO)
World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO)
World Tourism 
Organization (UNWTO)
Funds and programmes (14) 
UN Development 
Programme (UNDP)
UNDP – UN Capital 
Development Fund 
 (UNCDF)
UNDP – UN Volunteers 
programme (UNV)
UN Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF)
UN Population Fund 
(UNFPA)
World Food Programme 
(WFP)
Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR)
UN Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC)
UN Conference on 
Trade and Development 
 (UNCTAD)
UNCTAD – International 
Trade Centre (ITC)
UN Entity for Gender 
Equality and the 
Empowerment of Women 
(UN WOMEN)
UN Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near 
East (UNRWA)
UN Environment 
 Programme (UNEP)
UN Human
Settlements Programme 
(UN-HABITAT)
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Research and training institutions (6) 
UN Interregional Crime 
and Justice Research 
Institute (UNICRI)
UN Institute for 
Disarmament Research 
(UNIDIR) 
UN Institute for Training 
and Research (UNITAR)
UN Research Institute 
for Social Development 
(UNRISD)
UN System Staff College 
(UNSSC)
UN University (UNU)
Others (3)
Joint United Nations 
Programme on HIV/
AIDS (UNAIDS)
UN International 
Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction (UNISDR)
UN Office for Project 
Services (UNOPS)
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Annex 2: List of people interviewed 123
1 Douglas Allen Management Specialist UN Volunteers, formerly 
with DOCO
2 Marco Baumann Special Assistant to the Director, DOCO
3 Petra Lantz de 
Bernardis
Resident Coordinator and Head of Joint Office, 
Cape Verde
4 Ysabel Blanco Strategic Policy Adviser to the Executive Director, 
UNFPA
5 Stephen Browne Future of the UN development system (FUNDS) 
project, former RC in Ukraine and Rwanda
6 John Burley Formerly with UNCTAD, UNPD and the Office of 
the Director-General for Development / Office of 
the Director for Int. Economic Co-operation
7 Leelananda De Silva Independent Consultant, Sri Lanka
8 Christopher Davids Senior Advisor on UN Coherence, UNICEF
9 Richard Dictus Resident Coordinator, Malawi 
10 Beate Elsässer First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Switzerland
11 Sally Fegan-Wyles Acting Head of UNITAR, former Director of 
DOCO, former RC in Tanzania
12 Francesco Galtieri Portfolio Manager UN Volunteers, formerly with 
DOCO
13 Karina Gerlach Former Chief, USG Office, Department for 
Political Affairs, UN Secretariat
14 Kristinn Helgason Chief (a.i.) Development Cooperation Policy 
Branch, DESA
15 Valentine Hoschet Policy Specialist, DOCO
16 Jonna Jeurlink External Relations Specialist, UNFPA
17 Marie-Therese Karlen First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Switzerland
18 Henriette Koetter Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development of Germany (BMZ)
123 The author is grateful to all people interviewed for their valuable contributions and time. 
The usual caveat applies: all mistakes and opinions remain the authors’ and none of the 
people or institutions listed here are responsible in any way for the content of this study.
Timo Mahn
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)146
19 Dr. Simon Koppers Head of division for United Nations affairs, 
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development of Germany (BMZ)
20 Marta Lanzoni Policy Specialist, DOCO
21 Douglas Lindores Independent consultant, Ontario, Canada
22 Andrew MacPherson Development Cooperation Policy Branch, DESA
23 Claire Messina Senior Coordinator, Humanitarian Coordination 
System Strengthening Unit, OCHA
24 Cécile Molinier Former Head of UNDP Geneva Office and 
former RC of Sao Tome and Principe, Togo, and 
Mauritania
25 Flavia Pansieri Executive Director, UN Volunteers and former RC 
in Yemen
26 Julian Pfaefflin Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development of Germany (BMZ)
27 Erik Ringborg Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of Sweden to 
the United Nations
28 Juergen Schmid Deputy head of division for United Nations affairs, 
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development of Germany (BMZ)
29 Peter Silberberg Minister Counsellor, Head of Economic 
Department, Permanent Mission of Germany
30 Hendrik Schmitz-
Guinote
Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of Germany
31 Michael von der 
Schulenburg
Former Executive Representative of the Secretary-
General (ERSG) / HC / RC / RR in Sierra Leone
32 Dr. Silke Weinlich Researcher and project leader, Käte Hamburger 
Kolleg (Center for Global Cooperation Research)
33 Pio Wennubst Head of Development section, Permanent Mission 
of Switzerland 
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